The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants by Humbach, John A.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1983
The Common-Law Conception of Leasing:
Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of
Covenants
John A. Humbach
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, jhumbach@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
John A. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 Wash. U. L.
Q. 1213 (1983), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/98/.
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
LAW QUARTERLY 
THE COMMON-LAW CONCEPTION OF 
LEASING: MITIGATION, HABITABILITY, 
AND DEPENDENCE OF 
COVENANTS 
JOHN A. HUMBACH* 
Property law may be the most eternal of secular law. Its basic 
precepts and conceptions are largely stable and long settled.' An aspect 
of property law undergoing notable change, however, is the law of 
landlord and tenant.2 
The most important recent change in landlord-tenant law involves 
Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., 1963, Miami University 
(Ohio); J.D., 1966, Ohio State University. 
1. In part, this stability results from a deliberate policy choice to preserve the character of 
titles and long-term expectations. 
Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public 
that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such deci- 
sions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their 
change. . . . Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should 
be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change. 
Minnesota Mining Co. v. National Mining Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 332, 334 (1865). "Uniformity 
and certainty in rules of property are often more important and desirable than technical correct- 
ness!' Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312,320 (1918) (quoting Layton Pure 
Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 39 (1910)). See Heyert v. Orange & Rockland 
Utils., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 359-63 (1966). For an application of these ideas in the leasehold 
context, see Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 509-10,78 N.W.2d 377, 
381-82 (1956). 
2. No doubt this activity partly accounts for the considerable, perhaps even disproportion- 
ate emphasis which is given tblandlord-tenant law in first-year property courses. A survey of 
first-year property teachers revealed that 80% of those responding spend eight or more hours, and 
30% spend 15 or more hours, on the law of the relation between landlord and tenant, making it, 
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the reversal of responsibility for the quality of leased premises. In 
place of the tenant's traditional burden of caveat empto? and duty of 
r e p a s  many courts now recognize an implied warranty of habitabil- 
ity: at least for residential tenan~ies.~ These same courts typically re- 
ject the traditional doctrine that mutual obligations in leases are 
"independent," that is, that the tenant's obligations are enforceable by 
a landlord even when the landlord is in breach. Rather, the landlord's 
right to rent is made to depend on the landlord's meeting the newly 
recognized obligations to supply habitable premises.' 
Even the tenant who wrongfully repudiates a lease is receiving new 
protections. Increasingly, courts are requiring landlords to mitigate 
their damages after a tenant abandons, rather than allowing them to do 
nothing and collect the full rent8 
The traditional rules governing the landlord-tenant relation gener- 
ally have been thought to rest on the idea that leases are essentially 
conveyance transactions: that is, when a lease is made, an "estate" in 
land is conveyed by the landlord to the tenant.I0 Changes in the land- 
lord and tenant obligations such as those described above seem to go to 
the root of this conveyance conception of leases. The question there- 
fore arises whether the whole conception of the landlord-tenant rela- 
tion, at least for residential tenancies, is in need of wholesale revision. 
It is indeed the new vogue to call the conveyance idea "antiquated" 
after the estate system, the second most heavily covered area in first-year property courses. See 
Humbach, m a t  b Tmght in the Firirsr Year Proper9 Coursel, 29 J .  L E ~ A L  EDUC. 459,466 (1978). 
3. Eg., Civale v. Meriden Hous. Auth., 150 COM. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963); Smithfield 
Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardii, 156 N.C. 255,72 S.E. 312 (191 1); Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 
84, 152 Eng. Rep. 14 (1843); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, LEASES 392-93 (1974); 2 R POWELL, REAL PROP- 
E R ~  S 233 (1977). See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. 
4.  See i@a note 266. 
5. Seegenerally h o t . ,  40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971); infra text accompanying notes 238-61. 
6. Even the innovative Second Restatement of Property did not enlarge the landlord's du- 
ties to maintain the condition of the premises for commercial tenancies to include those duties that 
it had prescribed for iesidential tenancies. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Zj 5.1 cam- 
ment b, reporter's note 2. The present state of judicial and statutory development does not wnr- 
rant such extension. Id 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. See genera@ h o t .  21 A.L.R3d 534 (1968); infra text accompanying notes 1 10-218. 
9. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,517 P.2d 1168, 11 1 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); 
infra note 270. Seealso Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255,72 S.E. 312 
(191 1); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-17 (5th ed. 1942); 2 R. POWELL, 
REAL PROPERTY 11 221[1] (1980); infra notes 15 & 115-18 and text accompanying notes 47-56. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56, 115, 131-61,226-27 & 270-77. 
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Number 41 CONCEPTION O F  LEASING 
and to pretend to treat leases like other contracts," substituting an es- 
sentially contract conception of leasing for the traditional conveyance 
conception. In fact, however, courts do not treat leases like ordinary 
contracts, even in those ground-breaking cases in which they purport to 
do so.12 Moreover, on careful analysis, ordinary contract law appears 
even less conducive to the reformists' desired substantive changes than 
the traditional conceptions.13 To be sure, contract principles such as 
the rule of mitigation of damages, and the usual dependency of mutual 
promises, have been plucked out of context and set up as models for 
lease law to emulate.14 The recent importation of half-truth versions of 
contract principles into landlord-tenant law does not, however, treat 
leases as ordinary contracts, nor is it very good jurisprudence. 
It is thus a matter for debate whether the law of leases is due for a 
conceptual revolution, rejecting the old "conveyance" theory and ap- 
plying ordinary '%ontract" law to leasing transactions. Nevertheless, a 
11. Eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
925 (1970); Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445,528 P.2d 637 (1974); Lernle v. Breeden, 51 
Hawaii 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 77 N.J. 446,378 A.2d 767 (1977); Park West 
Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316,418 N.Y.S.2d 310,391 N.E.2d 1288 (1979); Lefrak 
v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 W.Y. City Civ. 1976). See infra text accompany- 
ing notes 201-11 & 264. 
A number of commentators have likewise viewed the conveyance conception of leasing as an 
obstacle to reform, suggesting that a contractual treatment is a preferable modem substitute. Eg., 
McCormick, The Righ/s offhe Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant, 23 
MICH. L. REV. 21 1 (1925); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of 
the Part With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of 
the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. LJ. 519 (1966); Note, Contract Principes and 
Leases of Real& 50 B.U.L. Rev. 24 (1970); The Cal.$ornia Lease-Contract or Conveyance?, 4 
STAN. L. REV. 244 (1952). 
One commentator argued that leases have always been treated as contracts. Siegel, Irs the Mod- 
ern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance? A HisloricaZ Inquiry, 52 J. URB. L. 649 (1975). The fact 
that parallelisms are found in the treatment of the two types of exchange transactions does not, 
however, mean that the two are mutatir murandis the same. Leases have received distinctive treat- 
ment, and the distinctions are intimately bound to the conception of leases as conveyances, in 
contrast to purely contractual arrangements for occupancy. Professor Siegel implicitly recognizes 
that leases are conveyances by analogizing leases to contracts for the sale of goods. Siege& supra, 
at 657-59, 670-72, 673-74. Such analogies, however, miss the point of the argument that leases 
should be treated as contracts: the point is that leases should be treated as contracts instead of as 
conveyances, not as contracts of conveyance. There are, however, some often overlooked parallels 
between lease law and ordinary contract law. See infra notes 269-95 and accompanying text. 
Nevertheless, these parallels are not quite as Professor Siegel imagines them. See infra notes 273 
& 287. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 204-1 1 & 269-95. 
13. Id 
14. See infra cases cited at notes 116 & 238. 
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suitable conceptual account for certain socially required changes in the 
law of leases clearly seems wanting. A primary objective of the discus- 
sion that follows is to attempt to provide such an account along tradi- 
tional lines. The approach will be to reexamine the core of landlord- 
tenant law-the basic framework-as it has come to us from the medi- 
eval mists of the common law." It is this framework, and its implica- 
tions-indeed, its mandate-for change that will be the focus at this 
Article. 
The common-law conception of the landlord-tenant relation will be 
portrayed as a natural resuit of an interplay between basic law of prop- 
erty and of contract. This conception will be described by the rules and 
results which it implies and by the theories that underlie these rules.16 
This will not be a historical account, though history must be men- 
tioned. Neither will it be a complete account.17 A flood of specific ap- 
plications would more likely obscure than elucidate the underlying 
conception which those applications imply and from which they can be 
seen to flow. Rather, the object here is to describe the basic conception 
itself. 
The hypothesis is that landlord-tenant law is in large part logically 
coherent18 and that most of the specific applications of landlord-tenant 
15. The extension by 1499 of the writ of ejctionefirmae (ejectment) to allow a leasehold 
tenant to recover actual possession may be seen as the point at which the modem concept of leases 
as property was crystallized. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 213-17; F. MAITLAND, 
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 46-47 (1971). For an early case expounding the common- 
law dual conception of leases, see Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587). 
16. The common-law conception of leasing, as portrayed in this Article, is by no menns the 
sole conception ever held or expounded by the common-law courts in deciding landlord-tenant 
controversies. One may easily lind cases which are irreconcilable with the conception or which, 
though compatible in outcome, depart from its details in their reasoning. Nevertheless, the con- 
ception portrayed has been the dominant common-law conception of leasing over the last 400 
years, and suitably explains the outcomes of most lease cases, even those which courts rationalized 
on somewhat different bases. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text. The fact that the 
conception can explain those cases which ostensibly proceed on different rationales only shows the 
validity and vitality of the conception as a fitting embodiment of the basic and intuitive policies 
and purposes underlying the law of landlord and tenant. Irreconcilable cases merely evidence 
further the resource and risk of the casuistic method of the common law. 
17. For excellent detailed discussions of landlord-tenant law, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP- 
ERTY (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; M. FRIEDMAN, w a  note 3; 2 R. POWELL, 
supra note 3; R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (1980); 3 & 3A G. 
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1980). 
18. In a frequently quoted phrase, Justice Holmes observed that: "the law as to leases is not a 
matter of logic in v m o ;  it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." Gnrdiner v. 
William S. Butler Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918). We are indeed indebted to Lord Coke, and 
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law follow from a basic conceptual framework. Thus, understanding 
the framework should allow lawyers to develop sound "instincts" about 
interstitial rules with which they may be unfamiliar. Furthermore, 
those aspects of landlord-tenant law most in need of reform can be seen 
as inconsistent with its fundamental conceptions. "Instincts" about 
these aspects may likewise develop; a visceral sense of injustice need 
not be the lone claim for reform. Change can be seen to promote, not 
derogate, the logical coherence of the law.19 
The fundamentally unique characteristic of the legal relation of 
landlord-tenant is that it consists of two intertwined legal relationships 
or "privities." The first of these legal relationships, based on contract, 
is called privity of contract; the other, called privity of estate, is based 
on ownership.20 
The relationship, or privity, of contract is perhaps better understood 
because of its analogies in other areas of law. Landlord and tenant are 
in privity of contract becausez1 they exchange promises between them- 
selves that create bundles of entitlements and detriments, or rights and 
certainly not for logic in vamo, but for an articulation of a coherent basic conception of landlord- 
tenant law. See Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22% 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587). 
19. Perhaps no apology is necessary for the implicit faith and homage which this Article as a 
whole accords to a "doctrinal" or "formalistic" approach to judicial decisionmaking. After all, it 
is the courts' appeals to conception, the making of conscious choices between conveyance or con- 
tract theories of leasing, which are the basis of the discussion. On this basis alone, doctrinal legal 
reasoning is inevitably germane to a discussion of what courts really do, irrespective of what ought 
to be the relevance of such reasoning. More importantly, doctrinal reasoning may contribute to 
consistency of results and, therefore, equality of treatment under the law, a point argued infra at 
text following note 325. 
20. See, e.8, Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209.21 1,146 P. 638,639 (1915); Arthur Treacher's 
Fish & Chips v. Chillurn Terrace, Ltd., 272 Md. 720,728-29,327 A.2d 282,287 (1974); Kanawha- 
Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427,80 S.E. 781 (1914); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 
22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587). 
21. Rather than "because," it would be more accurate to say "if," for it is not necessary to the 
existence of a landlord-tenant relation that any contract promises be made between the parties. 
National Bank of Commerce v. DUM, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938). See also Klinger v. 
Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1971); Consumer's Ice Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437,35 A. 1086 (1896). 
Seegenerally R. ME~ARRY & H. WADE, REAL PROPERTY 623 (3d ed. 1966); 1 A.L.P., supra note 
17, at 5 3.2. If no promises are either expressly or implicdly made, then there is no contractual 
relationship or privity of contract, and hence no dual relation as such. See Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 
Cal. 2d 673, 674-75, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940). There is only privity of estate. Because an ex- 
change of contractual promises is, at least by implication, almost invariably involved in the crea- 
tion of a landlord-tenant relationship, the parties arc in privity of contract with one another. 
Their relation, therefore, is necessarily a dual one. See Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 
Heinonline - -  60 Wash. U. L. Q. 1217 1982-1983 
which are enforceable on a theory of contract. If the landlord- 
tenant relationship involved only this, it could truly be said that a lease 
is merely a contract, enforceable purely as such. But landlord and ten- 
ant are not only seen by the law to be in privity of contract; they are 
also conceived to be in "privity of estate." 
Privity of estate, that is, the parties' legal relationship based on own- 
ership, exists between landlord and tenant because a lease is viewed as 
a  conveyance^'--the landlord conveys and the tenant receives an own- 
ership interest, albeit a temporary ownership interest, in the premisesF3 
The conveyance causes the landlord and tenant to become co-owners, 
and their legal relationship as co-owners provides a distinct and in- 
dependent basis, a "conveyance-theory" or property basis, for enforc- 
ing many of the performances required between them. Thus, privity of 
estate is the other part of the dual relationship between landlord and 
tenant. 
Unlike the rights and duties that make up the contractual relation- 
ship, arising out of the parties' privity of contract, the rights and duties 
arising out of privity of estate are more in the nature of tort. That is to 
say, they are law-imposed rights and duties, attaching to persons hav- 
ing the legal status of landlord and tenant. Unlike contractual rights 
and duties, which are essentially voluntarily or consensually created 
- - - -- - - - - - - -- 
638 (1915); Consumer's Ice Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437,35 A. 1086 (1896); National Bank of Com- 
merce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 47578 P.2d 535 (1938). 
The promise implied-in-fact referred to above means a genuinely "intended" promise. See in- 
fra note 230. It is thus distinguishable from the constructive "real covenant" to pay rqserved rent 
or covenant "in law" which is sometimes referred to in the older cases. Eg., Paradine v. Jane, 
Aleyn 26,82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587). See 
aho Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 437,80 S.E. 781 (1914). Seegener- 
af& 1 H.  TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 960-64,1030-34 (1912). In Arthur Treacher's Fish & 
Chips v. Chillum Terace Ltd., 272 Md. 720,327 A.2d 282 (1974), the court observed: 
Therefore, the obligations which the parties bear to each other may arise out of contract 
or from the real covenants of the leasehold estate, or sometimes from both. Generally, 
enforcement of the real covenants is independent of the contract obligations in the in- 
strument; the former obligations arise out of and inhere in the estate itself. 
Id at 727-28, 327 A.2d at 286. 
22. The entitlements and detriments comprising these bundles may consist of contractual 
"rights" and "duties" in the Hohfeldian sense as well as Hohfeldian privileges, powers, immuni- 
ties, and their respective opposites. See Hoh feld, Some Fundamentof Legal Conceptions a.r.4ppfiea' 
in JudiciaZReasoning 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), rwnfed in  W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEOAL 
CONCEITIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23 (Cook ed. 
1923). For the sake of simplicity and to avoid introducing unnecessary terminological distinc- 
tions, the entire packages of entitlements and detriments will be referred to as "rights and duties!' 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56. 
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and assumed, the specific rights and duties of privity of estate arise and 
are enforced whether or not they are voluntarily created or assumed.24 
Among the most important rights and duties arising out of privity of 
estate are (1) the landlord's obligation to allow peaceful possession to 
the tenant and the tenant's corresponding right to peaceful posses- 
sionF5 and (2) the landlord's right to receive the rent and the tenant's 
- 
corresponding duty to pay it.26 Although this possession-for-rent ex- 
change is basic to the usual landlord-tenant relation, there are also 
other aspects of privity of estate, including the duty of the tenant to 
refrain from wastez7 and the landlord's traditional immunity from re- 
sponsibility to the tenant for the acts of strangex2* The theoretical 
explanation for these privity of estate rights &d duties are discussed 
below, but for the present, it is enough to observe that they may exist 
and be enforced solely as a consequence of the supposed "conveyance" 
from landlord to tenant, and entirely apart from any contract-based 
rights and duties that the parties may or may not have.29 
24. Contractual rights and duties are not always the result of conscious volition, and are 
often law-imposed by the operation of such doctrines as objective mutual assent, the par01 evi- 
dence rule and the whole of interpretive presumptions. Clf Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 
F. 287,293 (D.C.N.Y. 191 1) ("A contract is an obligation attached by mere force of law to certain 
acts, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent"), af4 201 F. 664 
(2d Cir. 1912), af4 231 U.S. 50 (1913); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 8 95 (3d ed. 1957) ("It is 
even conceivable that a contract may be formed which is in accordance with the intention of 
neither party"). 
Likewise, the rights and duties incident to privity of estate are voluntarily created and assumed 
to the extent that the parties voluntarily assume the status of landlord and tenant. Furthermore, 
the specifics of the privity of estate relation can be altered by contract and thus exist only to the 
extent that the do not agree to the contrary, see infra note 222. Nonetheless, it appears 
both historically accurate and analytically useful to assign the privitysf-estate rights and duties to . 
the category of tort instead of contract. As a matter of history, the enforcement of such rights and 
duties was by means of actions which would now be thought of as tort actions: trespass and its 
offspring, ejectment, and the recuperatory action of debt. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 45, 
51; in& note 32 & text accompanying notes 54-71 & 86-89. 
In any event, a distinction generally is made between rights and duties created by manifested 
consent and, on the other hand, rights and duties imposed by law irrespective of consent. The 
package of rights and duties that accompany privity of estate seem to fall into the latter category. 
See Ames, The Hktory of as sum psi^, 2 ~ R V .  L. REV. 1, 5 (1888) (emphasizing this distinction in 
relation to the duties Mposed in the analogous relationship of bailment). 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56 & 86-89. 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 57-71. 
27. See infra notes 51 & 227. See a20 infra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 90-101. 
29. Eg., Winger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373,378 (Alaska 1971); Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 
673, 675-76, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940); Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd. 
272 Md. 720,727-29,327 A.2d 282,286 (1974); National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 
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Because landlords and tenants are almost always in both privity of 
contract and privity of estate, there is a dual relationship-a dual set of 
rights and duties-xisting between them. One might ask why all this 
is necessary. The rights and duties between landlord and tenant that 
arise out of privity of estate appear as though the? could easily be 
founded and enforced on a purely contractual basis.30 Indeed, they 
could be contractually founded and enforced, at least so long as third 
parties are not involved.31 One of the reasons for the duality of the 
landlord-tenant relationship is that third parties do get involved.32 As 
472,481,78 P.2d 535,539-40 (1938); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 23a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676,680 
(1587); 1 H. TIFF ANY,^^ note 21, at 5 171. The nature of the rent obligation is discussedinfra 
at text accompanying notes 57-71. 
30. "As &I original question, a lease might well have been regarded as a wholly bilateral 
agreement by which the lessor, instead of making a conveyance, promises a continuing permission 
to occupy the premises." 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 24, at 5 890. 
In fact, "the lease started as a matter of contract, and it grew into a counterfeit proprietary 
interest because the contractual protection was insufficient!' S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDA- 
TIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 101, 127-29 (1969). Origins are not, of course, an infallible key to 
modem classification: the antecedents of modem estate in fee simple were arrangements that 
likewise had an essentially contractual rather than proprietary nature. Id at 93. 
31. The contractual theory for protecting the tenant's right to possession is perhaps less obvi- 
ous than the contractual theory upon which the rent obligation may be enforced,   he common- 
law approach to protecting possession contractually has been to hold that a lease contains, absent 
provision to the contrary, an "implied covenant of quiet enjoyment." Historically, and still in 
most American jurisdictions, this implied covenant exists by virtue of the "mere relation" of land- 
lord and tenant. See, e.8, Fifth Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Kemochon, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 
(1917); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 251; 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.47; Annot., 62 
A.L.R. 1257, 1258-62 (1929), supplemenfedby 41 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420-22 (1955). The "relational" 
origins of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment suggest that this contractual contrivance was in 
fact rooted in privity of estate itself. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 251; 1 F. POLLACK 
& F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 301,306 (1968). Ultimately, however, via the route 
of analogue from the doctrine of "ancient warranty," the actual foundation for the protection, like 
the foundations for all fee and leasehold property, was the essentially contractual relationship 
existing shortly after the Norman Conquest between English lords and tenants. See S. MILSOM, 
supra note 30, at 90 ("The lord's obligation was, in our language, to guarantee the payment, to 
protect the holding of land"; namely, the land which was paid for the tenant's military services). 
See also supra note 30; infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment makes the landlord answerable only for the landlord's 
own acts, acts of persons in connivance with the landlord and acts of holders of paramount title, 
but not for acts committed by strangers to the title. Eg., Evans v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165 
S;W.2d 52 (1942); Smith v. Nortz Lumber Co., 72 N.D. 353,7 N.W.2d 435 (1943). But c/: Blackett 
v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817 (h4ass. 1977) (landlord liable for leasing part of premises for use as n 
noisy cocktail lounge, clashing with use by residential tenants). Seegenerally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 
1414, 1440-45 (1955). 
32. As the owner of a possessory interest in real estate acquired by conveyance, a leasehold 
tenant has standing to maintain such actions as trespass, ejectment, and nuisance against interfer- 
ing third parties. 1 A.L.P., supa note 17, at 3 3.53. See Ramos v. Fell, 128 So. 2d 481 (Ala. 1961) 
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with so much of property law, however, the reason why dual relation- 
ship was conceived is historical. 
The modem law of contract-with the routine enforcement of 
promises that are intended to be binding-simply did not exist when, in 
the late fifteenth century, the need arose to reformulate the interpretive 
conceptualization of legal rights and duties existing between landlords 
and tenants.33 A main problem at the time was protecting ejected ten- 
ants whose landlords were trying to convert arable land to sheep graz- 
ing and who were, in the process, depopulating the c~untryside.~~ The 
theoretical basis for the enforcement of legitimately expected perform- 
ances and for the protection of tenants' reasonable expectations could 
not be drawn from the then nonexistent modem theory of contract.35 
Rather, the most obvious analogue, and probably the most fitting at the 
time,36 was the feudal relation of lord and tenant, created by subinfeu- 
datioa3' Because this feudal relation provided a legal basis for protec- 
(trespass); Thompson v. Hams, 9 Ariz. App. 341.452 P.2d 122 (1969) (nuisance); Sherman v. Fall 
River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524,5 A. (1861) (same); Papadopulos v. Defabrizio, 102 
Utah 84, 125 P.2d 416 (1942) (trespass). SeegeneraIQ Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192 (1950). By com- 
parison, a mere occupant under a license who has no "interest in land" traditionally has not had 
such standing. See H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 1 18 (3d ed. 1939); compare Nahas v. Local 905, 
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808,302 P.2d 829 (1956) with United Elec. Light Co. v. 
Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943). 
33. See S. MILSOM, Supra note 30. On the development of the general enforcement of infor- 
mal promises, see id at 271-315; Ames, supra note 24, at 1-19. In commenting on certain substan- 
tive effects of the order of historical development, Williston noted that "the law governing leases 
. . . became settled before the law of mutually dependent promises was established . . .." 6 S. 
WILL IS TON,^^^^ note 24, at 5 890. The independence of lease covenants is erroneously supposed 
to be one of the important stumbling blocks to reaching just results. See infra text accompanying 
notes 262-306. 
34. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, sup'a note 9, at 216-17. 
35. See supra note 33. The medieval functional antecedents to modem contract law-ac- 
count, covenant, and debt- could have been extended or supplemented to provide much of the 
desired protection, and indeed Pollack and Maitland observed that the action of covenant "was 
lnvented chiefly for the enforcement of what we should call leases." 2 F. POLLACK & F. 
MAITLAND, supra note 31 at 106,203-25. These contract-law antecedents, however, were not ex- 
tended or sufficiently supplemented. 
36. To solve the problem of protecting ejected tenants, see supra text accompanying note 34, 
a basis for regarding leasehold rights as rights in rem, enforceable against the whole world, was 
needed. Thus, modem contract theory, which provides a basis only for in personam rights, proba- 
bly would not have served the intended purpose even if it had existed. See Golde Clothes Shop, 
Inc. v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E. 912 (1923) (protection of tenant's occu- 
pancy founded in legal title). "[Alfter the development of ejectment and the law of covenants 
with the land, the concept of a lease as a Gn~e~ance~afforded the parties remedies supe- 
rior to those available in contract!' 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.11. 
37. In early feudal times, when a transfer of land was made--even in fee simple absolute- 
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tion of sets of expectations not dramatically different from those of 
parties to leases, the application of its precepts to the landlord-tenant 
relation made considerable sense. 
Because of the Statute Quia Empt0res,3~ feudal land law, in its origi- 
nal application, was slowly becoming obsolete.39 The adaption and 
application of feudal land law to the landlord-tenant relationship, how- 
ever, gave it new life40 and supplied an analytical basis for protecting 
the transferor usually retained a proprietary interest analogous in many ways to that of a modern 
landlord. The transferee, though having the sole right of potentially perpetual possession, was 
thus only a co-owner. The legal relation which existed between transferor and transferee was 
referred~to as "tenure" or privity of estate, and resulted in a number of law-imposed rights and 
duties between the parties. This type of transfer, wherein the transferee became the tenant or 
vassal of the transferor, was known as "subinfeudation." Seegenera& H. CHALLIS, REAL PROP- 
ERTY 4-19 (3d ed. 1911); R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 725; F. POLLACK & F. 
MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 232-34. Successive subinfeudations resulted in a multilayered hier- 
archy of land ownership, ranging from the King at the top, through intermediate lords, down to 
the actual occupants. This ownership hierarchy characterized English feudalism. 
The Statute Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I (1290), had the effect of prohibiting, with narrow excep- 
tions, any future transfers of fee simple absolute interests by subinfeudation. Its enactment meant 
that the transferor of a fee simple absolute could no longer retain any proprietary interest in lands 
transferred. Thus a transferee of a fee simple absolute after 1290 was "substituted" in the place of 
the transferor in the feudal ownership hierarchy. Consequently, the transferee stepped into the 
privity of estate already existing between the transferor and the transferor's feudal lord. Such 
transfers were therefore said to be by "substitution" as distinguished from subinfeudation. 1 
A.L.P., supra note 17, at 10-12; H. CHALLIS, supra, at 18-20; F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra 
note 31, at 337. 
Transfer by substitution is the only method applicable to fee simple interests today except possi- 
bly in Pennsylvania and South Carolina. 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 58-60. Nevertheless, because 
the Statute Quia Emptores did not apply to transfers of less than potentially perpetual (fee simple) 
interests, it did not prevent subinfeudation between landlords and tenants. See R. MEOARRY &
H. WADE, q r a  note 21, at 45-46. Therefore, today's subiifeudation and substitution remain two 
alternative methods for transferring leasehold interests. When the modem leasehold tenant 
makes a transfer by substitution, the transaction is called an "assignment," whereas the modem 
leasehold version of subinfeudation is called a "sublease." See infra note 103 and text accompa- 
nying notes 102-09. 
38. See supra note 37. 
39. Because the Statute Quia Emptores prohibited the creation of new privity of estate rela- 
tions for lands held in fee simple, seesupra note 37, and because fee simple estates were gradually 
extinguished by escheats over time, the feudal hierarchy of ownership gradually collapsed. See H. 
CHALLIS, s p a  note 37, at 22; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 33, 46. Furthermore, 
economic inflation resulted in the increasing irrelevance of the transferors' retained interest in the 
fixed money rents on lands transferred earlier. See R. MEGGARY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 
789; C. MOYNIHAN. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 24 (1962). 
40. "By a paradox of history the relationship of landlord and tenant, originally no tenure at 
all, is now the only tenure which has any practical importance." R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, npra 
note 21, at 46. 
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most of the then usual expectations of parties to leasing transactionsP1 
Later, when promises became routinely enforceable as 
promises between landlord and tenant were not exceptedP3 Contract 
theory not only provided a supplementary basis for the enforcement of 
the rights and duties incident to privity of estate; it also supplied a basis 
for the creation and enforcement of many other landlord and tenant 
 expectation^.^^ It is only necessary that the landlord or tenant success- 
fully bargain for the right to enforce such other expectationsPs When 
the privity of estate or conveyance conception proved too inflexible to 
satisfy the multitudinous diversity of landlords' and tenants' desiderata, 
contract theory was applied, not merely as a parallel basis for enforcing 
the fundamental property relation, but as a superaddition to it. Thus 
arose the present dual relation of property and contract between land- 
lord and tenant. 
111. THE BASIC CONVEYANCE-THEORY INTERPRETATION 
The most basic observation that can be made about the landlord- 
tenant relation is that it is a relationship of exchange: rent is exchanged 
for possession, or in the more modem view, rent is exchanged for pos- 
session-plus-servicesP6 In this section, the conveyance-theory interpre- 
tation of the basic rent-for-possession exchange will be considered. 
The objective will be to show the grounds upon which the tenant's right 
to possession and the landlord's right to rent can be enforced without 
resort to contract theory and without assuming the existence of any 
contract at all between the parties. In the following section, the role of 
contract law in the traditional lease conception will be considered. 
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, introduction 3 4  (1977). 
42. See supra note 33. 
43. Ames, Assumpsif for Use and Occc~pafion, 2 ~ R V .  L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1889). 
44. For examplei teiant rights to repa& and services not otherwise required of the landlord 
by law, provisions for continuation or noncontinuation of the lease on condemnation or destmc- 
tion of the premises, and the sharing of any proceeds or awards in condemnation. Commercial 
leases, sometimes running to several dozen pages, demonstrate how far parties may seek by con- 
tract to secure advantages not accorded them as incidents of privity of estate alone. 
45. See infra note 222. Bui see infra text following note 222. 
46. Eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
925 (1970); cases cited infra notes 219 & 238. 
Professors Quinn and Phillips argue that the law's failure to accord the services portion of a 
lease the same degree of importance as possession has resulted in a two-level exchange relation- 
ship, consisting of a possession level and a services level. The subordination of services to a sepa- 
rate level is in-turn argued to be the source of much of the injustice of landlord-tenant law today. 
See Quinn & Phillips, supra note 11. at 233-34. 
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Specifically, the interplay between the conveyance and contract aspects 
of lease transactions will be described as it pertains to two aspects of 
landlord-tenant law which have recently been the subject of notable 
changes: mitigation by the landlord after a tenant's abandonment or 
forfeiture, and the assurance of tenants' rights to services provided by 
an implied warranty of habitability and dependency of lease covenants. 
The final section will address the question of whether any function is 
served by insisting that leases create a dual relation. 
Under the conveyance theory, the tenant's right to possession is en- 
forced as though the tenant has an ordinary property right in the prem- 
ises. For example, when a landlord leases to a tenant for a term of five 
years,'" the common law conceives the result to be a conveyance to the 
tenant of a property interest in the land-a property interest designed 
to last five ~ears .4~  Under this theory, the tenant receives the entire 
property interest, the right to possession for the entire five years, all at 
once at the time of c0nveyance.4~ The conveyance-theory conception 
of a leasehold is thus an application of the basic common-law concep- 
tion of possessory interests in land generally. Such interests or "es- 
tates" may be created so as to continue potentially forever or for lesser 
periods of time, such as a life estate measured by the lifetime of a per- 
son.'O Just as the owners of land can divide up their rights to posses- 
sion spatially (for example, east half to X, west half to Y), they can also 
47. Here, and throughout the discussion, the assumption is being made that the leasehold in 
question is a term or estate for years. For most purposes, other than duration, the periodic ten- 
ancy is treated the same as an estate for years, see 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.23, and though 
the tenancy at will is for many purposes treated differently, see id at § 3.28-3.31, it is a compara- 
tively infrequent interest in most states and will be disregarded entirely. 
Inasmuch as this is a discussion of the common law conception of leasing, statutory tenancies, 
and other peculiar effects of rent control, rent stabilization and the like are beyond the scope of 
this Article. Rent laws are essentially superadditions to, not abrogations of, the basic common law 
precepts; accordingly, the present discussion is also introductory to their subject matter. 
- ~ 
48. See ~ommonwealth v. Monumental Properties, 459 ~a.~450,470-72,329 A.2d 812,822-24 
(1974) and cases cited therein. See also Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. Madison Hotel, 
Inc., 513 F.2d 407,414 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Corn. 315,319, 180 A. 
464,465 (1935); Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 
(1876); Siegel, supra note 11 at 658 n.8. Seegenerally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 8 3.1 1. Compare 
the language quoted from Williston, supra note 30 with Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 687 
(1881) ("[A] lease is in one sense a running rather than a completed contract. It is an agreement 
for a continuous interchange of values between landlord and tenant, rather than a purchase single 
and completed of a term in lands."). 
49. See supra note 48. 
50. See 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 3 1, at 10-1 1. 
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divide up their rights to possession in terms of time (for example, dur- 
ing X's lifetime to X, remainder of perpetuity to Y). 
Thus, in line with the common-law conception of the divisibility of 
estates generally, we have the conception that a lease effects a temporal 
division in the landlord's ownership interest. Following this theory, the 
tenant's right to possession is just as complete during the stipulated 
term of the lease as a fee simple owner's interest would be in 
perpetuity. The only difference is duration-"a leasehold estate . . . 
during the life of the lease . . . for all 'practical purposes is equivalent 
to absolute ownership.' "S1 The landlord cannot interfere with the ten- 
ant's enjoyment during the lease term just as a grantor of a fee simple 
cannot invade the lands of the grantee. If the lease is for five years, 
then the tenant "owns" possessory rights, that is, the right to exclude 
others, for the five-year period. 
The important point is that the right to possession does not move to 
the tenant in a continuous flow from the landlord over the course of the 
lease Rather, the right to possession for the whole term passes 
to the tenant as a unitary block at the commencement of the lea~e.5~ 
Thereafter, the landlord becomes, for purposes of possession, like any 
51. Baker v. Clifford-Mathew Inv. Co., 99 Fla. 1229, 1232, 128 So. 827,829 (1930). Because 
the leasehold tenant is not the perpetual owner and the landlord has rights to eventual possession, 
the tenant is constrained to avoid-injuring what will one day pass to the successor in possession. 
In other words, the tenant is required to refrain from committing waste. See, e.g., People v. May, 
46 Ill. 2d 120, 262 N.E.2d 908 (1970) (arson by tenant). For discussions of the doctrine of waste, 
see A.L.P., mpra note 17, at 55 20.1-.23; R. POWELL, mpra note 9, at $5 636-650. See also infra 
text accompanying notes 80-81 & 227. 
52. see &a note 48 and accompanying text. 
53. Id Under the obsolete doctrine of inferesse termini, the tenant had to actually enter into 
possession to acquire the right of possession itself. Prior to actual possession, the tenant's interest 
was characterized as an "interest in the leasehold term," or an inferesse termini. The distinction, 
which apparently grew out of the rigorously possession-oriented idea of property rights, should 
now be irrelevant. See C. MOYNIHAN, mpra note 39, at 67, 166-67; H. UNDERHILL, LANDLORD 
AND TENANT 241-42 (1909). See also James v. Kibler's Adm'r, 94 Va. 165, 17426 S.E. 417,419 
(1896). 
More recently, courts have held that a lease need not convey a present interest but may create a 
future possessory interest, a leasehold to commence in the future. In re Wonderfair Stores, Inc., 
5 11 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1975); Imperial Water Co. No. 8 v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591,228 P. 678 
(1924); Motels of Md., Inc., v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306,223 A.2d 609 (1966). It is debata- 
ble whether there can now be privity of estate without possession by the tenant. See Imperial 
Water Co. No. 8 v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591,228 P. 678 (1924). CJ Arthur Treacher's Fish & 
Chips v. Chillum Terrace Ltd., 272 Md. 720, 729, 327 A.2d 282, 286-87 (1974) ("'when a lessee 
breaches a lease agreement prior to entering into possession, he cannot be held liable for rent, 
because the leasehold estate has never come into existence as a present possessory interest, and 
rent is an incident of the leasehold estate"). Accord Deming v. Scoville, 220 Ala. 224, 125 So. 683 
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other stranger to the titles4 with the same concorninant duty to respect 
the tenant's possession as any other third party.5s The landlord who 
violates this duty is subject to actions in trespass, nuisance, and eject- 
ment by the tenant.s6 From the outset of the term and for its duration, 
the tenant owns the possessory interest. 
The tenant's obligation to pay rent is more difficult to explain under 
the conveyance theory, but this obligation can likewise be interpreted 
to result from a purely "property" interest in the land, in this case a 
property interest held by the landlord. Unlike the tenant's possessory 
property interest, the landlord's property interest in the rent is not pos- 
sessory, but rather an "incorporeal" interest in the land,s7 similar to an 
easements8 or profit a   rend re.'^ These interests are referred to as "in- 
corporeal" because they do not carry a right to posses~ion.~~ 
Rent is a kind of incorporeal interest consisting of the right to a re- 
turn rendered out of the benefits of possession, that is, out of the bene- 
fits which a possessor of land is deemed to get purely by virtue of the 
posse~sion.~~ Depending on whether the possessor is making valuable 
- - - - - - - - - 
(1930); James v. Kibler's Adm'r, 94 Va. 165,26 S.E. 417 (1896). Seegeneral4 R. SCHOSHINSKI, 
supra note 17, at 23-24; infra note 154. 
54. The landlord may, of course, reserve special privileges or rights if these are specified in 
the lease, and the landlord is not a stranger to title with respect to waste. See supra note 51. 
55. See, ecg., Tooke v. Allen, 85 CaL App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948) (trespass and nui- 
sance); Ivey v. Davis, 81 Ga App. 598,59 S.E.2d 256 (1950) (trespass); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 
Mass. 33, 164 N.E. 807 (1929) (nuisance); Chelsea Hotel Corp. v. Gelles, 129 N.J.L. 102,28 A.2d 
172 (1942) (trespass); Golde Clothes Shop, Inc. v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 236 N.Y. 465, 141 
N.E. 917 (1923) (ejectment); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 8 3.38. See also inia text accompanying 
notes 86-89. 
56. See supra note 55. 
57. See 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 3 9.41. See also Smith v. Smith, 56 Hawaii 295,303,535 
P.2d 1109, 11 15-16 (1975) and cases cited therein, 2 F. POLLACK & F. MA IT LAND,^^^^^ note 31, at 
12533. 
58. For example, a right to use the land for a specific purpose, such as a right of passage. 
59. For example, a right to sever a substance such as coal or timber from the land. 
60. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Avco Dev. Co., 14 Ariz. App. 56,58-59,480 P.2d 671,673-74 (1971). 
Technically, only a right to rent payments unconnected with a lease, the so-called rent-charge, is 
truly "incorporeal." Rent reserved under a lease, the "rent-service," is "incident to the reversion," 
and, because the reversion itself is probably not an incorporeal interest, see H. CHALLIS, supra 
note 37, at 51-53; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 129, neither strictly speaking is 
the incident rent. See R. MEGGARY & H. WADE, supa note 21, at 693, 789. This definitional 
distinction, however, is more confusing than significant and, following the example of the AM~RI-  
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, see 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 2.41, will be ignored. 
61. "Rent may be defined in a general way, as a tribute or return o fa  certain amount, which 
is regarded as rSsuing out of the land, arpari of its actuolorpossibleprojfs, and is payable by one 
having an estate in the lwd, as compensation for his use and enjoyment of the land . . . ." 2 H. 
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use of the land or not, this benefit "by virtue of the possession" may or 
may not really accrue to the possessor. In either event, it is nevertheless 
deemed to accrue to the possessor because possession itself is valua- 
ble.62 The compensation that the tenant is to pay out of these benefits 
issued by the land is referred to as "rent,"63 and the incorporeal interest 
which gives a person the right to a part of this putative benefit is also 
called a rent.64 
The incorporeal property interest called rent, which is the property- 
right source of the landlord's right to payments, is created by a so- 
called "reservation" in the lease. In making a lease, the landlord does 
not have to part with the entirety of the ownership interest. The land- 
lord may hold back or "reserve" part of the ownership. Indeed, the 
landlord always holds back a right to future possession, the so-called 
reversion.65 He may, however, also retain other rights, such as incorpo- 
real rights, which are not inconsistent with the passing of possession to 
the tenant. For example, the landlord may reserve a right of passage 
across the land, or a right to sever timber. Or, as in the case of a min- 
eral lease with a royalty, the landlord may reserve the right to receive 
every fifth barrel of oil produced by the land. Comparably, a landlord 
may reserve a right to receive a stipulated monetary amount out of the 
benefits that the land is deemed to yield during specific time periods, 
for example, $500 per month for each month of the lease term. Al- 
though the subject matter of reserved "rent" is certainly less palpable 
TIFFANY. mpra note 32, at 1459 (emphasis added). Accord Hall v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 
416,424,250 A.2d 233,238 (1969); Graves v. Berdan, 29 Barb. 100,102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859), a#'4 
26 N.Y. 498 (1863); 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 21, at 5 168. 
62. When the land is not being-used by the possessor, or if it is being underutilized, the 
accruing benefit seems rather hypothetical. Even in the cases of total nonuse, however, the land's 
potential is nevertheless continuously available to the possessor. The potential value of possession 
is equal to the fair rental value of the land and is deemed to be continuously received by the 
possessor, even though the possessor, for reasons of his own, decides to squander the value by 
letting the land lie fallow or putting it to a less than optimal use. See 1 H .  TIFFANY, supra note 21, 
at 5 182b. See also infra notes 149 & 151 and accompanying text. But cf: W i a m s  v. Puccinelli, 
236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 521, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285, 290 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (no value received by 
tenant who was "never able to actually use the premises . . . during the short period in which 
[tenant] was in constructive possession thereof."). 
63. In  re Daben Carp., 469 F. Supp. 135, 141 (D.P.R. 1979). 
64. 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 9.41. Tiffany identifies two other distinct senses in which the 
word "rent" is used: to refer to particular payments or installments, and to refer to the proceeds 
received. 2 H. TIFFANY, mpra note 32, at 1459-60. 
65. The possibility of a perpetual lease or "lease in fee" is not addressed in this Article. See 
McLean v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 827.82931 (E.D. Va. 1970) (perpetual leases not favored 
in the law). 
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than the subject matter of reserved easements or profits a prendre, these 
different types of incorporeal interests are analogous.66 Like other in- 
corporeal interests, rent is a property interest in the land itself, reserved 
and held by the landlord, and this reserved property right to share in 
the benefits of possession exists irrespective of any express contractual 
promise by the tenant to pay rent.67 
Although the landlord leases to the tenant with a reservation of a 
portion of the benefits produced, the landlord does not automatically 
get the reserved benefit. Benefits of possession accrue to the possessor 
by virtue of possession. The tenant is the possessor, and therefore it is 
the tenant who will, in the first instance, receive the benefit of posses- 
sion. If, however, the landl6rd has reserved a monetized portion of the 
total possessory benefit in leasing to the tenant then, when the tenant 
"receives" the whole possessory benefit, he receives in effect something 
belonging in part to the landlord. Thus, the tenant becomes personally 
obligated to turn over to the landlord that portion of the received bene- 
fit which belongs to the landlord. In this way the landlord's incorpo- 
real rent interest in the land is, over time, converted into a chose in 
action against the tenant.68 Under common law pleading, an action in 
debt was the appropriate form of action for enforcing the duty to pay.69 
The gist of this action was that the defendant held a sum of money 
66. "The word rent is derived from 'render,' and the name thus emphasizes the distinction 
between rent, which is actually rendered or paid by the tenant, and aprojir aprendre, which is 
taken by the party entitled thereto, without the active intervention of the tenant!' 2 H. TIFFANY, 
supra note 32, at 1459. See also supra note 61. 
67. "[Rlent is not the result of an ordinary contract for future payments of money. . . . The 
land is the debtor, 'yielding and paying' the rents at the stipulated intervals; the covenant to pay is 
an accessory one." Hall v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 416,424,250 A.2d 233,238 (1969). See also 
supra note 29. Generally, the creation of a landlord-tenant relation will itself result in a contract, 
implied in fact, to pay rent. See supra note 21. 
68. While the right to unaccrued rent has been considered an incorporeal interest in the land, 
accrued and unpaid rent is treated as a chose in action. See Smith v. Smith, 56 Hawaii 295,304, 
535 P.2d 1109, 11 16 (1975); 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 9.41. In a number of American jurisdic- 
tions, however, even unaccrued rent is called a chose in action. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlardand 
Tenant 3 515 (1970). The loss of the distinction between the respective characters of accrued and 
unaccrued rent should not be of any practical significance since the abolition of the forms of 
action; in particular, the substantive requirements for the recuperatory action in debt. 
69. See Gunn v. scovib 4 Day 234 (Corn. 1810); 7 W. HoLDSWORTH,SU~~U note 9, at 261-75; 
Ames, supra note 43. The action of debt was also proper for enforcement of contract-based obli- 
gations of the tenant, as well as the conveyance-based constructive "real covenant" or covenant 
"in law" to pay reserved rent. See Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26,27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897,898 (1647); 
Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22% 76 Eng. Rep. 676-77 (1587). See generally 1 H. TIFFANY, supra 
noie 21, at 960-64, 1030-34; supra note 21. 
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belonging to the plaintiff?O 
The important point is that a sum of money could become due, and 
the action in debt was available even if the tenant never, even im- 
pliedly, promised or contracted to pay a penny?l The landlord's right 
to the rent payments could exist purely as a property interest whenever, 
by "reserving" a rent, he withheld from the tenant a part of the total 
interest that he held in the land. 
Several important principles of landlord-tenant law follow from this 
conception of the leasing transaction: 
I. Failure to pay the rent does not afect the tenant's r&ht to posses- 
sion .72 In the common-law conception, a failure to pay the rent cannot 
affect the tenant's right of possession because, by the time a rent default 
occurs, the tenant already has received a right of possession, as a uni- 
tary block, for the entire term of the lea~e.7~ Hence, the tenant's right 
of possession is independent from the performance of the obligation to 
pay rent. 
The landlord is thus in the same position as any other seller who 
70. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 366-68; F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 31, 51. 
Even though the action of debt was for recovery of a sum of money, the modem action most 
conceptually similar is replevin. The landlord would, in concept, "replevy" rents captured by the 
tenant but belonging under reservation to the landlord. 
At an even earlier time, the proper forms of action for the recovery of rents by a freeholder were 
the so-called real actions, such as the assize of novel disseisii-a functional precursor of modem 
e-iectment actions. In theory, non-payment by the tenant "disseised" the landlord of the rents. 
See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 262-63; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 
125-26; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1507-08. 
71. See 2 H. TIFFANY, sup'a note 32, at 1509-10; supra note 67. See also 2 F. POLLACK & F. 
MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 126-27. In modem cases, this phenomenon is most clearly seen in 
the liability of assignees in possession who have not "assumed" the obligations of the lease. See 
infro note 107 and accompanying text but see supra note 21. 
72. See e.6, tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1976); Hyde v. Bains, 247 
Ala. 8, 22 So. 2d 324 (1945); Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1971); Brown's Adm'rs v. 
Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Western Rebuilders & Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 237 Or. 191,391 
P.2d 383 (1964); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.94. CJ Continental Grain Co. v. Afram Bros., 35 
Wis. 2d 676, 151 N.W.2d 685 (1967) (lease of vessel). At common law, when a feudal tenant 
defaulted on promised services, the feudal lord had no procedure for regaining possession and was 
remitted to the power of "distress," that is, the right to seize chattels found on the land to satisfy 
the claim for rent. See S. MILSOM, supra note 30, at 95-96. 
73. See supra note 72 and text accompanying notes 47-56. See also D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 
557-58 (1973). For an analogous rule applicable to sales of real estate in the absence of an implied 
vendors' lien, see M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY 792-94 
(1975). 
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transfers title to a buyer on ~redit.7~ If a landlord wishes to use the 
leasehold as collateral for the payment of the original purchase price, 
the lease must stipulate the retention of a security interest in the lease- 
hold. This security interest, like any other, is a qualification of the ten- 
ant's title, making the right to possession defeasible in case the rent is 
not paid.75 The right to repossess the leased premises may take the 
form of a special limitation, analogous to a fee simple determinable, or 
it may be a condition on the term, analogous to a fee simple on condi- 
tion subsequent, enforceable by the right of Only on the basis 
of retained interests, such as a right of entry or special limitation, may 
the landlord assert a right of forfeiture against the tenant. 
It should be observed that at common law the tenant's right to pos- 
session cannot be affected by the failure of the tenant to perform any 
other obligations, whether created by covenant or otherwise, unless ex- 
pressly provided in the lea~e.7~ Thus, it is typical today for leases to 
provide expressly for termination by special limitation or condition in 
case the tenant defaults in the payment of rent or otherwise.78 In a 
number of states, the common-law rule has been modified by statute so 
that a default in the payment of rent or certain other defaults will con- 
74. See Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864). CJ U.C.C. § 2.702(a) (extremely lim- 
ited statutory right of a seller to reclaim goods after receipt by the buyer). 
75. See U.C.C. 9-503; D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at 857-58. 
76. See Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.Y.S. 239 
(App. Term 1928). Seegenerally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.89; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 
17, at 377-85; Niles, ConditionaILimitations in Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 15 (1933); 
Annot., 118 A.L.R. 283 (1939). Occasionally, particularly in leases, the special limitation is called 
a conditional limitation. See M. FRIEDMAN, PREPARATION F LEASES 43-45 (1962); 2 W. WALSH, 
COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY $ 193 (1947). Such a limitation, like a special limi- 
tation on a freehold, for example, a fee simple determinable, automatically terminates the lessee's 
. estate. On the other hand, a condition, like a co&ition subsequent, confers only a right of entry 
or power of termination which has no terminating effect on the lessee's estate until exercised by 
the lessor, either by reentry or ejectment. See Conger v. Conger, 208 Kan. 823,828-39,494 P.2d 
1081, 1086-87 (1972); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 3.89; R. SCHOSHINSIU, supra note 17, at 37-85; 
Annot, 118 A.L.R. 283 (1939). Both types of provisions operate to effectuate a forfeiture of the 
tenant's interest following the occurrence of the stipulated triggering events. 
77. See, e.8, Greenfeld v. Supervisors' Dist. No. 3,205 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1953) (violntion of 
use restriction); Olson v. Pedersen, 194 Neb. 159,231 N.W.2d 310 (1975) (no express covenant in 
forfeiture clause); Keller v. Model Coal Co., 142 W. Va. 597, 97 S.E.2d 337 (1957) (no forfeiture 
provisions); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 3.94. There were minor exceptions with only historical 
significance, such as the possibility of a tortious alienation. See Humbach, Lundlorrd Control of 
Tenant Behavior An Insfance of Private Environmental Legklation, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 
258-59, 259 a 1  16 (1976). 
78. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.94; 2 M. F R I ~ M A N ,  supa note 3, at 5 16.2. 
Heinonline - -  60 Wash. U. L. Q. 1230 1982-1983 
Number 41 CONCEPTION O F  LEASING 
stitute grounds for defeasance of the tenant's estate.79 One such statute, 
the Statute of Glouce~ter,~~ was enacted as early as 1278, and provided 
for termination in case the tenant committed waste. The Statute of 
Gloucester has been reenacted or received as a part of the common law 
in many states.81 In the absence of a statute or an express provision in 
the lease, however, a defaulting tenant is still secure in his posse~sion.~~ 
2. Eviction ofthe tenant by the landlord, or one who has a better title 
than the landlord, terminates the obligation to pay rent.83 This rule fol- 
lows obviously enough from the analytical basis of the common-law 
duty to pay reserved rent; namely, that the tenant by possession re- 
ceives a benefit, a portion of which belongs to, and must be rendered to 
the landlord.84 If the tenant is evicted from possession by the landlord 
or by a paramount title holder, then the tenant no longer receives the 
putative benefit of possessor as such; that is, the tenant no longer re- 
ceives anything belonging to the landlord. Either the landlord receives 
the benefit or, in case of eviction by a paramount title holder, the right- 
ful beneficiary receives it.85 
Incidentally, eviction by the landlord without some right to evict is a 
79. Eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 139,s 19 (Law Co-op 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS 8s 711, 
715 ( M c K i e y  1979). For a compendium, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 3 12.1, 
statutory note la (1977). 
80. 6 Edw. 1 ch. 5 (1278), repealedby Repeal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., ch. 59 (1879). 
81. For a compendium of authorities, see 5 R. POWELL, supra note 9, at § 650. See also infra 
note 227. 
82. Typically, an express provision in the lease or a statute now provides for defeasance. See 
supra note 78. Generally, therefore, a tenant who defaults is subject to eviction. Nonetheless, in 
the common-law conception of leases, defeasibility is exceptional and must be viewed as such if 
the contours of the conception are to be understood. 
83. Eg., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) (constmctive evic- 
tion); Morris v. Kettle, 57 N.J.L. 218, 30 A. 879 (1895) (actual eviction from a part of premises); 
Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917) (actual eviction); 1 A.L.P., 
supra note 17, at § 3.52. "Eviction" is used in this Article in the narrow technical sense, referring 
only to ousters by the landlord, through his connivance, or by a holder of paramount title. Na- 
tional Furniture Co. v. Inhabitants of Cumberland County, 113 Me. 175, 179, 93 A. 70, 71-72 
(1915); 49 AM. JUR. 2 ~ ,  Landlordand Tenant 300 (1970). 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 57-7 1. 
85. The tenant's contractual duty to pay rent, based on his promise to pay, would likewise be 
discharged by an eviction, since an eviction would surely constitute a matkrial breach of the im- 
plied covenant of quiet enjoyment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981); 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAC~S 5 276 (1932); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 3.48, 3.50; infra note 
278. Nevertheless, relieving the tenant of his obligation to pay rent because of an eviction does 
not depend on the existence or breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Fifth Ave. 
Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917). 
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tokg6 If the landlord commits the tort of eviction, he is liable for dam- 
ages to the tenant because such eviction constitutes an interference with 
possession rightfully belongingto the tenant." Further, trespasses and 
nuisances committed by the landlord are torts, which are actionable by 
the tenant.88 Nevertheless, if the landlord's wrongful acts fall short of 
depriving the tenant of possession, privity of estate-and hence the ob- 
ligation for reserved rent-is not affected.89 
3 Ouster ofthe tenanr by strangers to the title, destruction 0fbutX-f- 
ings on thepremises, or any other event detracti'ngfrom the tenant's use 
does not aflect the rent ~bZ&ation?~ Ouster of the tenant by a stranger 
to the title is not a technical "eviction," which refers only to ouster by 
the landlord or a paramount title holder.g1 Absent a true eviction, as so 
defined, a mere wrongful ouster does not affect the obligation to pay 
reserved rent?2 Likewise, it is well-established at common law that 
neither partial nor total destruction of buildings or improvements on 
the premises will in any way affect a tenant's liability for rent,93 al- 
though the rule is subject to numerous statutory and case-law 
 exception^.^^ 
86. Eg., Schuler v. Bordelon, 78 Cal. App. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 959 (1947); 1 A.L.P., supra note 
17, at $5 3.28, 3.49, 3.52. See also supra text accompanying notes 55-56; infra note 87. 
87. Kearns v. Sparks, 296 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1956); Brown ;. Holyoke Water-Power Co., 152 
Mass. 463,25 N.E. 966 (1890); Slater Realty Corp. v. Meys, 137 N.J.L. 263,59 A.2d 650 (1948); 
supra note 86. 
88. See supra note 55. 
89. Eg., Donaldson v. Mona Motor Oil Co., 193 Minn. 283,258 N.W. 504 (1935). See also 
Talbot v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 389 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1968); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at Q 3.50; 2 H. 
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1501. For a discussion of the recent trend to recognize certain lease 
obligations as "dependent," see infra text accompanying notes 262-313. 
90. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647) (dispossession in civil war) is one of 
the earlier landmarks. See also Bowers v. Sells, 125 Ind. kpp. 324, 123 N.E.2d 194 (1954); Kntz v. 
Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927); Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716 
(1917); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 849 (1980); cases cited hfra note 93. See genera/@ 1 A.L.P., supra 
note 17, at Q 3.103; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at Q 9.1. 
91. See supra note 83. 
92. Seesupra note 90. Nor would such an ouster of the tenants violate the implied warranty 
of quiet enjoyment. Seesupra note 31. 
93. Eg, Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. 416 (1868); Cook v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99,4 So. 713 (1888); 
Osterling v. Sturgeon, 261 Iowa 836,156 N.W.2d 344 (1968); Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175,146 
P.2d 883 (1944); Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135 P.2d 302 (1943). See genera/@ 1 
A.L.P., supra note 17, at Q 3.103; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at Q 9.1. 
94. Eg., Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 (1863); Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v. Kolep, 380 
A.2d 758 (Pa. 1977); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW. Q 227 (McKinney 1968); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 
Q 3.103. Total destruction of the demised premises, for example, when a destroyed building has 
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Of course, after such an outster or other use-impairing event it can- 
not easily be said that the tenant still receives the full possessory benefit 
from the land. Hence, after such events, it is harder to say that the 
tenant receives something out of which he must render rents belonging 
to the landl~rd?~ In the case of ouster, however, the tenant does have 
actions in trespass to recover damages96 and mesne profits9' and in 
ejectment?* Indeed, it is because the tenant has an action in ejectment 
that, under the common-law conceptualization, the tenant is treated as 
an owner of an interest in land?9 As such an owner, it arguably fol- 
lows that it is the tenant's responsibility to bring ejectment actions 
against dispossessors and to maintain the premises so that the premises 
are actually useful and yield the expected potential benefit.'* These 
ideas of the tenant's position reflect, of course, the doctrine of caveat 
emptor, albeit writ rather large. They do not, however, necessarily fol- 
low from the conveyance theory. Even viewing the lease as a convey- 
ance transaction, the law still may choose to impose a continuing 
responsibility upon the landlord for the usefulness of the land after the 
tenant agrees to take possession. Specifically, the conveyance may, that 
is, be accompanied by an implicit warranty of habitability.lO' 
been only partially leased to the tenant, is a typical common-law exception which constitutes 
grounds for termination of the lease and extinguishes the duty to pay rent. The tenant's duty to 
pay rent after destruction is often affected by lease provisions. 
95. Compare supra text accompanying notes 57-71 with infra note 151. See also note 100. 
96. See cases cited supra notes 32 & 55. 
97. Eg., Irwin v. Nolde, 176 P a  594, 35 A. 217 (1896); Creswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v. 
Scoggins, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 373,39 S.W. 612 (1897). Seealso ,QMot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1203-14 
(1950). 
98. See Heroux v. Katt, 76 R.I. 122,68 A.2d 25 (1949). See also Annot, 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 
1197-99 (1950). It has even been held that only the tenant, not the landlord, has standing to 
maintain ejectment. See Western N.Y. & P. Ry. v. Vulcan Foundry & Mach. Co., 251 Pa. 383,96 
A. 830 (1916). 
99. See supra note 15. See also R. MEGGARY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 1133-34; supra 
text accompanying notes 15 & 33-37. 
100. See infra note 151 and text accompanying note 225. The issue may also be couched, and 
resolved, in t e r n  of contractual allocation-of-risk analysis. For example, in the early landmark 
case of Paradine ir. Jane, Aleyn 26,82 Eng. Rep. 847 (1647) the court observed that "as the lessee 
is to have the advantage of casual profits, so he must run the hazard of casual losses!' Id at 27,82 
Eng. Rep. at 898. In order to reconcile its interpretation of the parties' allocation of risk with the 
notion that the rent issues out of the land, the Paradne court cited an earlier case which adopted 
the fiction that, if part of the leased land is destroyed, "then entire rent shall issue out of the 
remainder!' Tavemefs Case, 1 Dyer 56% 73 Eng. Rep. 123 (1544). For a remedy, the tenant was 
remitted to recourse against the wrongdoers who deprived him of his benefit. Paradine v. Jane, 
Aleyn at 26, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897. 
101. See infra text accompanying notes 25-61. 
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IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONVEYANCE AND CONTRACT 
The pure conveyance-theory paradigm for landlords' and tenants' 
rights and duties demonstrates that contractual promises are not neces- 
sary ingredients of an enforceable landlord-tenant relationship. Never- 
theless, contractual promises are usual ingredients of the relationship, 
and it is the interplay between the conveyance and contractual aspects 
of leases that gives the landlord-tenant relationship much of its unique 
character. 
In many cases, the dual nature of leases can be ignored because it is 
irrelevant to the outcome of the particular controversy at hand. In ac- 
tions between lessor and lessee, for example, to enforce the basic rent- 
for-possession exchange, both the conveyance and contract aspects of 
leases relate to the very same subject matters and, typically, require 
exactly the same performance behavior. The fact that the landlord- 
tenant relationship is a dual relationship is obscured and thus can be 
safely overlooked. In other cases, however, such as when the tenant 
abandons the premises or makes an assignment of the lease, recogni- 
tion of the dual nature of leases is the key to the outcome. 
An assignment by the tenant separates the normally intertwined obli- 
gations of privity of estate and privity of contract, revealing them as 
concurrent yet different grounds for enforcement of the rent-for-posses- 
sion exchange.lo2 Because an assignment causes this separation, it use- 
fully illuminates the distinct existences of conveyance-based duties and 
contract-based duties. 
Fundamentally, an assignment is a conveyance by the tenant of his 
entire proprietary interest or estate in all or part of the leased prem- 
ises.lo3 Thus, an assignment eliminates the privity of estate between 
102. See Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 673,675, 104 P.2d 507,509 (1940); Kanawha-Gauley 
Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427,430,80 S.E. 781,783 (1914); cases cited infra notes 106- 
08. 
103. Eg., J.D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little-Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 170, 148 S.E. 26, 27 
(1929); Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444,447, 151 S.W. 290,293 (1912). Seegenera/& 1 A.L.P., supra 
note 17, at 85 3.5647, 3.61-.63; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 552-74. A tenant also may 
transfer the possession of the demised premises for a period shorter than the time remaining in his 
own term, thereby retaining a portion of his proprietary interest in the premises. This latter type 
of transfer is a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment. 
A sublease is simply a lease from a lessee. It is little different from any other lease. By subleas- 
ing, the transferor-tenant remains the tenant of the prime-landlord and becomes the landlord of 
the subtenant, creating an ownership hierarchy. Subleasing is thus the modem vcrsion of subin- 
feudation. See supra note 37. The sublease does not affect either the privity of estate or the 
contract obligations existing between the original landlord and tenant under tlle prime lease. 
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the assignor-tenant and the landlord while establishing that same priv- 
ity of estate between the assignee and the landlord. The legal effects of 
an assignment are in part a reflection of this shifting of the privity of 
estate to the assignee. 
The usual effect of an assignment by the tenant is to give the land- 
lord two persons from whom he may recover the rent: t h e  assignor- 
tenant and the assignee-tenant. The landlord may recover rent from 
the assignor-tenant because, as a matter of contract law, assignments do 
not ipso facto relieve an assignor of the contractual duty to perform as 
promised.lo4 Accordingly, even after an assignment of a lease, the as- 
signing tenant remains liable on the contractual promiselo5 to pay rent 
made expressly or impliedly in the original lease.lo6 For purposes of 
Rather, it creates a second and simultaneous set of privities of estate and contract between the 
original tenant and the subtenant. 
By contrast, an assignment substitutes the assignee in the assignor's place with respect to origi- 
nal privity-of-estate obligations. It is the modem leasehold version of transfers by substitution, see 
supra note 37, and therefore corresponds to the modem conveyance of fee simple estates. 
-~ecause the designation of a transfer as a sublease or assignment is substant&ely significant- 
affecting the question of who is liable to whom and for what, courts should probably seek to 
ascertain and follow the parties' intentions in such matters. Jaber v. Miller, 219 Ark. 59, 239 
S.W.2d 760 (1951). Courts, however, often ignore the intent of the parties. Rather, a transfer is 
designated as a sublease only if the transferor retains a sufficient interest in the premises to remain 
in privity of estate with the landlord. A minority of jurisdictions will recognize a sublease based 
- ~ 
upon the transferor's retention of a mere right of entry for condition broken. To create a sublease 
under the majority rule, however, the retained interest must be a reversion, for without a rever- 
sion, the transferor has no "estate" and thus cannot be in privity of estate with the original land- 
lord. See general4 authorities cited supra; Femer, Can nere  be a Sublease for the Entire 
Unexpired Portion of a Term?, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1929); Wallace,Assignrnent andsubleare, 8 
IND. L.J. 359 (1933). 
In addition to conveying the assignor-tenant's estate, an assignment may also, depending on the 
parties' intentions, include: an assumption by the assignee of the assignor's contractual obliga- 
tions under the lease, see, e.g., Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Maloof, 83 N.J. Super. 273, 199 A.2d 
400 (1964), rev'd on other groundr, 89 N.J. Super. 128, 214 A.2d 45 (1965), or a release by the 
landlord of the assignor-tenant's contractual obigations under the lease, see, e.8, Eastman v. Nel- 
son, 8 Alaska 548 (1935), or both. Neither such an assumption nor release is, however, a necessary 
concomitant of an assignment, and a release of the assignor will not be implied ips0 facto from an 
assumption by the assignee, Eastman v. Nelson, 8 Alaska 548 (1935). 
104. Duties may be delegated, but the person delegating the duty remains liable for the failure 
of the delegate to perform. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Q 318(3) comment d & illus- 
tration 10 (1981); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS Q 866 (1964). 
105. This assumes that the original lease contains either an express or implied contractual 
promise to pay rent. See supra note 21. If the original lease included no contractual promise but 
only a reservation of rent, the assignor-tenant would not remain liable for rent accruing after the 
assignment. See National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472,487-88,78 P.2d 535,539- 
40 (1938). See aho infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
106. See Viera v. Soto, 240 F. Supp. 541 (D.V.I. 1965); Eastman v. Nelson, 8 Alaska 548 
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the duty to pay rent, therefore, the assignor-tenant remains in privity of 
contract with the landlord. In addition, upon taking possession the as- 
signee of the lease is also liable to pay the rent, whether or not he con- 
tractually promises or "assumes" to pay rent. This liability arises out 
of the privity of estate which the assignment establishes between the 
assignee and the landlord: "The assignee who does not assume [the 
lease] is not . . . bound by its contractual obligations. But the nonas- 
suming assignee who occupies the premises is liable by reason of his 
tenancy, and his obligation, arising out of privity of estate continues at 
least through the period of his occ~pancy."'~~ 
There can, of course, be only one recovery by the landlord'08 and, as 
between assignor and assignee, the latter is primarily liable for the 
rent.lo9 Nevertheless, the assignment situation presents an interesting 
exploded view of the dual nature of leases, showing the two privities of 
estate and contract in simultaneous but separate operation as bases for 
enforcement of the rent obligation. 
Two recurring factual circumstances involving the interplay between 
conveyance and contract deserve particular attention because they have 
(1935); Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 638 (1915); Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461,408 
P.2d 487 (1965); Gerber v. Pecht, 15 NJ. 29, 104 A.2d 41 (1954). See a/so Walker's Case, 3 Co. 
Rep. 22a, 23% 76 Eng. Rep. 676,680 (1587) ("the lessee himself shall not prevent by his own act 
such remedy which the lessor hath by his own contract."). Even if the landlord's consent to the 
assignment is necessary and obtained, such consent would not release the assignor from the con- 
tract obligation to pay rent. A deliberate release by the landlord is required. Eastman v. Nelson, 
8 Alaska 548 (1935); Broida v. Hayashi, 61 Hawaii 493,464 P.2d 285 (1970); Gerber v. Pecht, 15 
N.J. 29, 104 A.2d 41 (1954); Buck V. J.M. McEntee & Sons, 275 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1954). Seesupra 
note 103. 
107. Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 673,676,104 P.2d 507,509 (1940). Accord Consumer's Ice 
Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437,35 A. 1086 (1896); Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. 
Va. 427,80 S.E. 781 (1914). See also Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 22b, 76 Eng. Rep. 676,678 
(1587) ("Forasmuch as the rent issues out of the land, the assignee who hath the land, and is in 
privy of estate is debtor with respect to the land.") The nonassuming assignee, however, remains 
liable for accruing rents only until he makes a bona fide reassignment to another. See Reid v. 
John F. Wiessner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234,40 A. 877 (1898); Packard-Bamberger Co. v. Maloof, 
83 N.J. Super. 273, 199 A.2d 400 (1964), rev'don othergroundr, 89 N.J. Super. 128, 214 A.2d 45 
(1965); National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938); Annot., 89 
A.L.R. 433 (1934), Annot., 148 A.L.R. 393 (1944). 
The assignee's liability is for reserved rent based upon the reservation made by the landlord in 
leasing to the original tenant. The assignee acquires the leasehold estate subject to this reservation 
because no one can convey a better title than he has. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71. 
108. See, kg., Gholson v. Savin, 137 Ohio St. 551,31 N.E.2d 858 (1941); Lincoln Fireproof 
Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929). 
109. See Kintner v. Ham, 146 Mont. 641,408 P.2d 487 (1965); Gerber v. Pecht, 15 N.J. 29,104 
A.2d 41 (1954). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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engendered the greatest criticism of the conveyance theory, and hence, 
the dual relationship conception of leases: first, cases of abandonment 
or forfeiture by the tenant, and second, cases in which the landlord fails 
to provide necessary services. These are discussed in turn. 
A. Abandonment and Forfeiture 
If the tenant abandons the premises and ceases to pay rent prior to 
the termination of the lease, and if the tenant is not j~stified"~ in doing 
so, then there is a breach of duty by the tenant."' Upon such a breach, 
the landlord traditionally has been entitled to leave the premises empty 
and recover the entire agreed rent as it accrues under the terms of the 
lease, as if the premises were still occupied by the tenant.'12 Moreover, 
this entitlement to recover the full rent for empty premises traditionally 
has been available to the landlord irrespective of the landlord's ability 
110. An abandonment is justified when there is eviction, either actual or constructive. See, 
eg., Fifty Assocs. v. Berger Dry Goods Co., 275 Mass. 509, 176 N.E. 643 (1931); Dittman v. 
McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932); First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. L. Wiemann Co., 93 
Wis. 2d 258, 286 N.W.2d 360 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 84-89; infra notes 
275-77. 
111. As a general matter, merely abandoning occupancy would probably not constitute a 
breach of the lease unless the tenant has agreed, expressly or by implication, to remain in occu- 
pancy. Eg., Stevens v. Mobi Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Miller v. Benton, 55 
Conn. 529, 13 A. 678 (1887); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lackey, 397 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 1981); 
Baron Bros. v. National Bank, 83 S.D. 93, 155 N.W.2d 300 (1968); K & C Assoc. v. Airborne 
Airfreight Corp., 20 Wash. App. 653,581 P.2d 1082 (1978). Seegenerally 1 A.L.P.,supra note 17, 
.it 8 3.41: Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 971 (1971). It is the failure to pay rent as it accrues which most 
frequently constitutes the breach of duty at issue. Thus, abandonment as a legal wrong refers 
more often to an attempt by the tenant to abandon, and thereby repudiate, the whole arrangement 
rather than merely to relinquish his actual occupancy. See tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, 542 F.2d 
919,924 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976) ("two elements are necessary to show abandonment: (1) vacation of 
the premises; and (2) a clear intent not to be bound by the lease.") 
It might have been better to refer to abandonment of the whole arrangement as "repudiation" 
in order to distinguish it from mere relinquishments of occupancy. See K & C Assoc. v. Airborne 
Airfreight Corp., 20 Wash. App. 653, 581 P.2d 1082 (1978). Nevertheless, abandonment is the 
word usually employed to describe the type of events under discussion, perhaps because the term 
~ -~ 
"repudiatbn" has strong contract associitions while "abandonment" hi&, in ;he case of chattels, 
the fairly long-standing property connotation of relinquishment of title. See R. BROWN, PER- 
SONAL  PROPER^ § 1.6 (3d ed. 1975). 
112. Eg., Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464, 26 P. 967 (1891); Sagamore Corp. v. Wicutt, 120 
Corn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 M i .  502, 78 
N.W.2d 377, (1956); Centurian Dev. Co. v. Kenford Co., 60 A.D. 2d 96, 400 N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th 
Dept. 1977); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876). Seegenerally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 3.99; 2 
M. FRIEDMAN, sup'a note 3, at 16.3; 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1492-93; 2 S. WILLSTON, 
npra note 24, at 1403; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 546-56 (1968). 
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to mitigate damages by taking back possession or relettix~g."~ In the 
typical modern context of an apartment dweller who must move 
before the end of the lease, this no-mitigation rule seems harsh from 
the tenant's point of view. Moreover, it appears to be at variance with 
the general rule applied to "ordinary" contracts that no recovery may 
be had for losses that the plaintiff, with reasonable effort, could have 
a~o ided . "~  The no-mitigation rule for leases is founded, however, not 
on ordinary contract principles, but rather on the view that a lease is a 
conveyance of an ownership interest in land.H5 Because of the per- 
ceived injustice of the no-mitigation rule for leases, it has been sub- 
jected to considerable criticismn6 and, in some jurisdictions 
modification."' The modification is sometimes accompanied by dis- 
paraging remarks about the conveyance theory of leasing out of which 
the no-mitigation rule flows.118 
When the tenant attempts to abandon a lease arrangement, there is 
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
114. Seegeneral4 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 3 336 (1932); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 104, 
at 5 1039; D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at 3 12.6; J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS 9: 227 (1974). It is often 
said that there is not, strictly speaking, an obligation or duty to mitigate damages, but rather a rule 
prohibiting recovery of compensation for so-called "avoidable consequences." This rule is im- 
plicit in the general measure of damages for the breach of executory contracts of exchange, that is, 
the difference between the contract price and fair market value. D. DOBBS, slpra note 104, at 
3 12.6. See in/io text accompanying notes 133-37. 
115. "[A lease] is like the sale of specific personal property to be delivered. In such a case the 
title passes to the vendee, and of course he is liable for the purchase-money." Becar v. Flues, 64 
N.Y. 518,520 (1876). See also D. Do~Bs,supra note 104, at $ 12.6; 2 M. F R I E D M A N , ~ U ~ ~ ~  note 3, 
at 667-68; supra note 48. 
116. Eg., Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502,78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Bern- 
stein v. Seglii, 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,378 A.2d 767 
(1977); Mar-Son v. Tenvaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289 (N.D. 1977); Wright v. Baumam, 239 
Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965). The seminal article on the subject is McConnick, The R@ts of the 
Landlord Upon Abandonrnenf of the Premises by the Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REV. 21 1 (1925). 
117. A dozen or more states have created rules which depart from the traditional common-law 
rule allowing the landlord to recover full damages without mitigation, Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 
565-70 (1968). See also Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 452-53, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977). See 
general4 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 665 (1974 & Supp. 1982). The rule has also been 
modified by statute. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. 5 8-207 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN, 
3 704-29 (West 1981). 
118. McCormick's statement is typical: "The notion of 'privity of estate' and its attendant 
rights and duties appears as quaint and startling as a modem infantryman with a cross-bow." 
McCormick, supra note 116, at 222. 
See also Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690,692,353 N.Y.S.2d 623,626 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1974). "[Tlhis [mitigation] issue should be met head-on by removing the long-established 
and deeply encrusted veneer from the real estate lease wntract and showing it for what it is--a 
wntract like any other contract." Id. 
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no reason to suppose that either privity of contract or of estate is extin- 
guished. The unilateral repudiation of an executory contract by one of 
the parties does not in itself rescind the obligation or privity of con- 
tract.' l9 The nonrepudiating party presumably could elect to treat the 
repudiation as an offer of mutual rescission; that is, as an offer to termi- 
nate by mutual agreement all extant rights and duties under the con- 
tract.120 Such an election to extinguish all aspects of the contractual 
relation, including the remedial aspects, is certainly one which the 
nonrepudiating party is, however, free to reject.121 Similarly, the uni- 
lateral repudiation of a conveyance by the transferee does not place the 
119. See Walker & Co. v. Hamson, 347 Mich. 830, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); Rosenthal Paper 
Co. v. National Folding Box Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919). Seegenera/& RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $5243, 253 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $5 313, 317, 318 
11932); 5A A. CORBIN, Supra note 104, at $§ 982, 1236; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
410 (1932). It should not be inferred from the statement in the text that the disappointed prom- 
xsee may regard the contract as unaffected by the repudiation and proceed to a wasteful 
and unwanted counterperformance. It is well established that if the repudiation was accompanied 
by a present breach, the promisee cannot proceed with his own performance and refuse to mitigate 
damages, except at his own risk. See, e.8, Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, (N.Y. 1845); RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS @ 243(2), 350 comment b (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
3 317(2) (1932); Farnsworth, 22eProblemsof Non-performance in Contract, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
249,314 (1982). Even if the repudiation is entirely anticipatory, the weight of authority denies the 
promisee an election to proceed with performance at the repudiator's expense, precedence being 
given to the rule of mitigation. See, e.g., Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488 (10th 
Cir. 1930); Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $3 253, 350 comment b (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 317 
(1932); but see Reliance Cooperage v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977, (8th Cir. 1952); 4 A. CORFIIN, supra 
note 104, at 981-983. Nevertheless, despite the effects of repudiation on the parties' obligations 
of performance, the contract remains alive at least for purposes of the remedial obligations, see 
infra notes 133-37, and, indeed, the remedies may even be accelerated by virtue of the repudia- 
tion. Long Island R.R. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 455,362 N.E.2d 558,393 N.Y.S.2d 
925 (1977); Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 El. & B1.678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853). See also Coughlin 
v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953). See genera/& 5A A. CORFIIN, supra note 104, at 
$5 959, 982, 1236; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 12-2 (2d ed. 1977); infra note 134. 
120. See McCreary v. Mercury Lumber Distrib., 124 Cal. App. 2d 477,268 P.2d 762 (1954); 
Olson v. Pedersen, 194 Neb. 159,23 1 N.W.2d 310 (1975). Seegeneroily U.C.C. 1-107; RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 277(1) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 410 (1932). The 
repudiating party is hardly in a position to object to such an election by the aggrieved party. 
Nevertheless, the nonrepudiating party would ordinarily have available the more favorable alter- 
native of treating the repudiation as an event which both discharges the duty of further perform- 
ance and which triggers a right to recover damages for breach of contract from the repudiating 
party. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 243(2), 253 (1981); RESTATE- 
MENT OF CONTRACTS $5274,313,317,318,397 (1932); 4 A. C O R B I N , ~ ~ ~ ~  note 104, at § 975; 5A 
A. CORBIN, Supra note 104, at @ 1236-1237; supra note 119. 
121. Seempra note 120. The leading case is Hochester v. De la Tour, 2 El. & B1.678,118 Eng. 
Rep. 922 (1853). 
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conveyed title back in the transferor. The transferor may elect to ac- 
cept reconveyance of the title, but there is no requirement to do so.122 
When a leasehold tenant conveys title back to the landlord and the 
landlord accepts such reconveyance, the transfer is called a "surren- 
der."123 A surrender thus places both parties back in the positions that 
they held, with respect to title, prior to making the lease. It follows 
that, at the very least, a surrender extinguishes the privity of estate and 
its attendant 0b1igations.l~~ Accordingly, an accepted surrender is to 
privity of estate what mutual rescission is to contract. An abandon- 
ment by the tenant, however, cannot be in itself an accepted surrender; 
it can only be regarded as a unilateral offer, or "proffer," of surrender, 
which the landlord may either accept or reject.125 Just as one party to a 
contract cannot, by breaching, force the other to accept a mutual rescis- 
sion of the contract, so also a tenant cannot, by breaching, force the 
landlord to accept a surrender of the tenant's leasehold. 
Because of the dual-relationship conception of leases, when a tenant 
abandons with the intention to relinquish his arrangement with the 
landlord, it may be said that the tenant proposes two changes in the 
legal relationships between them: the tenant ofers to rescrid the con- 
122. Examples of this principle outside the landlord-tenant context include: the requirement 
of acceptance by the donee as a requisite to the effectuation of a transfer of chattels by gift, see R. 
BROWN, supa note 111, at § 7.14, and the requirement of acceptance by a grantee in order to 
complete the delivery of a deed to real property. See Hood v. Hood, 384 A.2d 706 (Me. 1978); 
Holbrook v. Trusdale, 100 A.D. 9,90 N.Y.S. 91 1 (1904); 23 AM. JUR. 2 ~ ,  Deeds 88 77, 127 (1965). 
123. See Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507,27 P. 369 (1891); Pams-West Maytag Hotel Corp. v. 
Continental Amusement Co., 168 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1968); Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 
640 (1928); 2 H. TIFFANY, ~upra note 32, at 1578. A transfer by the landlord of his reversionary 
interest to the tenant in possession is called a "release." Id. at 1568-70. Release is, therefore, the 
counterpart from the landlord's side of surrender. 
124. See Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); supra text accompanying note 23; 2 H. 
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1588; McCormick, supra note 116, at 216. 
125. See, e.g, Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Noce v. Stemnn, 
77 N.M. 71,419 P.2d 450 (1966); Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928); Ralph v, 
Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640 (1928). Of course, what the landlord says and whnt he in fact does 
may be two quite diierent things. The application of such general principles as estoppel may 
cause courts to recognize surrenders even in the absence of any deliberate or informed ncceptnnce 
by the landlord. Eg., Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales Corp., 396 F. Supp. 288 
(N.D. Tex. 1975); Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507,27 P. 369 (1891); Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 
(Fla. 1953); Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1972); Pague v. Petroleum Prods., Inc., 77 
Wash. 2d 219,461 P.2d 317 (1969). When surrenders are imputed on the basis of conduct incon- 
sistent with the continuation of the tenancy, for example by reletting, they are referred to as "sur- 
renders by operation of law." See general& 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 3, at 16.301-02; Updegrd, 22e Element of lnlent in Surrender by Operalion of l;ar~u, 
38 HARV. L. REV. 64 (1924). See also infra note 148. 
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tract andproflers a surrender of title. In theory, at least, the landlord 
may accept either or both of these proposed changes, or he may accept 
neither and thus keep alive both the privity of contract and the privity 
of estate.126 Faced with an abandoning tenant, the landlord thus has in 
theory three1" choices available: 
Choice I-refuse to accept both the proffered surrender and the offer of 
mutual rescission implied by the abandonment; 
Choice 11-accept the proffered surrender but refuse to accept the offer of 
mutual rescission; 
Choice 111-accept both the proffered surrender and the offer of mutual 
rescission. 
Considering these three choices in light of the dual-relationship con- 
ception of leases, it appears that a no-mitigation rule for leases would 
arise and apply only if the landlord elects Choice I. In electing Choice 
11, the landlord only retains a contract basis for enforcing the future 
rent obligation and this rationale of enforcement would be subject, one 
may correctly suppose, to the rules and limitations of ordinary contract 
law, including the rule of mitigation. In the third choice, the landlord 
would have no basis at all for enforcement of the rent obligation as to 
the future,lZ8 and rent accrual would cease. 
Choice I leaves the dual nature of the lease intact and, accordingly, 
leaves intact the dual nature of the relationship arising from the breach 
of the 1 e a ~ e . l ~ ~  Thus, Choice I, but only Choice I, could theoretically 
lead to the application of the no-mitigation rule founded upon the dual 
126. See McCormick, supra note 116, at 216-21. 
127. A cursory look at the three listed choices makes obvious a fourth possibility available to 
the landlord: acceptance of the offer of rescission but refusal to accept the proffered surren'der. 
This fourth choice would leave the landlord without the extra protection of the privity-of-contract 
rights while he still has a tenant-and a breaching one at that. Therefore, it is hard to see why the 
landlord would ever, as a practical matter, wish to elect this fourth possibility. 
There may also be a fifth possibility, namely, termination of the lease pursuant to a forfeiture 
provision, if such a provision is contained in the lease. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
This possibility represents a somewhat different category of choice, with legal effects that depend 
to some extent on the language of the forfeiture provision, and will be discussed separately infra at 
text accompanying notes 183-200. A sixth possibility, in many states, is statutory forfeiture. See 
mpra notes 79-80-and accompanying text. ~ e c a u s e ~ t h e  operation of such statutes is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, and not of common-law conception, it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
128. For this reason, it may be speculated that a landlord generally would not deliberately 
elect Choice 111 except as part of a settlement, for additional consideration, negotiated with the 
tenant. Local rules on surrender by operation of law may, however, cause the landlord to extin- 
guish inadvertantly all the tenant's liability (Choice 111) when the landlord only is trying to extin- 
guish the privity of estate (Choice 10. See supra note 125, infra text accompanying notes 167-82. 
129. See supra notes 119-20. 
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relationship. Indeed, the cases seem to support the position that, under 
the traditional rules, the landlord may recover the full rent without mit- 
igating only if the landlord selects Choice I in response to the tenant's 
abandonment. Otherwise, the landlord's recovery, if any, will be re- 
duced by the losses which the landlord could have avoided by 
mitigation. 
Applying the traditional dual-relation framework to cases in which 
the landlord elects Choice I or Choice 11,130 and cases of tenant forfei- 
ture, the analysis proceeds as follows: 
I. Landlord Rqects Both Surrender and Mutual Rescission (Choice 
I). If the tenant abandons and the landlord decides to accept neither 
the offer of mutual rescission nor the proffered surrender, the landlord 
continues to have a right to rent based on both the contract and estate 
aspects of the dual relation. In other words, by refusing to accede to 
the termination of either aspect of the dual relation, the landlord 
should retain both the right to reserved rent based on the privity of 
estate,13' as well as an action for damages based on the contractual 
promise to pay rent.132 There is a difference between contract damages 
and rent. 
Damages are essentially a compensato'y payment exacted by the law 
in order to protect a disappointed promisee from losing, among other 
things, the value of his bargain.133 Damages give the promisee a substi- 
130. Because the election of Choice 111 terminates the basis for any future rent obligation, the 
analysis under Choice 111 does not merit separate discussion. Seesupra note 128 and accompany- 
ing text. The only issue that could arise is the essentially factual one of whether the election of 
Choice I11 was also accompanied by a release of the obligations for any accrued rents as well. See 
supra note 119-20 and a&mpany&g text. 
131. See, e.6, Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Pague 
v. Petroleum Prods., Inc., 77 Wash. 2d 219, 461 P.2d 317 (1969). 
132. See, e.6, Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935). The landlord 
would not, of course, be able to obtain both the rent and damages if this would result in a double 
recovery. In addition, there may be limitations on the times at which he may sue for damages. 
Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928). See infra note 143. 
133. See, e.6, Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929); Freund v. Washington 
Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974); C. MCCORMICK, DAM- 
AGES 561 (1935). See genera/& RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); J. 
CALAMARI & J. PERIL LO,^^^^ note 119, at 518-19,521-22; J. MURRAY, Supra note 114, at $8 219- 
220.. Typically, when damages are assessed to protect the expectation interest under a contract for 
an exchange, the measure of recovery is the difference between the contract price and the fair 
market value of the item being sold. See J. MURRAY, Supra note 114, at 5 220; ini@ note 136. 
Damages may also be assessed to protect the disappointed promisee from other losses, so-called 
special damages, to protect other interests such as reliance, or to force disgorgement by the breach- 
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tute for the performance bargained for, but they do not always, or even 
usually give him the performance i t~e1 f . l~~  Even if the very perform- 
ance owed to the promisee was intended to consist solely of a payment 
of money, for example, a contractual agreement to purchase for a price, 
damages would still not generally be the equivalent of the performance 
itself. This is because the cost or value of the promisee's own perform- 
ance would, to the extent not incurred or rendered, be deducted from 
the recovery.135 Thus, when an ordinary executory contract to 
purchase is breached by the buyer, the damages recoverable are not 
equal to the agreed price. Rather, the general measure of damages is 
the difference between the agreed price and the market value of the 
thing to be sold.136 Or, viewed another way, the disappointed seller is 
expected to mitigate his damages either by retention of the thing sold or 
by resale at its market ~ a 1 u e . l ~ ~  From either viewpoint, however, the 
seller's recovery would be only the seller's net loss or "loss of bargain" 
due to the breach, not the whole price. The recovery of contract dam- 
ages thus gives the seller a substitute for performance and not the con- 
tract performance itself. 
Rent, by contrast, is seen at common law as an incorporeal interest in 
land.138 A tenant in possession is required to pay the reserved amount 
of rent to the landlord in order for the landlord, as the owner of the 
ing party of an unjust enrichment via restitution. Seegenerally D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at 12.1; 
J. MURRAY. supra note 114, at 219-220; Farnsworth, LegalRemedies for Breach of Contract, 70 
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970). These and other functions of damages are disregarded in the text 
because their discussion would not further illuminate the distinction between an exaction in lieu 
of performance made to compensate for the nonperformance (damages), and an exaction of the 
agreed performance itself (rent). 
134. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587,598,262 P.2d 305,311 (1935) ('The judgment for 
damages is substituted for the wrongdoer's duty to perform the contract" and "absolves the de- 
fendant from any duty, continuing or otherwise, to perform the contract"). See also Freund v. 
Washington Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974); RESTATE- 
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 313(1) comment c (1932); Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 1149-60. 
135. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967); J. MURRAY, 
supra note 114, at § 221. For the sake of simplicity, numerous nongermane exceptions and 
provisos have been ignored in this generalization. 
136. Eg., Coombs & Co. v. Reed, 5 Utah 2d 419,303 P.2d 1097 (1956); D. DOBBS, supra note 
73, at S) 12.11; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 186. See also U.C.C. 5 2-708(1), which has 
somewhat modified the details but not the basic principles for calculating damages applicable to 
breaches of contracts for the sale of goods. 
137. U.C.C. 2-703, -706, -708 (1973); D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at § 12.6. The implicit in- 
corporation of the rule of mitigation into the general measure of damages for breach is thus a very 
important occasion for its application. 
-138. See supra text acco&panying notes 57-67. 
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rent, to have the enjoyment of the incorporeal interest.139 When the 
courts exact payments of reserved rent from a tenant they are not giv- 
ing the landlord a compensatory remedy but rather a recuperatory one, 
a kind of specific perf~rmance. '~~ Like an action in ejectment, an ac- 
tion for reserved rent gives the landlord exactly what is his, not merely 
compensation for its loss.141 The landlord's incorporeal interest- 
rent-is thus treated as being comparable to, and as specifically pro- 
tectable as, the tenant's corporeal, possessory interest in the land.142 A 
tenant's right to regain possession by ejectment is not qualified by rule 
of mitigation nor, on this basis, would one expect that the landlord's 
right to reserved rent would be so q~a1iiied.l~~ 
- - 
The next logical inquiry is how privity of estate, as the basis for rent 
obligations, can persist after the tenant has abandoned occupancy. Af- 
139. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
140. Id Seealso 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 262-63; F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 
38-39, 5 1-52. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
142. The comparability of rent and possession at common law is further underlined by the fact 
that, before their abolition, real actions such as the assize of novel disseisin were the appropriate 
.. - 
forms of action for the recovery of rents held in freehold. See supra note 70. 
143. The policy significance of the differences between payments of money and possession is 
disregarded in this analytical explanation of the traditional no-mitigation rule for leases. Obvi- 
ously, though, it is precisely due to the difference between payments and possession that the ana- 
lytical explanation given in the text fails so stunningly to find any parallel policy justification. See 
D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at $ 12.6. This appears to be a place where the implications of the 
common-lawconception seem to stray too far from the underlying policy desiderata. Neverthe- 
less, as pointed out hfra at text accompanying notes 212-18, the fault may not be with the tradi- 
tional conception, but rather with unsuitable factual assumptions which typically accompany its 
application. 
Incidentally, as a corollary to the idea that rent is a benefit yielded up to the tenant and then 
paid to the landlord, the common-law rule is that, absent agreement, the landlord may not recover 
rent in advance even if the tenant has totally repudiated the lease. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, 
at § 5.101. Seealso Jordan v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952). This rule at least has the merit 
of analytical consistency, but the same carinot be said of the related rule, applied in a minority of 
jurisdictions, which prevents the recovery even of contract damages for anticipatory repudiation 
or breach. See, eg., Barrow v. Irving Trust Co., 68 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1934); Cooper v. Casm 
Merchandise Trust Co., 134 Me. 372,186 A.2d 885 (1976); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 
162 N.E. 97 (1928); General Dev. Corp. v. Wilber-Rogers Atlanta Corp., 28 Ohio App. 35,273 
N.E.2d 908 (1971); Henson v. B. & W. Finance Co., 401 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The 
latter holdings appear to indefensibly disregard the difference between damages and rent. Amick 
v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 453 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1969), overruled on other grounh, 
Wickware v. Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976); Grayson v. Mixon, 196 Ark. 1123,5 S.W.2d 312 
(1928); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Stableford v. Schul- 
ingkamp, 67 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 1953); South Main Akron v. Lynn Realty, 106 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1951). See also Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1941). See general4 Note, 
Z5e Modern Lease-An Estate in b n d o r  a Contract, 16 TEX. L. REV. 47,48-55 (1937). 
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ter all, the theory of the landlord's privity-of-estate right to reserved 
rent depends on the assumption that possession yields benefit to the 
tenant-possessor and that a portion of this benefit belongs, by reserva- 
tion, to the 1andl0rd.l~~ If the tenant removes himself from possession, 
it is not readily apparent that the tenant continues to receive something 
belonging to the landlord. In order to account for the continuation of 
privity of estate after the tenant's abandonment, it is necessary to in- 
dulge a fiction; namely, that a nonoccupying tenant's right to posses- 
sion is equivalent, for these purposes, to possession itself. Such a 
fiction is closely related to the idea that it is up to the tenant, like any 
other owner, to see that the land produces the benefit which it can 
produce.145 The tenant is deemed to receive the benefits of possession 
by virtue of having an entitlement to them. If the tenant decides to 
squander the benefit by underuse or nonoccupancy, blame for the loss 
lies solely with the tenant.146 
The frequent inappropriateness of the fiction that the tenant's right 
to possession is for these purposes the equivalent of possession will be 
examined below.14' There is one argument, however, that may be 
made in its favor. The landlord should not, by the tenant's abandon- 
ment, be made a possessor against his will. The landlord who refuses 
to accept a proffered surrender does not necessarily become the pos- 
sessor just because the tenant, as a matter of actual possession, is no 
longer in possession.148 If the landlord does not in fact resume posses- 
sion after the tenant abandons, then it would seem to be in best accord- 
ance with general principles to regard the tenant as being in 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101. 
146. See supra note 62. 
. 
147. See infra text accompanying notes 212-18. 
148. After it is discovered that the tenant has abandoned possession, the landlord may take 
steps to protect the premises from damage or deterioration. The usual holding is that such protec- 
tive steps by the landlord do not constitute acceptance of the proffered surrender. Cotfin v. Fowl- 
er, 483 P.2d 693 (Alaska 1971); 1 A.L.P., mpra note 17, at § 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, mpra note 3, at 
5 16.301. But see supra notes 125 & 128. Nor is acceptance and retention by the landlord of the 
keys to the premises treated as a per se acceptance of the surrender. See, eg., Coilin v. Fowler, 
483 P.2d 693 (Alaska 1971); Noce v. Stcmen, 77 N.M. 71,419 P.2d 450 (1966); Surety Realty Corp. 
v. Asmer, 249 S.C. 114, 153 S.E.2d 125 (1967); but see Bove v. Transcorn Elec., 116 R.I. 210,353 
A.2d 613 (1976). Nor is offering the premises for rektting. See, e.g., Noce v. Stemen, 77 N.M. 71, 
419 P.2d 450 (1966); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 8 16.301; but see Williams v. Kaiser Alumi- 
num & Chem. Sales, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Tex. 1975) ("There is some imprecision on the 
question o f .  . . reentry"). For a diussion of whether these conclusions are compelled by the 
conveyance theory of leasing or even consistent with it, see infra text accompanying notes 212-18. 
Heinonline - -  60 Wash. U. L. Q. 1245 1982-1983 
1246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VO~. 60: 12 13 
constructive possession of the premises.149 The legal entitlements at- 
tendant upon constructive possession, including the tenant's right to 
reenter,lSo form the basis for continuation of the privity of estate,15' 
and hence the obligation to pay the full rent.lS2 
There is one situation in which the landlord must sue for contract 
damages and cannot sue for reserved rent-when the landlord has 
merely contracted to lease but has not yet made a conveyance with a 
reservation of rent, thereby establishing privity of estate with the ten- 
ant. Such a contract to convey a leasehold conceptually resembles an 
ordinary executory sales contract and one might surmise that the recov- 
ery of contractual damages for its breach would be subject to the gen- 
eral rules for contract damages such as the rule of mitigation for 
avoidable losses. Because the general measure of damages in sales 
contracts is the difference between the agreed price and the market 
value of the thing to be sold, an injured landlord recovers only the loss 
of bargain due to the breach, not the whole price.lS3 
149. Walsh v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 20 F.2d 586, 587 (3d Cir. 1927) ("premises . . . remain 
constructively in possession of the tenant"). 
" w h e r e  there is no adverse possession, the title draws with it constructive possession, so as to 
sustain the action of trespass." Giiespie v. Dew, 1 Stew. 229, 230 (Ala. 1827). 
150. See Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945); 
Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507,27 P. 369 (1891); Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 19 
Wis. 428,224 N.W. 98 (1929). 
151. If the abandoned premises were usurped by an adverse possessor, the tenant would be 
entitled to maintain ejectment and, in connection therewith, a trespass action for damages and for 
mesne profits to recoup lost possessory benefit. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. The 
tenant's right to exclude others from the benefits of possession should have a theoretical markel 
value which approaches the value of the benefits themselves. See supra note 62. In fact, the right 
to exclude others and recover mesne profits is what is meant by "title" insofar as possessory title to 
land can be recognized at al l  in persons not having actual possession of the land. 
It is assumed, of course, that the landlord has taken no steps to reassert his own dominion and 
control over the premises and thus justify the assertion that he has accepted the proffered surren- 
der. The kinds of facts which might properly justify such an assertion are considered elsewhere. 
See supra notes 125 & 148; infra text accompanying notes 212-18. 
152. One may speculate whether the mitigation~rule would apply if the landlord refused the 
proffered surrender and sues on the tenant's promise to pay rent instead of suing for the reserved 
rent itself. Historically, this election could seemingly be accomplished merely by suing in assump- 
sit rather than debt. See 2 H. TIFFANY, Supra note 32, at $913. Whether the landlord could limit 
the theory of recovery under modem rules of procedure is problematical. See Winshall v. Ampco 
Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Taylor v. DeBus, 31 Ohio St. 468 (1877). 
Consider, however, the analogous possibility that a landlord may sue the lessee-assignor ex con- 
tractu after abandonment by a nonassuming assignee. See Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. 
Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929); supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36. 
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Mitigation is thus the rule when the landlord and tenant have en- 
tered only a contract to lease rather than having made an actual 
lease.l5Wpon the tenant's breach of such a contract to lease, the land- 
lord is expected to minimize the loss resulting from the breach, by 
either possessing or reletting.lS5 By application of the same principle, 
which governs other sales contracts, the landlord cannot simply insist 
on payment of the full amount that was promised, but can recover only 
those damages which could not have been avoided by mitigation.lS6 
Because no title has been transferred to the tenant and no rent has yet 
been reserved, and because no possessory benefit has been received by 
the tenant via possession, there is no rent to be recouped by the land- 
lord from the tenant. 
By contrast, however, once the landlord and tenant make the lease 
itself and the tenant enters,lS7 the view that the lease is a conveyance 
would imply that the landlord should be able to recover the full prom- 
ised rent without mitigation as ordinary contract damages. Even with 
an ordinary contract of sale, the loss of bargain measure of damages is 
applicable only if the buyer has not accepted the thing sold.lS8 Once 
the buyer has taken title, the seller becomes entitled to recover the en- 
tire price.15' By parity of reasoning, under ordinary contract rules, the 
landlord should be able to recover the full promised rent as it accrues 
154. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd., 272 Md. 720,327 A.2d 282 
(1974); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410,398 P.2d 119 (1965); R. SCHOSHINSKI, Supra note 17, at 
22-27.689-90; Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 514 (1978); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534,573-75 (1968). Depend- 
ing upon the parties' real intention, an agreement looking to a future leasehold possession might 
be either a "contract to lease" or a lease of a future possessory interest, that is, leasehold to com- 
mrnce in futuro. Motels of Md. v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306,311,223 A.2d 609,612 (1966); 
Railway Express Agency v. Commissioner, 307 Minn. 245,246,239 N.W.2d 245,246 (1976). One 
- .  
court held that, in either event, there is no privity of estate in praesenti, and therefore, the mea- 
surement of damages is governed solely by contract principles and thereby limited to nonmiti- 
gable losses. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd. 272 Md. 720,327 A.2d 
282 (1974). This outcome, however, is technically questionable because recognizing the creation 
of a leasehold future interest-if an abrogation of the doctrine of inferesse termini--should give 
the landlord a privitysf-estate basis to recover rent. Imperial Water Co. v. Cameron No. 8, 67 
Cal. App. 591,228 P. 678 (1924). Seealso Greening v.. Herres, 165 Wash. 470,5 P.2d 992 (1931); 
R. SCHOSHINSKI, Supra note 17, at 23-24; supra note 53. 
155. See supra note 154. 
156. Id 
157. On the need for entry by the tenant to complete the conveyance, see supra note 53. 
158. See U.C.C. 5 2-709(a); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 335 comment a, illustrations 3,4 
(1932); see also U.C.C. 55 2-706, -708. 
159. See supra note 158. 
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once there has been a conveyance of the leasehold to the tenant.160 
In summary, the rule permitting landlords to recover the full amount 
of rent even after the tenant has abandoned, though seemingly contrary 
to the usual contract rule, may be seen in terms of the traditional analy- 
sis to have two explanations. First, the landlord may not be suing for 
contract damages at all, but rather to recoup the rent that has been 
reserved. Second, the principles of ordinary contract law, applied to the 
conveyance of a leasehold, also would allow a full recovery without 
mitigation. Of course, both of these explanations require acceptance of 
the traditional conception of leases as conveyances and the fictional, 
though not necessarily concomitant assumption that landlords, in al- 
lowing premises to lie idle, do not in fact resume possession and 
thereby "accept the surrender." Both explanations thus depend on the 
appropriateness of that conception and fictional a~sumption.'~~ 
2. Landlord's Acceptance of Surrender but not Mutual Rescission 
(Choice 11). If the landlord accepts the surrender of the abandoning 
tenant's estate but not the rescission of the lease-contract, the right to 
reserved rent based on privity of estate would be e~tinguished.'~~ The 
landlord should still be able to recover damages for breach of the con- 
tract to pay rent.163 This recovery, however, because it is damages and 
not rent, would be subject to the rule of mitigation and would compen- 
sate only for nonavoidable 10sses.l~~ 
Because Choice I1 gives the tenant the benefit of mitigation, it is, 
160. See Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876); supra note 115. 
161. See infra text accompanying notes 201-18. 
162. Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428,224 N.W. 98 (1929); Annot., 
70 A.L.R. 1102 (193 1). 
163. Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Novak v. Fon- 
taine Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 
231 S.C. 84,97 S.E.2d 403 (1956); McCormick, supra note 116, at 216-21; UpdeGraff, supra note 
125, at 79-82. 
164. See supra note 163. See also Condor Corp. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 
87 (8th Cir. 1976), cerf. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976); Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464,26 P. 967 (1891); 
Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953). The mitigation rule could be given effect directly or, 
analogizing to ordinary contract cases, by implication in the general measures of damages for 
executoy exchange contracts, that is, the agreed rent less the fair rental value of the premises. 
Randall v. Thompson Bros., 1 Tex. Civ. Cas. 1102 flex. Civ. App. 1881); Brown v. Hayes, 92 
Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916). See also Yates v. Reid, 36 Cal. 2d 385, 224 P.2d 8 (1950) (lease 
authorized reletting). 
Of course, if the landlord were unable to make any alternative arrangements to cover the losses, 
then the damages would be equal to the rent. B.K.K. Co. v. Schultz, 7 Cal. App. 3d 786,86 Cal. 
Rptr. 760 (1970). In the Scirulz case, however, the court seemed to overlook the benefit deemed 
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from the tenant's point of view, clearly preferable to Choice I.165 For 
practical reasons, however, Choice I1 often would be the most sensible 
choice for the landlord as well, despite the application of the rule of 
mitigation.166 By accepting the proffered surrender, the landlord re- 
gains the right to possession and thereby puts himself in a position to 
minimize his potential losses either by reletting or enjoying possession 
himself. Because he has accepted only the proffered surrender and not 
the contract rescission, the landlord still retains his contract right of 
recourse against the breaching tenant for losses which the landlord 
cannot avoid. Choice I theoretically gives the same contractual protec- 
tion as Choice 11, but as a practical matter the landlord's exposure to 
loss is much greater under Choice I. The collection of rent from a non- 
occupant can be =cult, expensive and problematic. Hence, Choice I 
would be less favorable than Choice I1 if there is a good chance that, by 
reletting or holding possession himself, the landlord can derive benefit 
from the premises. 
Although Choice I1 often is more attractive than Choice I for the 
landlord, and almost always more attractive for the tenant,16' there 
seems to be disagreement as to how or even whether the landlord can 
selectively terminate one part of the dual relation, by retaking posses- 
sion or reletting, while leaving the other part intact. Several commen- 
tators and a few cases appear to accept the position that a landlord 
cannot accept a proffered surrender without terminating the whole 
lease arrangement and extinguishing all rights, including the right to 
contract damages with respect to future accruing rents.168 Rather ironi- 
to be received by a possessor by virtue of the possession. See supra text accompanying notes 61- 
64. 
165. The advantage to the tenant of Choice I1 has been specifically cited as a reason for re- 
]ecting the rule applied in some cases, see inJa text accompanying notes 167-78, which would 
prevent the landlord from opting for Choice 11. See Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274,277, 142 
S.E. 12, 15 (1928); Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 685-88, 212 P. 1057, 1058-59 (1923). 
166. A principal exception is if the landlord rents many units and has constant vacancies be- 
cause of high turnover. see infra text accompanying notes 210-11. 
167. The only advantage of Choice I to the tenant is that the right to resume possession would 
continue. This advantage is seldom of direct benefit to the tenant, although in a rare case the right 
to possession may give the tenant some collateral advantage. See, eg., Kulawitz v. Pacific Wood- 
enware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945) (tenant continued to have the benefit, as 
condition precedent to rent obligation, of "essential" restrictive wvenant by landlord; landlord's 
breach of the covenant dixhargcd tenant's rent obligation). See infra note 182. 
168. Eg., Gardiier v. W i a m  S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 (1918); tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, 
542 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1976); Williamson v. Crossett, 62 Ark. 393, 36 S.W. 27 (1896); Vineyard 
Village-Georgia, Inc. v. Crum, 136 Ga. App. 335,221 S.E.2d 208 (1975); Eidelman v. Walker & 
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cally, this version of the law actually would discourage mitigation be- 
cause it would penalize landlords who try to mitigate their damages by 
extinguishing their rights to recovery entirely.169 Though the reason 
for imposing such a "both-or-neithery7 limitation on the landlord's 
choices is somewhat obscure, the notion perhaps derives from the his- 
torical rationale for allowing contract actions for rent in the first place: 
'Y@or better securiy of payment [of the rent] . . . the lessor should 
have his remedy of debt upon the reservation or action upon this cob 
laterallpromise at his election."170 
If actions in contract (assumpsit) were extended to cases already cov- 
ered by another action (debt) solely "for better security," then it is per- 
haps logical that the contract rights be interpreted, presumptively at 
least, to be merely coextensive with the secured rights. Any event 
which extinguishes the secured rights, for example, the reserved rent, 
should likewise extinguish the securing ones.171 
Dunlop, Inc. 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972); Taylan Realty Co. v. Student Book Exchange, 
Inc. 354 Mass. 777, 242 N.E.2d 877 (1968); Haycock v. Johnston, 97 Minn. 289, 106 N.W. 304 
(1906); Saracena v. Preisler, 180 App. Div. 348, 167 N.Y.S. 871 (1917). Seegenera/& 2 M. FRIED- 
 MAN,^^ note 3, at 70; 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 1348; H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, 
at 1588. But see infra notes 178-81. 
169. See Abraham v. Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 S.W. 778 (1924); Haycock v. Johnson, 81 
Mi. 49, 83 N.W. 494 (1900); Whitehorn v. Dickerson, 419 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). 
Another criticism is that this rule promotes the idleness, not the usefulness, of property. See 
Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683,687,212 P. 1057, 1058-59 (1923) (rejecting the rule and allowing 
the landlord to relet without "surrender of the landlord's rights [to contract damages] under the 
lease agreement"). 
170. Ames, supra note 43, at 378-79. "[The covenant to pay [rent] is an accessory one." Hall 
v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 416,424, 250 A.2d 233,238 (1969) (quoting Jersey Blvd. Corp. v. 
Lerner Stores Corp., 168 Md. 532,539, 178 A. 707,709 (1935). 
171. A constructional presumption that a surrender was intended to be accompanied by a 
mutual rescission of the contract in the form of Choice I11 makes eminently good sense where the 
surrender is voluntary and involves no breach by the tenant. See, e.8, Dills v. Stobie, 81 Ill. 202 
(1876). Exactly the opposite presumption is indicated if the tenant has breached and the landlord 
needs better security. See Gordon v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 195 Kan. 341, 404 P.2d 949 
(1965). 
Updegraff observed that the situation of abandonment followed by the landlord's reletting is 
"andogous to the situation found to exist in any case of assignment of a lease," that "the tenure 
between the landlord and the lessee is at an end, but the contractual obligation continues." Upde- 
g r a ,  supa note 163, at 79-80. Seesupra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. The distinction is 
merely that in reletting after abandonment, the old privity of estate is extinct and a new one is 
created. In an assignment, by contrast, the original privity of estate and its contract promise, given 
as security, can be seen to continue. To give substantive effects to such a distinction, however, 
yields an anomalous result: when the original tenant does not breach, the original tenant is held 
to the contract, and the landlord is given two possible debtors in the assignor and assignee, 
whereas when the original tenant breaches, he is allowed to go free. 
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Another speculation, perhaps more apt, is that exponents of the both- 
or-neither limitation simply have lost sight of the dual nature of the 
rent obligation and assume that the landlord only has one basis of re- 
covery, a monistic lease, which must be stood upon or reli~quished.'~~ 
Indeed, this kind of conf~sion"~ is evident not only in the both-or- 
neither cases, but also in others holding to the contrary that, without 
accepting the surrender or losing his remedy, the landlord may relet the 
premises to a second tenant, but only as self-appointed and wholly ficti- 
tious agent for the first.'74 Although this fictitious agency theory for 
allowing the landlord a recovery after reletting has held considerable 
172. See, eg., Ten-Six Olive Co. v. Curby, 208 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1953) ("[A] surrender 
and acceptance of a lease terminates the liability of the tenant on all obligations under the lease 
not then accrued.") (emphasis added); Vineyard Village-Georgia v. Crum, 136 Ga. App. 335,337, 
221 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1925) ("[Acceptance of a surrender] discharges the tenant from liability for 
future rents and a cancellation or rescission of the contract is thus effected by agreement of the 
parties, express or implied.") (emphasis added). Sometimes a court will refuse to allow a recovery 
of rent on the grounds of surrender and refuse to consider the possibility of the survival of con- 
tract damages. See, e.g., Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 
(1900); Pelton v. Place, 71 Vt. 430,46 A. 63 (1899). See also Haycock v. Johnson, 81 M i .  49,83 
N.W. 494 (1900); Hensen v. B. & W. Fin. Co., 401 S.W.2d 261 vex. Civ. App. 1966); Anderson v. 
Andy Darling Pontiac, 257 Wis. 371,43 N.W.2d 362 (1950). For a discussion of variations and 
cases, see Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. 1953). 
For a recent case which kept the dual nature of the rent obligation in very clear focus, see 
Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976), in which the court 
specifically rejected defendant's attempt to confuse the issue by trying "to engraft the cumbersome 
doctrine of surrender onto the body of contract law!' Id at 336. See also Novak v. Fontaine 
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916). 
173. There are other sorts of confusion as well. For example, it is the view in New York that a 
surrender of possession is not always a surrender of a "lease" or of the estate thereby created, and 
that acceptance of a surrender of possession is merely evidence of a surrender of the estate. Kot- 
tler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 242 N.Y. 28,34 150 N.E. 591,593 (1926). Thus, even after 
reletting, the landlord may still recover "rent" as opposed to "damages" from the Erst tenant, 
provided only that the reletting was with the tenant's consent. Underhill v. Collins, 132 N.Y. 269, 
271,30 N.E. 576,577 (1892). This rent, however, is measured rather like damages. Id at 272,30 
N.E. at 577. Moreover, whether this rent obligation survives the estate termination or not depends 
on the existence of a contract calling for such survival. Michals v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381,62 N.E. 
425 (1902). Thus, the rent obligation seems incontestably contractual in nature. If, on the other 
hand, the landlord takes possession by summary dispossession proceedings, the tenant's liability is 
said to be "not for rent, but for damages." Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 
(1928). See also infra note 197. 
174. Eg., Liberty Plan Co. v. Adwan, 370 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1962). In Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 
90, 141 A. 640 (1928), the court specifically recognized the dual nature of the lease, but then 
inexplicably stated that "privity of estate is divested when the lessee [merely] quits the premises" 
while acceptance of the surrender would terminate the privity of contract. Id at 95, 141 A. at 643. 
Incidentally, subsumed under "fictitious agency" cases are those holdings that ascribe the con- 
tinuation of contract damages liability to the fact that the landlord in reletting is acting "for the 
account" or "for the benefit" of the tenant, whether or not the court actually uses the word 
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sway, the fiction upon which it rests is unnecessary and distracting175 
and has served mainly to produce confused opinions176 and anomolous 
h01dings.l~~ There is no reason why a landlord who reenters after an 
abandonment, either resuming possession or reletting the premises, 
should be deemed to have accepted both the proffered surrender and 
the offer of mutual rescission. 178 
In most jurisdictions there is no "both-or-neither" limitation on the 
landlord's choices, and Choice I1 is recognized as one of the landlord's 
possible responses to the tenant's abandonment, even if sometimes on 
the fictitious agency theory. There are two variants of the rule.179 
Under the first, the landlord may accept the surrender of the leasehold, 
thereby terminating the privity of estate without impairing the land- 
lord's contract rights, provided notice is given to the tenant that this is 
the landlord's intention.lS0 Under the second variant, the landlord's 
contract rights are preserved, provided only that the landlord demon- 
strate an intention to do so in dealing with the premises.181 Under 
"agent!' Eg., DeHart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829,832, 161 P.2d 453,455 (1945); Carpenter v. Riddle, 
527 P.2d 592,594 (Okla. 1974). 
175. See Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); 1 A.L.P.,mpra note 17, 
at 5 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, mpra note 3, at 5 16.302, The agency theory is more than just an inapt 
fiction; it carries with it such excess baggage as the seemingly irrelevant question whether, without 
the tenant's consent, the landlord can act as the tenant's agent in reletting. Compare Gray v. 
Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388,56 N.E. 903 (1900) with Underhill v. Collins, 132 
N.Y. 269,30 N.E. 576 (1892). 
176. See supra notes 172 & 174. 
177. If the landlord relets as the tenant's agent, it would be anomalous to hold, as courts do, 
that the tenant has no right to any surplus which the landlord might gain by relelting. Eg., 
Whitcomb v. Brant, 90 N.J.L. 245, 100 A. 175 (1917). See Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton Corp., 
40 Ill. App. 3d 552 (1976); Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972); 
Maida v. Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648 vex. Civ. App. 1971). It is quite an anomalous agent who 
does not have to account to its principal for the profits of the endeavors on the principal's behalf. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5427 (1958); F. MECHAM, OUTLINES OF LAW OF 
AGENCY 365 (4th ed. 1952); W. SEAW, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 243-44 (1964). 
178. Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Novak v. Fontnine 
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93,146 A. 526 (1929); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916). See 
supra text accompanying notes 163-64. In Gordon v. Consol. Sunray, 195 Kan. 341,346,404 P.2d 
949,954 (1965), the court stated: "Acceptance of a surrender of a lease should not be presumed. 
The burden of proving it is on the lessee . . .!' 
179. The two variants are expressed in terms of the dual-relation conception of leases, nl- 
though the cases themselves are often rationalized in other terms, such as the fictitious agency 
theory. 
180. Eg., Von Schleinitz v. North Hotel Co., 323 Mo. 11 1423 S.W.2d 64 (1929); Liberty Plan 
Co. v. Adwan, 370 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1962); Karns v. Vestor Motor Co., 161 T ~ M .  331, 30 S.W.2d 
245 (1930). See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, Supra note 3, at 675. 
181. Eg., Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Corn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Kanter v. Safran, 68 
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either variant, the results are the same: the tenant's privity-of-estate 
duty to pay rent and right to possession are extinguished, while the 
tenant's liability for mitigated damages on the contractual promise to 
pay is preserved.lS2 
3. Forfeiture by the Tenant. Under the general common-law rule, 
absent provision for forfeiture in the lease, the tenant's right to posses- 
sion for the term is not affected by the tenant's failure to pay the rent or 
to perform any other obligations under the lease.lS3 That is, at com- 
mon law, leases are nonforfeitable for breach, absent an express condi- 
tion or limitation on the leasehold estate.lS4 Nevertheless, landlords 
can and do provide for lease termination or reentry when tenants de- 
fault. Moreover, it seems fair to say that, by custom if not law, forfeita- 
ble leaseholds are more the norm than the exception today even if 
courts abhor forfeiture and are alert to prevent or relieve against it.ls5 
Because forfeiture works by means of express conditions or limita- 
tions terminating the tenant's estate, the juridical effect of a forfeiture 
is, at very least, to extinguish the privity of estate.lS6 The situation is 
- - - - - - - - - -- 
So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Hoke v. Williamson, 98 Kan. 580, 158 P. 11 15 (1916); Novak v. Fontaine 
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640 (1928). 
182. See w e s  citedmpra notes 180-81. Any contractual obligations of the landlord in rela- 
tlon to possession should, presumably, be discharged as a result of the tenant's material breach. 
Amick v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 453 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1969), overruled on other 
ground, Wickwire v. City & Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976). See Walker & Co. 
v. Hanison, 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
g241-243 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ss 274,397 (1932). Acceptance of the proffered 
surrender eliminates the tenant's property basis for continued possession, see supra text accompa- 
nying notes 47-56 & 72-82, and the remaining legal relationship of the parties rests solely in con- 
tract. 
For a case illuminating this distinction, see Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 
Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945). In Kuiawitz, the tenant abandoned possession, but no acceptance 
of surrender or rescission occurred. The landlord then brought an action for rent while the ten- 
ant's possessory and contractual rights were both still in force. Although the tenant was in default 
on the rent, the tenant's continuing possessory interest prevented application of the usual contract 
consequences of a material breach. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS s 246 
( 1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS @ 309310 (1932). Indeed, the continuing possessory inter- 
est supplied justification for discharge of the tenant under the lease when the landlord breached a 
.- ~ 
counter-promise. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. 
184. See supra note 76. 
185. Seegeneral4 R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 385-94; Humbach, supra note 77, at 266- 
332; in@ text accompanying notes 295-313. Even with a forfeiture provision, the landlord's 
power to evict is seriously limited by equitable and other judicial protections. 
186. Hall v. Gould, 13 N.Y. 127 (1855); Oldershaw v, Holt, 12 Ad. & E. 590, 113 Eng. Rep. 
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similar to cases of evicti~n'~' where, as previously mentioned, the priv- 
ity of estate and the duty to pay rent arising out of it terminates.lg8 In 
cases of wrongful eviction, the landlord loses not only the privity-of- 
estate right to reserved rent but also the contractual right to rent pay- 
ments. The contract right to rent is lost because, by wrongfully evicting 
the tenant, the landlord has committed a breachIs9 which would, on 
ordinary contract principles, discharge the tenant from further 
performance. 190 
When a leasehold is forfeited on the grounds that the tenant has 
committed a material breach, however, the eviction by the landlord is 
justified rather than wrongful. Although a justified eviction terminates 
privity of estate and the attendant right to reserved rent, a justified evic- 
tion should not necessarily affect the tenant's contractual obligations 
under the lease. By acting pursuant to an appropriate provision for 
forfeiture in the lease, the landlord ought to be able to terminate the 
privity of estate without breaching any duty owed to the tenant. One 
might therefore expect that an eviction on forfeiture should not consti- 
tute a per se excuse or discharge of the tenant from the contract-based 
obligations under the lease. Although a forfeiture must extinguish the 
obligation for rent, it does not follow that the tenant's liability for con- 
tract damages necessarily should also be extinguished unless the parties 
agree to a release.lgl Despite this reasoning, however, it is the general 
935 (1840). See Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Lincoln Fireproof 
Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929). 
187. See Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165, 50 P.2d 23 (1935); supra note 83. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89. 
189. For a discussion of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, see s'pra notes 31 & 84-85. 
190. In order to excuse a tenant, the landlord's breach would have to be material. See /n& 
notes 278 & 295. In the case of a contract to supply possession, however, one can scarcely imagine 
a more material breach than eviction from that very possession. 
191. If the tenant breaches by abandoning possession and ceasing to pay the rent two possible 
- .~ 
characterizations may apply to the landlord's resumption of the tenant's estate: either forfeiture 
based upon the tenant's wrongful abandonment, or acceptance of a proffered surrender. There is 
only one necessary analytical difference between forfeiture after the tenant's abandonment and 
acceptance of the proffered surrender in such a case. The difference is that forfeiture must ostensi- 
bly be founded upon a forfeiture provision in the lease, or on a statute providing for forfeiture, see 
supa text accompanying notes 72-81, whereas the acceptance of a proffered surrender is thought 
of as an independent, post-lease transaction between the parties, for which no lease provision is 
required. The juridical effects on privity of estate and privity of contract could be and arguably 
should be the same for both, that is, the tenant's estate and reserved rent obligation are extin- 
guished, but the tenant's contract obligations continue unimpaired. Nevertheless, because of the 
confused development of the law on surrenders, such as its fictitious agency theory, sees'pra notes 
167-82 and accompanying text, and the general presumption that forfeiture also extinguishes con- 
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rule that a termination of the lease by the landlord's retaking of posses- 
sion upon a forfeiture extinguishes all further 0bligati0ns.l~~ 
Fundamentally, the matter should be one of intention: the juridical 
effects of a forfeiture provision-whether the forfeiture extinguished 
privity of estate alone or the privities of estate and contract-should 
depend on the parties' intentions in creating the p ro~ is ion . '~~  Thus, in 
one view, a forfeiture provision may be treated as an alternative dura- 
tion provision for the overall arrangement, intended to apply to the 
parties' contractual relationship as well as to the leasehold estate itself. 
This interpretation would be appropriate in a case in which, for exam- 
ple, the lease provided that, on the tenant's breach, the lease would 
"determine and be utterly void"194 or that it would "cease and come to 
an end as if that were the day originally fixed [tlherein for the expira- 
tion of the term [t]here~f."l~~ Conversely, if the lease contains a con- 
tractual undertaking that expressly continues the tenant's liability-a 
so-called survival clause or lessee's covenant of indemnity-then liabil- 
ity for contract damages should survive f0rfe i t~re . l~~ Why such a sur- 
vival clause or covenant of indemnity should be necessary to preserve 
contract-damage liability is q~est ionable, '~~ though the issue is merely 
tract rights, see infro notes 192-96 and accompanying text, the two have significantly different 
~uridical effects. As a result, it matters considerably which response a landlord chooses after the 
tenant abandons. See McCormick, supra note 116. 
192. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 669-70; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 42 (1935). See McArthur v. 
Kostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Sutton v. Goodman, 194 Mass. 389 (1907). 
193. See Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 Ill. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1893). 
194. Jones v. Carter, 15 M. & W. 718, 153 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1846). 
195. Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 162 Tex. 534, 536, 349 S.W.2d 95, 96 (1961). 
196. Eg., William Filene's Sons v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597 (1918); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 
N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Selts Inv. Co. v. Promoters of the Federated Nations, 197 Wis. 471, 
222 N.W. 812 (1929). See 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 3.97. But see Northern Ind. Steel Supply 
Co. v. Chrisman, 139 Ind. App. 27, 36-37, 204 N.E.2d 668, 673-74 (1965). 
197. In Oldershaw v. Holt, 12 Ad. & E. 590, 113 Eng. Rep. 935 (1840), the court apparently 
was prepared to allow a recovery of any provable contract damages even though the obligation for 
reserved rent had terminated. Similarly, in Hall v. Gould, 13 N.Y. 127 (1855), the court upheld a 
judgment for damages rendered on a claim for rent, saying that, though the estate was at an end 
and rent, as such, could no longer accrue, liability nevertheless rested on covenant. These cases, 
however, seem to have no following, and Ha22 1: Gould seems to have been effectively limited to 
cases of reentry by ejectment action or without legal process. Summary dispossession proceedings 
are the more usual proceeding for recovering possession in New York and such proceedings are 
held to annul the relation of landlord and tenant except to the extent that there are covenants that 
expressly survive such proceedings. Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381,62 N.E. 425 (1902); Gray v. 
Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 (1900). 
The more typical view, stated in Watson v. Memll, 136 F. 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1905), is that 
resumption of possession by the landlord "necessarily constituted, in the absence of an express 
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one of correct interpretation, not of conception. Thus, the propriety of 
the usual interpretive presumption is not of direct concern to the pres- 
ent analysis. In any case, a draftsman can readily avoid the problem by 
explicitly clarifying intenti011.l~~ The important point is that, after a 
forfeiture, any rent obligation which does survive, whether or not ex- 
pressly provided for, can only be purely con t rac t~a l '~~  and is therefore 
subject to the rule of mitigation.200 
4. Evaluation offhe Traditional and 'Purely" Contractual Ana/uses. 
In treating a lease as a contract of conveyance and applying ordinary 
contract principles to it, we have seen that when the tenant wrongfully 
abondons or breaches a condition of the lease two distinct possibilities 
emerge. First, the landlord may recover the full reserved rent without 
mitigating damages by choosing to stand on the conveyance and re- 
jecting the tenant's attempt to force title Second, the landlord 
will be expected to mitigate damages if he reacts to the tenant's breach 
by taking back title through an acceptance of the proffered surrender, 
or by a forfeiture. 
Although the conveyance theory of leasing can explain the tradi- 
tional outcomes in terms of a coherent conception of leasing transac- 
tions, such conceptual explanations do not justify those outcomes or, in 
particular, justify the rule that the landlord can recover the full rent 
without mitigation. To the contrary, the significant minority of courts 
agreement to the contrary, a termination of the lease, and a release of the lessee from the payment 
of all the installments of rent he had promised to pay thereafter." One possible explanation of this 
interpretational bias towards total extinction of all further liability is that, having retaken the 
possession, it would be unfair to allow the landlord to have the premises' use as well as the agreed 
compensation for its use. See Lamson Consol. Store Sew. Co. v. Bowland, 114 F. 639, 641 (6th 
Cir. 1902). Nevertheless, this hardly explains the refusal to allow contract damages. See Grom- 
mes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 Ill. 634,35 N.E. 820 (1893); infra note 214. Another possible reason 
for this rule is that, if the purpose of the contract liability is to provide "better security," then the 
contract liability should terminate whenever the secured obligation terminates. See supra text 
accompanying notes 170-77. 
198. See supra note 196. 
199. Crawford Clothes, Inc. v. Levine, 434 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1970); Grommes v. St. Paul Trust 
Co., 147 Ill. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1892); Fifty Assocs. v. Berger Dry Goods Co., 275 Mass. 509, 176 
N.E. 643 (1931); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Selts Inv. Co. v. 
Promoters of Federated Nations, 197 Wis. 476, 222 N.W. 812 (1929). See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra 
note 32, at 1494 n.75. 
200. Seesupra note 199. Seealso Satin v. Buckley, 246 A.2d 778 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Jordon 
v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952); Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928). 
201. Depending upon its wording, however, breach by the tenant of a conditional limitation 
may force title back on the landlord without his desiring it. See supra note 76. 
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that have refused in recent times to apply the no-mitigation rule have 
said in doing so that they were rejecting the conveyance theory and 
treating leases like other contracts.202 But does rejection of the no-miti- 
gation rule really require rejection of the conveyance theory, and more 
to the point, is a purely contract theory of leasing really better suited to 
support a general mitigation rule for leases than the traditional convey- 
ance-cum-contract conception?203 
Although the adoption of a mitigation rule for leases supposedly is 
an application of ordinary contract principles to leases, an examina- 
tion of the mitigation-rule cases themselves often belies that claim. 
Many cases hold, for example, that in order to have any recovery, the 
landlord must affirmatively prove that reasonable efforts were made to 
relet the abandoned premises.204 That is, without an attempt to miti- 
gate, no damages are recoverable at all. This "duty" to mitigate, 
backed up by a forfeiture, is not at all the rule applied to breaches of 
ordinary contracts. 
Under the general measure of damages for breach of an executory 
contract for an exchange of values, the aggrieved party may usually 
recover at least the difference between the value to be provided by the 
breaching party and the fair market value of the aggrieved party's own 
perf~rmance.~~' This general measure of damages does not presup- 
pose or require that the aggrieved party attempt to mitigate damages; 
that is, it does not create a "duty" of mitigation backed up by a forfei- 
ture. Rather, it merely places the onus of securing a substituted per- 
202. See. e.g., Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968); Bernstein v. Seglin, 184 
Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,378 A.2d 767 (1977); Lefrak v. 
Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); Parkwood Realty Co. v. Mar- 
cdno, 77 Misc. 2d 690,353 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1974); Mar-Son, Inc. v. Tenvaho Enters., t 
Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289 (N.D. 1977); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 565-70 (1968). 
203. Despite the occasional attacks on the conveyance conception of leases, see, e.g., Sommer 
v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,378 A.2d 767 (1977); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197,390 N.Y.S.2d 959 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); supra notes 11 & 118, there is no case to my knowledge that purports to reject 
the conveyance theory for purposes of determining the tenant's right to possession. Consequently, 
whatever courts may say, they are not adopting a contractual theory of leasing, at least not for all 
purposes. Such an attempt to mount two hors2s at the same time is perhaps conceptually unaes- 
thetic but may be acceptable if justice compel; it. But does justice compel it? 
204. Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968) (part of cause of action); Sommer v. 
Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,378 A.2d 767 (1977) (same); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197,390 N.Y.S.2d 
959 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976) (same); but cf: Hirsh v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 166 Ind. App. 
497, 336 N.E.2d 833 (1975) (tenant must prove possibility of mitigation); Parkwood Realty Co. v. 
Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 693, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (same). 
205. See supra note 133. 
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formance on the aggrieved party.206 
An employment contract probably is the kind of ordinary contract 
most closely resembling a lease. Like a lease, in its contract aspects, an 
employment contract involves a continuous interchange of values be- 
tween the parties.207 The employee hires out his services over an 
agreed term much as a landlord, in contractual terms, hires out the use 
of his premises. Thus, a premature wrongful discharge of the employee 
compares with the premature abandonment by a tenant of the use of 
the premises hired for a term from the landlord. Quite interestingly, 
the usual contract rule for employment contract cases closely parallels 
the traditional no-mitigation rule for leases: the wrongfully discharged 
employee is allowed to recover the present value of the full contract 
wage, without mitigation, unless the employer sustains the burden of 
proving facts of mitigation, such as substitute income which was or rea- 
sonably could have been earned.208 If this ordinary contract rule were 
applied to leases, a landlord could at least recover the difference be- 
tween the rent and fair rental value, and perhaps the full rent, even if 
the landlord made no effort to mitigate damages.209 
Likewise, the cases rejecting the no-mitigation rule for leases do not 
always seem to take adequate account of another ordinary contract 
rule, sometimes referred to as the "lost volume" seller rule, This rule 
applies to cases in which, after a breach, the aggrieved promisee cannot 
truly prevent ensuing loss by making a substitute contract with another 
party. This results when the "substitute" contract would have been 
available to the promisee even if the first contract had not been 
206. 'The rule of mitigation may not be invoked by a contract breaker as a basis for hypercrit- 
ical examination of the conduct of the injured party . . . . F h e  defendant] had the burden of 
proving that the plaintiff did not use reasonable diligence in procuring a substitute . . . ." Apex 
Mining Co. v. Chicago Copper & Chem. Co., 306 F.2d 725,731 (8th Cir. 1962). 
207. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, as a matter of comparison, leases and employment con- 
tracts are treated in the same Title ("Of Lease") as alternative types of synallagmatic contracts for 
hire. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN., arts. 2669,2673-75 (1952). See also Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 
674, 687 (1881); Williston, supra note 30; supra note 48. 
208. Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176,474 P.2d 689,89 Cal, Rptr. 
737 (1970); Crillo v. Curtola, 91 Cal. App. 2d 263, 204 P.2d 941 (1949); Krehbiel v. Goering, 179 
Kan. 55,293 P.2d 255 (1956); Spurk v. Civil Sew. Bd., 231 Minn. 183,42 N.W.2d 720 (1950). See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 350 comment c (1981); D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at 
3 12.25; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 627-28; Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 1195. The rule 
has been criticized, see, e.8, C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 628, but it has held firm 
nevertheless. 
209. See Whitehorn v. Dickenson, 419 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (Tennessee law) (dic- 
tum supporting proposition although adhering to no-mitigation rule). 
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breached. Were it not for the breach, the promisee could have had the 
advantage of both contracts. The breach of one of the contracts, how- 
ever, irretrievably deprives the promisee of the advantage of that con- 
tract. Because, in such cases, the second contract does not truly 
mitigate the loss from breach of the first one, the rule of mitigation 
ordinarily would not require the promisee's recovery to be reduced by 
any amounts received under the second 
Similarly, a landlord of a multi-unit building in which there nearly 
always is a number of empty units might never be able to mitigate 
damages by reletting a breaching tenant's apartment. If the landlord 
did relet the breaching tenant's apartment while there are other vacan- 
cies, the landlord might thereby lose a chance to lease one of the other 
vacant apartments. It does not, however, generally appear from the 
cases rejecting the no-mitigation rule that the landlord becomes enti- 
tled to the full rent simply by showing other vacancies,211 
Thus, many of the results in cases requiring mitigation, though pro- 
fessedly based upon ordinary contract law, seem to deviate freely from 
it. A rather special contract law has been invented if contract theory is 
to account for the results. These results would, however, in most prac- 
tical situations, fit rather nicely under the traditional conveyance theory 
of leasing. All that is required is to recognize the reality that when the 
tenant acts to relinquish his claim to possess the premises, the posses- 
sion in fact usually is resumed by the landlord. The landlord may not 
want the possession, but it is hard to believe that in most cases the 
landlord does not in fact accept the possession. Certainly, landlords do 
not under such circumstances regard the right of possession as up for 
grabs, available to anyone who wishes to take occupancy.212 Most 
landlords would act firmly and decisively to exclude any squatters who 
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS @ 347 comment f, 350, comment d (1981); 
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 5 41; J. M u R R A Y , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  note 114, at 462-63; Far=sworth,supra 
note 133, at 1195-98. See also Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 293,285 N.E.2d 311,334 
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972); U.C.C. 5 2-708(2); . 
21 1. The idea was specifically rejected in Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,457,378 A.2d 763, 
773 (1977), in which the court said that the landlord must treat the apartment in question as if it 
were one of his vacant stock. See, e.8, Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445, 528 P.2d 637 
(1974) (number of units the landlord has for rent is taken into account in determining reasonable- 
ness of effort to relet). See also Lefrak v. Lamben, 89 Mic. 2d 197,390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ. 
Ct. 1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. 5 8-207 (1981). 
212. This notion is reminiscent of the old rule of general occupancy which applied to life 
estates pur autre vie ("to A for the life of B ) .  If the life tenant died before the cestui que vie, 
nobody had an automatic right to possession, and the rule was that "[hie that first can hap it, shall 
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may appear, and this exclusion-oriented frame of mind, plus control de 
facto exercised by the landlord, constitutes possession. 
If the landlord does not make reasonable efforts to relet or otherwise 
take advantage of the potential benefits of resumed possession, then the 
landlord has only himself to blame for the premises' low yield.213 In 
any event, as a possessor excluding others from the premises' benefit or 
yield, the landlord ought to be deemed to be receiving, and perhaps 
also spurning, the benefits of posse~sion.2~~ Privity of estate would, of 
course, be extinguished on such a view. Therefore, the landlord's only 
possibility of recovery would be on a contract basis for the difference 
between fair rental value which he is deemed to have received and the 
rent agreed to in the lease. Thus, implicitly, the rule of mitigation 
would apply to such recovery.215 Consonant with the conveyance con- 
ception of leases, the burden would be on the landlord, as a seller, to 
show that the claimed losses were not mitigatable; that is, that the fair 
rental value of the premises was less than the rent agreed upon in the 
broken lease.216 Further, because the repossessed premises would be 
"the landlord's," they would properly be treatable as a part of his va- 
cant stock for purposes of determining whether mitigation is 
possible.217 
Admittedly, the view that a landlord does resume possession in fact 
after abandonment is a departure from one of the traditional assump- 
enjoy out the term." See H. CHALLIS, supra note 37, at 359; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, q r a  note 
21, at 103-04. See also 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 226. 
213. Compare s p a  note 151 with supra text accompanying notes 144-46. See Wright v. 
Kilgo, 212 Ga. 712,95 S.E.2d 7 (1956); Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1972); Frisco 
Joe's, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977); Richter v. Fassett, 253 Wis. 101, 33 N.W.2d 230 
(1948). 
214. Seesupra notes 125 & 151. Though the landlord may be receiving the benefits of posses- 
sion, it must be remembered that he is nevertheless being deprived of the benefits of his bargain. 
Those benefits include not merely the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value 
of the premises, but also the value of the freedom from the risks of possession. Seesupra note 100. 
~ c c o r d i n ~ l ~ ,  even after applying the conveyance theory in the fashion described in the text, the 
landlord seemingly should still be entitled to a contractual recovery of the fair rental value direr- 
ential plus costs, including lost rent during a reasonable vacancy period pending reletting, arising 
from the need to relet--costs whose risk were supposedly shifted under the original lease. 
215. See supra note 137. 
216. D. Dosss,mpra note 73, at § 12.6. See Davis v. Wilson, 261 Or. 137,493 P.2d 31 (1972) 
(citing 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES 3 582 (1948) on the burden of a seller of goods to prove the general 
measure of damages). The case implicitly treats a lease as a conveyance although recognizing that 
the rule of mitigation applies-thereby reaching the result of cases like those cited s p a  note 204, 
without resort to a novel contract theory rationale. 
217. See supra note 211. 
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tions of the conveyance theory.*l"he particular assumption departed 
from is, however, one of fact, not concept; it is merely a question of 
interpreting actual intent to retake dominion and control, based upon 
the evidence of conduct. Moreover, the departure appears likely to 
conform better with the usual facts under modern conditions and pat- 
terns of behavior. In any event, such a departure certainly is less than 
that required by the adoption of a contract theory of leasing. Despite 
frequent assertions to the contrary, few of the desired results in aban- 
donment cases could be better rationalized by conceiving of leases 
purely as contracts, at least not by reference to ordinary contract law. 
If, however, leases are treated as conveyances in the traditional concep- 
tion, for which and concerning which contracts are made, ordinary 
contract law applied to the resulting conveyance-cum-contract readily 
provides a conceptual account for the rule of mitigation. 
B. The Problem of Services 
The typical lease of space in a multi-unit building is not merely an 
exchange of rent for possession. Rather, it is an exchange of rent for 
possession-plus-services.219 Services that are expected to accompany 
possession usually include maintenance and repairs of the physical fa- 
cility, but can also include such items as utilities, central heat, door- 
men, or even saunas and pools, depending upon the circumstances and 
the parties' agreement. As an original question, the services part of the 
exchange may or may not have been conveniently fit into a purely con- 
veyance theory of lease rights and duties.220 Nevertheless, until very 
218. Seesupra note 148. Perhaps one reason for holding that de facto resumptions of posses- 
sion are not acceptances of proffered surrenders, see supra notes 125 & 148, is the desire to avoid 
depriving the landlord of all rights against the defaulting tenant, on the assumption that accept- 
ance of surrender would extinguish the landlord's contract rights to rent. Seesupra text accompa- 
nying notes 167-82. 
219. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 400 U.S. 
925 (1970); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 vex.  1978). See also King v. Moorehead, 495 
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 418 
N.Y.S.2d 310,391 N.E.2d 1288, cerf. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). Seegenerally Quim & Phillips, 
Jupra note 11. at 225-39. 
220. The idea of affirmative duties as a part of property interests is hardly unknown. There 
are, for example, the duties with respect to hazardous conditions, which are imposed in favor of 
invitees, passers-by, and others, on persons who possess land. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 351-99 
(4th ed. 1971). In addition, there are the affirmative duties attaching in the form of so-called real 
covenants or equitable servitudes. Eg., Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. 
Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 783 (1938); 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at §§ 9.16, .36. Perhaps more 
on point is the implied covenant or obligation of the tenant to make ordinary repairs in order to 
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recently, no general obligation on the landlord to provide services be- 
yond bare possession has been understood to arise from the conveyance 
of the possessory interest itself.221 
In theory, at least, it should be no cause of serious concern that the 
conveyance aspect of a lease transaction does not protect the tenant's 
service-related expectations. If the parties to a lease are not satisfied 
with the law-imposed details of their legal relationship, they can always 
m o d e  those details. By contractual agreement, the basic landlord-ten- 
ant relation created in a conveyance can be shaped and molded to fit 
the requirements of virtually any imaginable exchange relation involv- 
ing a temporary interest in real estate.ZZ2 For two important reasons, 
however, the possibility of contracting has not proved a panacea for 
perceived deficiencies in the basic conveyance-created relation. First, 
parties-specially residential tenants-very often do not or realisti- 
cally cannot bargain for the contractual protections they need in order 
to have a legal right to the benefits that they expect to receive under the 
lease. Second, even when the desired contractual protections are suc- 
cessfully bargained for, such protections may be rendered practically 
nugatory by the long-held rule that a tenant in possession must pay the 
full rent whether or not the landlord performs the contractual obliga- 
tions to provide services under the lease. This rule for leases, superfi- 
cially at variance with ordinary contract law;= is sometimes referred 
to as the doctrine of "independence of covenants" in leases.ZZ4 
I. Failure of Tenants to Negotiate for Desired Protections. As a mat- 
ter of common law, the landlord traditionally had no law-imposed gen- 
eral obligation to put or maintain the leased premises in any particular 
- - 
prevent permissive waste. See infra note 226 and accompanying text. Because the rights and 
duties arising out of privity of estate were essentially law-imposed incidents of a voluntarily as- 
sumed status relationship, it may be guessed that they were intentionally made no more onerous 
or detailed than was required by the status relationship-between possessor and the reversioner, 
or incorporeal-interest, holder. 
221. See infra text accompanying notes 225-29. 
222. The law-implied rights and duties under a lease are almost never mandatory and almost 
always yield to a contrary agreement of the parties. See tenBraak v. WaHe Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d 
919, 925 n.8 (4th Cir. 1976); M. Karam & Sons Mercantile Co. v. Serrano, 51 Ariz. 397, 77 P.2d 
447 (1938); Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929). 
223. See infra text accompanying note 269. 
224. Eg, Thornson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39 
N.E. 7 (1894); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 1978); Rock County Sav. & Trust Co. v. 
Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 153 N.W.2d 594 (1967); J. MURRAY, mpra note 114, at 5 183; 6 S. 
WILLISTON, mpra note 24, at 5 890. 
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c o n d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  To the contrary, consonant with the conveyance theory 
that the tenant is owner of a temporary interest in land, the tenant has 
been the one required to make ordinary repairs.226 The failure to make 
such repairs would be actionable by the landlord and is referred to as 
"permissive waste."227 Of course, it would be theoretically possible for 
the landlord to assume contractually the responsibility for keeping the 
- - - - - - - -- -- - - 
225. Eg., E.P. Hinkel& Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201,206 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Smithfield 
Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardii, 156 N.C. 225,72 S.E. 312 (1911). Accord Lawler v. Capital 
City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 
F. Supp. 52 (D. Del. 1945); Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975); Hart v. 
Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68,152 Eng. Rep. 114 (1843); Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26,82 Eng. Rep. 897 
(1647). Seegenera/& 1 A.L.P.,supra note 17, at 8 3.45; 2 M. FRIED MAN,^^^^^ note 3, at 392-93; 2 
R. POWELL, supra note 3, at 3 225. Over time, exceptions were grafted on to the general rule, such 
as making the landlord responsible for common areas and facilities, see, e.g., Primus v. Bellevue 
Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950); Charlow v. Blankenship, 80 W. Va. 200, 92 
S.E. 318 (1917); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 406-07, for the fitness of particular facilities 
which the landlord contracted to provide, see, e.6, Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. 
App. 385.75 P.2d 112 (1938), or for the condition of furnished premises leased for short terms, see 
rnfra note 240. There was, however, no general warranty of habitability or fitness, and primary 
responsibility for the condition of the premises was left to the tenant, like any other owner of an 
interest in land. "[Flraud apart, there is no law against letting a tumbledown house." R o b b i  v. 
Jones, 15 C.B. OJ.S.) 221,240, 143 Eng. Rep. 768,776 (1863). 
226. E.g., E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Thomas v. 
Roper, 162 COM. 343,294 A.2d 321 (1972); 1 A.L.P.,supra note 17, at 8 3.78; 5 A.L.P., supra note 
17, at 5 20.12; R. POWELL, supra note 3, at 1 W, R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 269-77. For a 
description of the types of repairs required of the tenant, see cases cited supra See also diicussion 
m Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450.454 (1873): 
[Tlhe implied covenant or obligation of a lessee growing out of the relation of landlord 
and tenant [is], "to treat the premises demised in such manner that no injury be done to 
the inheritance, but that the estate may revert to the lessor undeteriorated by the willful 
or negligent conduct of the lessee . . . ." If a window in a dwelling should blow in, the 
tenant could not permit it to remain out and the storms to beat in and greatly injure the 
premises without liability for permissive waste; and if a shingle or board on the roof 
should blow off or become out of repair, the tenant could not permit the water, in time of 
rain, to flood the premises, and thus injure them, without a similar liability. He being 
present, a slight effort and expense on his part could save a great loss; and hence the law 
justly casts the burden upon him. 
Id 
The court concluded, however, that "the Lessee was not bound to make substantial lasting or 
general repairs, but only such ordinary repairs as were necessary to prevent waste and decay of the 
premises." Id 
227. Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 454 (1873). See also supra note 51. Technically, the 
common law did not authorize any remedy for waste in the case of tenants for years. The remedy 
was first provided by the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23, fj 2 (1267), subsequently ex- 
panded by the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278). Both were repealed, Repeal Act, 42 
Vict., ch. 59 (1879), though not before their substance became a part of American law. See supra 
notes 81 & 226. 
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premises in r e ~ a i r . 2 ~ ~  Traditionally, however, the landlord may refuse 
such responsibility and, in a tight housing market, the tenant might 
have no option but to deal on the terms which the landlord offers.229 In 
any case, the tenant often may not possess the legal knowledge neces- 
sary to realize the need for contractual modifications of his convey- 
ance-based rights and duties. 
Because tenants so often fail to negotiate for desired protections, the 
traditional rule that the landlord is generally not responsible for the 
condition of the premises has caused much consternation among those 
concerned about the plight of tenants. Injustice is perceived to result 
from the application of the rule. For present purposes, however, the 
difficult issues of ultimate justice can be side-stepped by making a sim- 
ple, relatively noncontroversial assumption: When parties act deliber- 
ately and without compulsion to modify their legal rights and duties 
vis-a-vis each other, so that each intentionally leads the other to expect 
a benefit enforceable at law, justice requires the legal protection of the 
expectations thus intentionally ~ r ea t ed .2~~  
By defining justice in this narrow way for this narrow purpose, it is 
possible to avoid such virtual imponderables as, for example, whether a 
tenant has a "human right" to a decent home or the landlord has a 
"natural right" to dispose of his property on whatever terms he 
228. Eg., Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 Ill. App. 2d 382,210 N.E.2d 809 (1965);supra note 222. 
Landlord covenants to repair are discussed at length in 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 428-42. 
229. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 400 
U.S. 495 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,625,517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 11 1 Cal. Rptr. 
704,709-10 (1974). This discussion should not be taken to imply that a tight housing market or 
the landlord's bargaining position are the sole reasons why tenants may have no option but to deal 
on the landlord's terms. It may simply be that the transaction costs of truly negotiated leases are 
too high for anybody to feel justified in incurring them. For further discussion of this point, see 
Humbach, supra note 77, at 304-08. Nor is it suggested that one should uncritically accept the 
notion that the terms of "adhesion" leases offered by landlords are necessarily much different than 
those that might be contained in freely negotiated leases. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 84-85 (2d ed. 1977). Even a monopolist, if he wishes to maximize profits, must be respon- 
sive to the market. Some tenants, at least, may prefer to live in cheaper "tumble-down" housing 
and use the money saved for other purposes. See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 131-33 (W. VP. , 
1978) (Neeley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
230. The word "intentionally" refers here to an objectively manifested intention, not to a 
purely subjective intention. That is, a person ought to be held responsible for the expectations 
which he should realize that he is creating in others, not merely those which, subjectively but 
secretly, the person may want to create. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 
(S.D. N.Y. 191 l), o z  201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 
Va. 493,84 S.E.2d 516 (1954). Seealso RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1932); 3 A. CORDIN, 
supra note 104. at 5 538. 
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pleases.231 It is sufficient to say that a person is justly entitled to a de- 
cent home if someone else, in exchange for an agreed quid pro quo, 
has willingly undertaken to provide it.232 What, then, accounts for the 
perception of injustice in thetraditional application of the common law 
landlord-tenant conception? The foregoing suggests that the injustice 
comes from the unredressed disappointment of tenants' reasonable ex- 
pectations; that is, expectations that tenants reasonably form on the ba- 
sis of the intentions which landlords objectively manifest in the course 
of making leases.233 
In the factual context of a typical residential lease, the tenant may 
reasonably suppose that the landlord, and not the tenant, will be the 
one responsible for making and keeping the premises suitable for the 
intended purpose. Widespread customary patterns, the particular land- 
lord's normal mode of operation, and practical necessity all tend to 
make landlord responsibility the more reasonable expectation. The 
tenants, especially in multi-unit buildings, cannot as a practical matter 
assume responsibility for the supply of heat, operation of the elevators, 
231. Calling these questions "virtual imponderables" does not mean that they should not be 
pondered, nor that the implied issues of distributive justice and the just distribution of resources 
cannot be at least tentatively resolved. It is certain, however, that such questions and issues re- 
quire quite fundamental value judgments. Because the implementation of any tentative resolution 
will likely have serious adverse effects, the value judgments involved may be quite controversial. 
For example, assume that every tenant is seen to have a moral right to a decent home. It would 
not follow that landlords should be forced to bear a special burden, in effect a special tax, to 
subsidize such a right. In any event, such a determination would be better made by processes 
normally thought of as political rather than legal in the traditional sense. Happily, for purposes of 
the present description of landlord-tenant law, it is not necessary to enter into this thicket. It is 
assumed that some other mechanism must be relied upon to provide a social distributive scheme 
which is adequate to permit everyone to afford a decent home. Correspondingly, it is assumed 
that the relevant function of landlord-tenant law is not to redistribute wealth, but rather to assure 
that those who have bargained for a decent home get what they bargained for. 
232. Another issue, which is being deliberately postponed, see infra text accompanying notes 
245-61, is what might be called the "paternalism" issue: whether the state should require that all 
agreements on particular subjects must contain particular terns. For example, should all product 
sales mandatorily include warranties of quality, or should all residential landlords, if they wish to 
lease at all, be required to supply "decent" housing? The paternalism issue is really a policy deter- 
mination of whether the freedom of contract should be restricted so that people may not enter into 
arrangements which, in the real, imperfect market world, they may find acceptable but to which, 
in an ideal, perfect market they would not likely assent. The answer is an emphatic "sometimes." 
See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 131-33 (W. Va. 1978) (Neeley, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Calabresi & Melamed, Properg, Liabili!~ andlnalienabili/y Rules: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 11 11-15 (1968). See also infra text accompanying notes 
245-61 (suggestions in relation to the landlord-tenant context). 
233. See supra note 230. 
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conditions in common areas and so on.234 Practicality requires that re- 
sponsibility for these matters be centralized, and the landlord is the 
most logical, perhaps the only logical point of centralization. Hence, 
the almost inevitable expectation is that the landlord will assume the 
responsibility. Even as to those facilities for which the tenant conceiva- 
bly could assume responsibility, for example, the plumbing fixtures in- 
side the tenant's apartment, the virtually universal custom-and 
probably greater economy--of landlords having responsibility for these 
matters, generates the expectation that the landlord will take the re- 
sponsibility. Doubtless these expectations of landlord responsibility 
are in fact subjective expectations of both tenant and landlord in al- 
most every case. The landlord and tenant both expect the landlord to 
take care of these things. If the landlord does not perform as expected, 
the reasonable lease-created expectations of the tenant are disap- 
pointed, and there is "injustice."235 
The disappointment of such intentionally236 created expectations of 
the residential tenant, however, is more than mere injustice. On any 
reasonable interpretation of a typical residential lease, in light of the 
usual circumstances, such disappointment would appear to be a pure 
and simple breach of contract. Ordinarily, it is not even necessary to 
view the contract merely as a contract implied in fact. As a matter of 
interpretation, a lease of an "apartment" or a lease "for residential pur- 
poses" means a space which has been and will continue to be appropri- 
ately outfitted for living-that it will be "livable."237 
234. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970); accord Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,624-25; 517 P.2d 1168, 1173; 11 1 
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. 1978). 
235. See supra note 234. See also Liverpool City Council v. Irwin, [I9761 Q.B. 319. 
236. The reference is, of course, to objectively manifested intention. See supra note 230. 
237. Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 144,265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970); accord Green v. Superior 
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974); Kamnrath v. 
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658,661 (Tex. 1978). 
The fact that premises are leased for some particular purpose known to both parties does not 
necessarily mean that the landlord is intended to be the one who should put and maintain the 
premises in a condition suitable for that purpose. For example, an empty storefront leased for use 
as a restaurant does not necessarily connote an intention that the landlord is obligated to install or 
maintain expensive refrigeration, stoves, decoration, or other such items. See &hard Paul, Inc. 
v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945). Ultimately, the proper interpretation 
of intention must be found in the words used and the surrounding circumstances. The circum- 
stances of residential leasing are usually conducive, it is submitted, to the interpretation stated in 
the text 
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Over the last decade or so, ~ourts~~~-sornetimes with assistance 
from legislature~~~~-began to recognize the interpretational relevance 
of these factual realities, and began to impose responsibility on land- 
lords for the condition of residential premises. This new responsibility 
of landlords has become generally known as the "implied warranty of 
habitabilit~."~~" In defining the precise performance requirements of 
the implied warranty of habitability, two basic approaches have been 
taken: One, as outlined above, is to view the warranty as part and par- 
cel of the actual objective understanding of the parties as interpreted in 
light of the circ~mstances.2~~ The other is to treat the warranty as an 
implied undertaking to meet the requirements of the applicable hous- 
ing That is, it is taken to be a reasonable expectation of the 
tenant that the landlord is offering the lease on terms which would not 
violate the 
The actual understanding approach arguably is preferable since it 
presumably incorporates the material housing code requirements as a 
minimum expectation while explicitly offering the flexibility to impose 
such further requirements which the circumstances of leasing may im- 
238. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 CaL3d 616,517 P.2d 1168, 11 1 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); 
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,280 
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 
521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); 
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 
1978). 
239. See, eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 554.139 (1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 5 235-b (Mc- 
K i e y  Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. j3 59.18.060 (Supp. 1982). Seealso UNIFORM RESI- 
DENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT 5 2.104(a)(2). 
240. Seesupra notes 238-39. Earlier, an implied warranty of habitability had been recognized 
as applicable to short-term leases of furnished dwellings. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 
348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); P i e s  v. Perssion, 14 Wi. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Smith v. 
Marrable, 11 M & W. 5, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843). 
241. Eg., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); 
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); 
Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130,265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 flex. 
1978). 
242. Eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 400 U.S. 
925 (1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 
495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). 
243. As part of its rationale in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 362,280 N.E.2d 208, 
214-15 (1972), the court observed that "the parties . . . would have expressed that which the law 
implies had they not supposed that it was unnecessary to speak of it because the law provided for 
it." /d(quoting Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 544-45, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290-91 
( 1960)). 
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ply.244 Under either approach, however, the implied warranty of habit- 
ability is not a departure from the common-law conception of leasing 
transactions, but is rather a necessary consequence of it. It is true that 
for residential premises the implied warranty reverses the traditional 
presumption that the tenant, not the landlord, has primary responsibil- 
ity for the premises' conditi0n,2~~ but that presumption is, after all, fun- 
damentally only a presumption of intention, an issue of fact. It is thus 
quite proper to reverse the presumption where such a reversal is neces- 
sary to a realistic interpretation-in the modem context--of the con- 
veyance-cum-contract comprising the lease. Leases should be 
recognized to contain an undertaking as to the character of that which 
is conveyed, not because such an undertaking "ought to be" assumed 
by the landlord, but because it is actually assumed, or understood to be 
assumed, by persons offering leases of residential premises. The con- 
ception of the landlord-tenant relationship need not change, but the 
facts to which it is applied must be recognized to have changed. 
Although the contractual basis for the implied warranty of habitabil- 
ity is analytically plausible, there is much to be said for rooting the 
warranty of habitability not in contract, but rather in tort. Phrased dif- 
ferently, there is good reason for seeing the warranty not as an objec- 
tively intended promissory undertaking, but rather as a duty that 
inheres in the landlord-tenant relationship itself as an integral part of 
privity of estate. For one thing, such a tort conception of the warranty 
would free it from any possible questions concerning the applicability 
of the limitations on contract remedies, such as the requirement that 
special damages be foreseeable246 or that the plaintiff be in privity of 
contract with the landlord.247 
It appears that at least some courts are willing to treat the warranty 
of habitability as though its breach constitutes a tort, for example, by 
244. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 
144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970). 
245. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
246. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854). See Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 Ill. App. 2d 
382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965); Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949). But see 
Reitmeyer v. Spreacher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
Q 357 (1965). 
247. See W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 622-27. See also Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. 
App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 
252 (1959). The Uccello case permitted recovery by the tenant's neighbor, who was clearly not in 
privity of contract with the landlord, for injuries inflicted by a dog belonging to the tenant. 
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allowing punitive damages.248 General legal principles provide ample 
grounds for doing so. It frequently occurs that parties who have en- 
tered into a legal relationship find themselves subject to certain duties 
not voluntarily assumed, even though the relationship itself was quite 
voluntary. For example, in the property relationship of bailment, the 
bailee owes a duty of ordinary care in relation to the bailed goods sim- 
ply by virtue of the fact that he is in possession of goods belonging to 
another.249 Similarly, in the landlord-tenant relationship the law has 
long imposed an obligation on the tenant not to commit waste-an ob- 
ligation which exists purely as an incident of the privity of estate 
itself.250 
Comparably, in the case of the warranty of habitability, the justifica- 
tion for imposing the duty on the landlord may be found in his conduct 
relative to others-specifically, in the landlord's act of putting residen- 
tial space into the hands of persons who experience shows are often 
unable to keep it habitable themselves.251 That is, the duty may be 
founded, in accord with general principles, on the landlord's position to 
control hazards or losses to others in relation to whom he acts. As such, 
the duty may be seen as an extension of the duties of care and mainte- 
nance placed on persons in control of land252 and, perhaps even more 
closely, as an extension of the duties of care imposed on landlords of 
premises leased for admission to the The history of founding 
248. See, e.8, Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goodbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054,367 N.Y.S.2d 916 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975); cases citedsupra note 247. See also Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537,70 
N.E.2d 418 (1946); Kline v. Bums, 11 1 N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971). 
Conduct violating the implied warranty of habitability may itself be a tort, such as a failure to 
use due care, if injury ensues. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388,308 A.2d 628 (1973). A strong 
argument can be made, however, that the implied warranty should be law-imposed-as a non- 
waivable ton duty--only in cases of personal injury or property damage, and not in cases which 
merely involved so-called "economic" (loss of bargain) losses. Cj U.C.C. 5 2-719(3) (1973). 
249. R. BROWN, supra note 11 1, at 252-70; W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 5 92. 
250. See supra notes 51 & 227. 
251. See Kline v. Burns, 11 1 N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971) (warranty of habitability is imposed 
by law because of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the surround- 
ing circumstances). Cj Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961) ("It is not the 
contractper se which creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature 
of the undertaking in the contract"). Prosser observed that in the analogous context of warranties 
implied in sales of chattels "the obligation is imposed upon the seller [landlord], not because he 
has assumed it voluntarily, but because the law attaches such consequences to his conduct, irre- 
spective of any agreement. . . !' W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 635. 
252. See mpra note 220. 
253. Eg., Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172, 379 P.2d 149 (1963); Fitchett v. Buchanan, 2 Wash. 
App. 965,472 P.2d 623 (1970); W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 5 63. 
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affirmative tort duties as a part of the undertaking in voluntarily as- 
sumed relationships is a long 0ne.2~~ 
Treating the landlord's duties in relation to habitability as tort, or 
law-imposed, duties arising out of the privity of estate itself is in no 
way at odds with the contractual explanation for the implied warranty 
of habitability. Holding that the warranty ordinarily is dually based, 
both in contract and in conduct relative to others, comports quite com- 
fortably with the traditional dual conception of the landlord-tenant re- 
lation and the overlapping bases of the basic rights and duties of that 
relation.255 
Moreover, to regard the warranty as being based on the conveyance 
as well as in contract avoids technical battle with another potential dif- 
ficulty posed by a purely contractual theory: How can the law deal 
with the disclaimers of responsibility for the premises' condition that 
may be routinely expected in any lease which, from the landlord's per- 
spective, has been competently drawn? If the implied warranty of hab- 
itability is predicated solely on contract, that is, on the actual, although 
perhaps unexpressed, objective consent of the landlord, it is hard to say 
that the warranty exists when the lease expressly disclaims landlord 
responsibility for the condition of the premises, in general or in particu- 
lar.256 There are good arguments for a policy refusing to give effect to 
such disclaimers. In a world of standard-form leases, the implied war- 
ranty of habitability could be effectively repealed by private legisla- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Further, it might be assumed that tenants in an ideal (perfect) 
market would not assent to such disclaimers; thus, they should be pro- 
tected from effectively doing so out of real world e~igency.2~~ 
254. See supra note 251; Ames, supra note 24, at 3-6. 
The argument that actions on warranties of quality were originally founded in tort law, see W. 
PROSSER, supra note 220, at 634-35, and therefore still may have a tort "flavor," see Ackarey v. 
Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946) ("[aln action of tort, as well as an action of 
contract, may be maintained upon a false warranty"), seems to carry little weight in itself. The 
modem landlord's duty of quality is called a "warranty" probably because of a semantic accident 
rather than because of a choice conscious of history. In any event, virtually all modem contract 
actions would, at an earlier time, have procedurally sounded in tort. 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29. 
256. See Kamarath v. B e ~ e t t ,  568 S.W.2d 658 flex. 1978) (recognizing express waivability); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Q 5.1 (1977) (same). 
257. Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 
1978); supra note 222. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960). 
258. Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130-31 (W. Va. 1978). See W. PROSSER, supra note 220, 
at 442-43; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 232, at 11 11-15. 
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One plausible contractual justification for ignoring the disclaimers, 
at least in a case that does not involve a deliberate slumlord "milking" 
his building, is to treat routinely printed disclaimers as disingenuous 
and contrary to the actual practice, performance expectations, and 0s- 
tensible intentions of the landl0rd.2~~ Although this approach may en- 
counter analytical difficulties with the par01 evidence rule, exceptions 
to that rule are available, possibly along the lines of fraud.260 Never- 
theless, by viewing the warranty of habitability as founded on the rela- 
tionship that results from the conveyance transaction, that is, as a 
normal law-imposed incident of privity of estate, there is no need for 
any conceptual embarrassment when finding the warranty "implied" in 
the very agreement which expressly disclaims it. Rather than insisting 
that, contrary to all evidence, the landlord has assented to its creation, 
the law remains free, as a matter of policy, to disallow the 
di~claimer.2~' 
2. The Independence of Covenants in Leases 
Placing the responsibility for the premises' condition on the landlord 
goes only part of the way in preventing the injustice of disappointed 
tenant expectations. There still remain the problems posed by the doc- 
trine of "independence of covenants," a doctrine which traditionally 
has meant that the tenant's obligation to pay rent is not affected by the 
landlord's breach of the duty to supply services.262 Courts that recog- 
259. The question might be treated as one purely of interpreting inconsistent manifestations of 
intent, see Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968), or of unconscionability, see Tai On Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380,216 
N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197,390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); 
Seabrook v. Commuter Hous., 72 Misc. 2d 6,338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Fair v. Neg- 
ley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 5 234-c (McKinney Supp. 1980); RE- 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY $5.6 (1978). 
260. Lusk COT. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90,332 P.2d 493 (1958); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 
143 N.E.2d 906, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957); International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 
407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955); Green River Valley Found. v. Foster, 78 Wash. 2d 245, 473 P.2d 844 
(1970) (Finley, J., concurring). 
261. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.) (disclaimer disallowed, 
referring to statutory [law-imposed] basis of the duties), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) (same). 
It should be observed that when the law insists that parties to particular types of contractual 
relationships have agreed in certain ways, contrary to their actual agreement, the law has in fact 
imposed the duties in question by virtue of the type of relationship. It serves no purpose to insist 
that such duties are contractual duties rather than tort duties, except perhaps to confuse the issue. 
262. See, e.g., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945); 
Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 11 1 So. 10 (1926); Interstate Restaurants v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 
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nize the implied warranty of habitability have characteristically also 
held that the obligation to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's per- 
formance under the warranty.263 In so holding, courts usually have 
said that they are treating leases as ordinary contracts.264 In reality, 
however, they are not,265 for if leases were treated as ordinary con- 
tracts, the obligation to pay rent usually would still be independent of 
the landlord's performance of the service obligations.266 Quite surpris- 
ingly, a reconsideration of the traditional dual-relationship conception 
of leases, the lease as a conveyance-cum-contract, reveals that the effec- 
tive dependence of lease obligations is not necessarily excluded by, and 
indeed, is seemingly required by the common law conception. Before 
discussing the implications of a pure contractual theory of leasing and 
the interesting implications of the dual-relationship conception, the 
problem of independence of covenants under the conception of leases 
as generally understood at common law must be examined. 
It is the hypothesis of the preceding subsection that tenants often 
cannot, or at least do not, bargain for the contractual protections 
needed in order to have a legal right to the services that they expect to 
receive under a lease. Even if the tenant does succeed in obtaining a 
lease covenant to provide services from the landlord, the doctrine of 
independence of covenants may frustrate the objective of securing the 
services. If a landlord breaches the covenant, then the tenant will have 
an action for damages.267 Except in the most egregious cases, however, 
108 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938); Duncan Dev. 
Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 
Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); 
3 A. CORBIN, SIIpa note 104, at 5 686; 6 S. WILLISTON, mpra note 24, at $9 890-901; Annot., 28 
A.L.R.2d 446 (1953). 
263. See sup/a cases cited at note 238. 
264. Eg., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 11 1 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); 
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa, 
Super. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). 
265. See infra text accompanying notes 278-95. 
266. See infra text accompanying notes 285-87. 
267. See, e.g., Rosen v. Needleman, 83 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1955); Selz v. StaKord, 284 Ill. 610, 120 
N.E. 462 (1918); Duncan Dev. Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955); 
Pryor v. Foster, 130 N.Y. 171,29 N.E. 123 (1891); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 
139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See also Annot., 
28 A.L.R.2d 446,453-56 (1953). 
Generally, the damages recoverable are the cost of making repairs or diminution in rental 
value. Eg., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945); Rosen 
v. Needleman, 80 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1955); Cook v. Soule, 56 N.Y. 420 (1874); Jersey Silk & Lace 
Stores v. Best Silk Shops, 134 Misc. 315, 235 N.Y.S. 277 (City Ct. N.Y. 1929). See also 2 M .  
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the damages will usually be less than the expenses of the lawsuit. In 
any case, the tenant really wants the services, not damages. If the serv- 
ices involve, for example, expensive repairs, the landlord may prefer, 
instead of the certain cost of performance, to take the relatively insub- 
stantial risk that the tenant will sue. Since it may be presumed that the 
tenant typically will not sue and will simply endure the lack of services 
or vacate, this strategy often can succeed in enabling the landlord to 
evade his services obligations. 
By contrast, permitting tenants to withhold rents in cases of landlord 
defaults appears to be a very efficient means of inducing landlords to 
perform their obligations under leases. The landlord's interest in leas- 
ing transactions is almost always purely pecuniary. Landlords are in 
the business of leasing for the rents that leases produce, and therefore 
have an important incentive to eliminate any situation that interferes 
with the inflow of rents. If the interference is the landlord's own non- 
performance, then the landlord has a compelling incentive to perform. 
Thus, when the law allows the landlord to recover the full rent irrespec- 
tive of the landlord's performance, the tenant is deprived of a powerful 
weapon for inducing the landlord to perform.268 
An apparent solution to the problem of landlord defaults in provid- 
ing services is the application in such cases of a general principle of 
ordinary contract law: You do not have to pay for what you do not get. 
This general principle finds expression in the ordinary contract rule 
that performance obligations under contracts are usually "depen- 
dent.''269 Applying this contract rule to leases, the argument goes, ten- 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 434-35; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446 (1953). The possibility of proceeding 
in small claims court would of course reduce litigation costs, but even so, damage actions are at 
their best poor substitutes for performance and poor incentives for providing it: 
Injunctive relief could provide a specific, albeit delayed, performance if the court would be 
willing to order it. See Continental & Vogue Health Studies v. Abra Corp., 369 Mich. 561, 120 
N.W.2d 835 (1963). Even if the desired injunction were granted and followed, however, the result 
would, as a practical matter, hardly satisfy the tenant's objective in bargaining for the landlord's 
promise to repair. 
268. Landlords have long been aware of the corresponding efficacy of dispossession in induc- 
ing performance of tenants' obligations under leases. For an extensive discussion of this subject, 
see Humbach, supra note 77, at 258-68. 
269. K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 223 Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451 (1960); Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 
252, 264 N.W. 361 (1936); Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See RE- 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS @ 251-52, 237-38 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
266 comments a & b, 274 (1932). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, sup'a note 119, at 405- 
12; Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 253-59. The statement in the text is an extreme simplification 
of the contract doctrines of conditions and is meant only to express their spirit. A more elaborate 
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ants would not only be protected from the injustice of paying for 
unprovided services, but would also possess a potent weapon in secur- 
ing such services. Elimination of the rule of independence of covenants 
would eliminate the main legal impediment to tenants' use of the rent 
weapon to secure services. 
The existence of the doctrine of independence of covenants for leases 
is not, of course, the reason for the traiitional rule that tenants' obliga- 
tions to pay rent are not conditioned on landlords' prior due perfo&- 
anceY0 The doctrine is merely a way of describing the rule. Indeed, to 
say that the covenants or promises in leases are independent obscures a 
situation which, under the traditional dual-relationship conception, is 
more complicated. 
Because in the traditional analysis a lease is seen not merely as a 
contract, but as a conveyance-cum-contract, rent is due not merely be- 
cause it is promised, but because it is reserved.271 Thus, even if the 
tenantyspr;mise to pay rent were dependent on performance by the 
exposition of the applicable contract doctrines, as they might be hypothetically applied to a purely 
contractual leasing transaction, is set forth infra text accompanying notes 278-95. Certainly, how- 
ever, the courts that purport to treat leases as ordinary contracts seem to have in mind an oversim- 
plified and novel version of contract law, rather than the actual law of contracts as generally 
understood. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. 
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). "Under contract principles. . . the tenant's obligation to pay rent is 
dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligations. . . . In order to determine 
whether any rent is owed to the landlord, the tenants must be given an opportunity to prove the 
. . . breach of the landlord's warranty [of habitability]." Id See also Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. 
Super. 76,384 A.2d 1234 (1978); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 3.11, at 202; c/: Farnsworth, npra 
note 119, at 257 ("many courts have begun to apply the concept of constructive conditions even to 
leases"). 
As a matter of ordinary contract law, a promise or covenant may be or become independent 
under certain circumstances such as when the agreed return has been substantially performed, see 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS 8 237 comment d (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 8 274 (1932); infra note 278, 
where the contract is aleatory, see Southern Sur. Co. v. MacMillan Co., 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 
1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 8 379 (1981), RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $5 292,293 (1932); or where the promisor continues to accept the benefits of the contract from the 
other party after the other party has committed a material breach, see Rosenthal Paper Co. v. 
National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313,123 N.E. 766 (1919); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS 8 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 8 298 (1932). This last qualification 
upon the doctrine of the dependency of contractual promises is highly pertinent to the contractual 
analysis of lease defaults, and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 278-95. 
270. CJ Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,6345 17 P.2d 1168,1180,111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 
716 (1974) ('These [prior] decisions, however, rested primarily upon the ancient property doctrine 
of 'independent covenants'"); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 377. 
271. s e e  supra text accompanying notes 57-71, 
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landlord-that is, even if the tenant's promise to perform were dis- 
charged by the landlord's breachzT2--the tenant would still, under the 
dual-relationship conception, have a privity-of-estate liability to pay re- 
served rent. This privity-of-estate liability, which results from the land- 
lord's reservation in leasing, has nothing to do with promises, contract 
or the "independence" thereof. Unless the landlord's failure 
to perform amounts to an eviction, there is no extinguishment of the 
privity of estate and, therefore, no extinguishment of the attendant re- 
served-rent liabilityF4 
There are, to be sure, circumstances in which the landlord's failure to 
perform may result in a rent-extinguishing eviction; namely, where the 
landlord's breach of duty is so severe as to cause the premises to be- 
come untenantable, causing the tenant to abandon. An abandonment 
"forced7' in this manner will be treated as an evictionY5 and is denomi- 
nated a b'constructive" eviction to distinguish it from a direct physical, 
or "actual" eviction. Like an actual eviction, a constructive eviction 
suspends the obligation to pay rent because the possession upon which 
the rent is predicated no longer existsF6 Thus, the doctrine of con- 
272. CJ O.W. Grun Roohg & Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 237, 241-42,225(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CON- 
T R A ~  §§ 274, 397 (1932). See supra note 269; infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
273. Seesupra text accompanying notes 57-71. Professor Siegel argues that "in fact, the inde- 
pendence of lease covenants results from. . . the [contract] doctrine of substantial performance." 
Siegel, supra note 11, at 664. See aho infra note 278. This contention does not appear to be 
historically accurate inasmuch as it ignores the significance of the much older view that, apart 
from contractual promises, the tenant is liable for reserved rent. See supra text accompanying 
notes 57-71. Nor does it seem technically accurate, since many landlord failures to provide serv- 
ices are certainly of sufficient magnitude to constitute a failure of substantial performance in the 
nature of a material breach. See infra notes 278 & 295. Professor Siegel apparently was confused 
by the constructive "real covenant" to pay reserved rent and was thus led to overlook the tradi- 
tional common-law view that the obligation to pay reserved rent, though supported by covenant, 
is not founded in covenant. See Siegel supra note 11, at 650 n.5; supra notes 21, 67 & 69. 
274. Technically, the liability is not extinguished by eviction. The liability ceases to arise after 
eviction because the tenant without possession does not receive benefits out of which rents belong- 
ing to the landlord can be rendered. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71. Reentry by an 
evicted tenant should cause liability for future-accruing rents to resume. Talbot v. Citizens Nat'l 
Bank, 389 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1968); Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855). 
275. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444,251 A.2d 268 (1969); Tallman v. Murphy, 120 
N.Y. 345, 24 N.E. 716 (1890); Dyett v. Pcndleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826); see Barash v. Penn- 
sylvania Station Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970); see 
also infra note 295. Seegenerally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at 5 3.51; Bennett, Z2e Modern Lease- 
An Estate in Londor a Contract, 16 Tuc. L. REV. 7,63-73 (1937); Rapan, Origin and Evolution of 
Comtructive Eviction in the United Sfates, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 69 (1951). 
276. See supra note 275; and text accompanying notes 83-85. 
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structive eviction constitutes a major exception to the general rule of 
independence of covenants in leases, even under the traditional con- 
veyance-cum-contract conception. If the tenant does not abandon pos- 
session after the landlord's default, however, no constructive eviction 
occurs and the conveyance-based obligation to pay the reserved rent 
remains uni~npaired."~ This requirement of abandonment makes the 
doctrine of constructive eviction an unsatisfactory device for securing 
landlord services. The general rule remains that the landlord's 
breaches do not per se affect the occupying tenant's obligation to pay 
rent. 
Although the conveyance theory of leasing is sometimes seen as the 
villain preventing tenants from withholding rent from defaulting land- 
lords, it would appear on analysis that the same independence of cove- 
nants would also be required by a purely contractual theory of leasing. 
That is, even if leases were treated as ordinary contracts, the tenant's 
promise to pay rent would still be independent-at least insofar as it is 
independent under the traditional conveyance-cum-contract view. 
Consider in purely contractual terms the case of a simple lease in 
which the only promises are as follows: 
Tenant's Promise Landlord's Promises 
Pay Rent Allow Occupancy 
Supply Services 
The tenant has a single performance obligation in a given rent period 
in exchange for which the landlord has two separate performance 
obligations. 
Suppose the landlord fails to supply services and that this failure is a 
material breach.."* Under ordinary contract analysis, the tenant 
277. See Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 5 (1930); 
supra note 275. But see Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grant Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 
(1959). 
278. Under ordinary contract law, only a material breach has the effect of discharging the 
other party's obligation to perform. See Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 
859 (3d Cir. 1952); Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); Plante v. 
Jacobs, 10 Wis. 2d 567, 103 N.W.2d 296 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $9237, 
242 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 55274,397,313 comment c (1932); A. CORBIN, supra 
note 104, at 5 946. This requirement of a material breach for discharge is sometimes referred to as 
the doctrine of "substantial performance," that is, a substantial performance by one party suffices 
to trigger the duty of performance of the other. Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 226-72, 287-88. 
Arguably, and possibly historically, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 634, 517 P.2d 
1168, 1180, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 716 (1974); J. MURRAY, supra note 114, at 8 183, the landlords' 
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would have two  alternative^.^'^ The tenant may either rescind the lease 
and regard it as terminated for purposes of performance, if not for pur- 
poses of remedies.280 Alternatively, the tenant may accept the land- 
lord's partial but deficient performance of allowing occupancy without 
supplying the services.281 
failure to provide services would not necessarily be viewed as a material breach, and hence not 
discharge the tenants from their performance obligation. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
# 268(2), 269,274(1) (1932); A. CORBIN, sup's note 104, at f j  946; Siegel,supra note 11, at 663-66, 
discussed supra note 273. For purposes of this discussion, however, it will be assumed that a 
landlord's failure to provide agreed services is a material breach. See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 
114,126 (W. Va. 1978); Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 41 1, 132 P.2d 
457 (1942). 
279. See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. C1. 1976); Grady-Gould 
Watershed Improvement Dist. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1978); Southern 
Pipe Coating Co. v. Spear & Wood Mfg. Co., 235 Ark. 1021, 363 S.W.2d 912 (1963); Rosenthal 
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); Dunn v. 
Steubing, 120 N.Y. 232, 24 N.E. 315 (1890); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633,263 S.E.2d 763 
(1980); Towery v. Carolina Dairy, 237 N.C. 544,375 S.E.2d 254 (1953); Longenecker v. Brommer, 
59 Wash. 2d 552,368 P.2d 900 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS fj§ 309 comments 
a-d, 313, 317 (1932). Seegeneral4 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 119, at fjfj 11-22(a), 11- 
37; A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at f j  946; supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
280. Seesupra note 279. Some contracts commentators argue that the word "cancel" is prefer- 
able to the word "rescind" in this context. See, e.8, J. CALAMARI & J. PERIL LO,^^^^^ note 119, at 
758; A. CORBIN, Supra note 104, at f j  1236; Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 282. The term "re- 
scind," however, is amply supported by usage, e.8, Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 143 A. 609 
(1928); Longenecker v. Brommer, 59 Wash. 2d 552, 368 P.2d 900 (1962), and will be used here. 
281. See authorities cited supra note 279; See also infra note 282. 
The last proposition assumes that the landlord has not repudiated the lease. See Wheeler v. 
Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS fj 317 (1932); A. 
CORBIN, supra note 104, at 8 954; supra note 119. The effect of a repudiation is to make a total 
breach of a partial breach and thereby to disable the other party from treating a total breach as 
partial in order to keep the contract alive for purposes of performance. In other words, under 
ordinary contract rules a repudiation by the landlord would deprive the tenant of the choice of not 
rescinding and accepting the deficient performance. As a matter of ordinary contract law, how- 
ever, it is not clear exactly how a partial repudiation should be treated. See A. C O R B I N , ~ ~ ~ ~  note 
104, at f j  972. A court in one case involving a partial repudiation refused to treat the partial 
repudiation as a total breach. See Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D. 460 (1886). The contract at 
issue in Miffing was, however, a lease and, for that reason, the case may not shed direct light on 
ordinary contract law. Moreover, as pointed out by Corbin in his extensive discussion of the case, 
the reasoning of the court, which required the other party's assent for a repudiation, was out of 
harmony with modem trends of the law of anticipatory repudiation. A. CORBIN, supra note 104, 
at 5 972. 
It would appear to make little sense to hold that landlords' anticipatory repudiations, even of a 
material part of their obligations, should oblige tenants to regard the breach as total, provided at 
least that there is no repudiation of the tenants' occupancy rights. Such a holding would deprive 
the tenant of the choice of treating the lease as on-going and remaining in possession. If ordinary 
contract law were to compel such result, and a literal reading of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS fjfj 250,253 (1981) and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS fjfj 317(2), 318(a) (1932), sug- 
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If the tenant rescinds the lease, the tenant's contractual obligation for 
future-accruing rents would of course be terminated.282 In this sense, 
under ordinary contract law, the rent promise would be dependent on 
the landlord's promise to supply services. But in electing to rescind the 
lease, the tenant would have to relinquish occupancy. The tenant could 
not, under ordinary contract law, rescind the lease as to the tenants rent 
obligation while keeping the lease alive for purposes of the landlord's 
occupancy obligation.283 If the tenant wishes to retain occupancy, then 
the tenant cannot rescind the l e a ~ e . 2 ~ ~  
When the tenant elects the second alternative, accepting the deficient 
performance which the landlord offers (occupancy without services), 
the tenant would be seen, under ordinary contract principles, to have 
waived the discharge for the tenant's performan~e.2~~ This "excusing 
the nonoccurrence of a condition" precedent286 can occur whenever a 
promisor's performance is conditioned on two or more other perform- 
- - 
gests that it may, then this is certainly one instance where the conveyance theory of leasing would 
be more advantageous to tenants than a pure contract theory. 
282. Coughlin v. Blair, 41 CaL 2d 587,262 P.2d 305 (1953); Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252,264 
N.W. 361 (1936); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $5 313(1), 397 (1932). 
283. Specialities Dev. Corp. v. C-0 Two Fire Equip. Co., 207 F.2d 753, 756 (3d Cir. 1953) 
("[Olne against whom a material breach is wmmittedmkt make up his mind what he is going to 
do about it."). See Venz v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 217 Iowa 662,251 N.W. 27 (1933); Rosenthal 
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $9 298,309,317(2) 
(1932); A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 755. 
284. Two recent construction contract cases seem to hold that when a subcontractor commits a 
material breach, the contractor may withhold progress payments even though the contractor con- 
tinues to accept the subcontractor's defective performance. See K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 223 
Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451 (1960); Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746 vex. Civ. App. 1977). Both of 
these cases, however, ignore the principle of "Acceptance as Excusing the Non-Occurrence of a 
Condition," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 246 (1981). See infra note 285 and text 
accompanying notes 285-91. Both appear therefore to be at odds per incuriam with ordinary 
contract law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAITS 246, illustration 1 (1981). The prin- 
ciple is easily overlooked even by persons keenly aware of it. Eg., Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 
285 n.174, 295-302. 
285. See supra note 283. "[A disappointed promisee] has power to recreate his former duty 
. . . nearly always by continuing to render his own performance or by receiving further perform- 
ance from the other party, with knowledge that the condition has not been performed!' A. 
CORBIN, supra note 104, at Q 755. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 246 (1981); 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 309 (1951). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 295- 
302. 
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CON- 
TRACTS § 298(1) (1932). The same principle may also be referred to as "waiver of the right of 
rescission,"see Longenecker v. Brommer, 59 Wash. 2d 552,368 P.2d 900 (1962), "waiver by con- 
tinuing to perform or accept performance," see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633,263 S.E.2d 763 
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ances and the promisor elects to accept a deficient performance rather 
than treat the deficiency as grounds for rescission.287 Of course, waiver 
of the discharge of performance should not constitute a waiver of the 
promise to perf0rm.2~~ The tenant thus could still recover contract 
damages for the failure to supply the ~er i ices .2~~ The crucial point is, 
however, that even if leases were treated as ordinary contracts, the 
promises in leases would nevertheless be independent-tenants in oc- 
(1980), or ''waiver of the material breach," see Cities Sent. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 
1306, 1313 n.16 (Ct. C1. 1976). 
287. See supra notes 279 & 283. Excuse of conditions precedent after their nonoccurrence 
should not be confwd with the generally discredited Sergeant Wiams '  Third Rule: "Where a 
covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both sides and breach of such covenant can be 
paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant,'' Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Sound 319,85 Eng. 
Rep. 449 (1669) (Reporter's Note). 
The acceptance of the deficient performance must be elected in order to have the effect of excus- 
ing the condition. If X promises to paint Y's house and then X quits after painting only two sides, 
Y will not be deemed to have accepted the deficient performance merely because he does not 
return X's paint and labor. See Cawley v. Weiner, 236 N.Y. 357, 140 N.E. 724 (1923); RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 298(2) (1932). 
A promisee has no choice but to accept a defective performance which is attached to his land or 
chattels. It may be said, of course, that the leasehold is "land or chattels" of the tenant so that, by 
parity of reasoning, the tenant's mere retention of possession should not be deemed an excuse of 
condition or waiver of discharge. This argument, however, presupposes that a lease is a convey- 
ance and not a mere contract, and such an argument would lead the analysis, if not the result, in 
an entirely different, and presumably quite traditional, direction. See RESTATEMENT OF CON- 
TRACTS §§ 309 illustration 1, 400 (1932). The suitability of analyzing the problem along these 
lines is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 296-313. 
In a contract calling for performance in installments, a less-than-substantial performance of an 
installment may justify the other party in withholding a payment without justifying declaring the 
contract at an end. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 269 (1932); A. CORBIN, sup'a note 104, 
at 708. Nevertheless, even if the delay in the landlord's performance of his service obligations 
became so great as to excuse the other party altogether from his duty, see RESTATEMENT OF CON- 
TRACTS § 269 comment a (1932), essentially a question of the materiality of the breach, id, the 
duty would still be subject to recreation under the principles referred to in note 285 supra. See 
RESTATEMENT OF  CONTRA^ $309 illustration 2 (1932). Therefore, the so-called independence 
of covenants in leases most emphatically cannot be regarded as simply a result of the doctrine of 
substantial performance, as has k n  alleged. See Siegel, supra note 11 at 664; supra note 273. 
288. See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. C1. 1976); Rosenthal 
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); Graham 
Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, sup'a note 
119, at 5 11-39; A CORBIN, supra note 104, at 8 766;see also Lydner v. S.S. Kresge Co., 329 Mich. 
359.45 N.W.2d 319 (1951); Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 
N.Y. 34,39 N.E. 7 (1894); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $8 317(2), 327 (1932); but see Richard 
Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945) (holding that by taking 
possession and paying the rent, the tenant waived the breach in relation to consequential damages 
(lost profits) but not for general damages). 
289. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
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cupancy would still be obligated to pay rent, despite the landlord's 
breach, just as they have been obligated under the traditional lines of 
cases.290 Only if the tenant rescinds based upon the landlord's mate- 
rial breach, that is, only if the tenant abandons occupancy, would ordi- 
nary contract law provide for extinguishment of the rent obligati~n.~~' 
Thus, in treating the tenant's rent obligation as effectively independ- 
ent of the landlord's promises, it appears that courts have been treating 
leases as ordinary contracts.292 Even the abandonment requirement for 
constructive coincides with ordinary contract rules. A dis- 
charge, based on the landlord's material breach of a contractually de- 
pendent obligation to pay rent, would require the tenant to relinquish 
occupancy just as the doctrine of constructive eviction. Constructive 
eviction is, in effect, the conveyance-theory counterpart of rescission 
290. The possibilities of counterclaim and recoupment of setoff, see infra note 297 and accom- 
panying text, make it unlikely that a landlord in material breach would ever actually recover the 
full rent from a properly represented tenant. Moreover, a tenant might anticipate the effects of 
these procedural devices by withholding all or part of the rents due and, as a result of the land- 
lord's breach, never have to pay--or in a real sense, owe-the full amount of rents provided for in 
the lease. See infra text accompanying notes 290-313. The fact remains, however, that based on 
ordiary contract law, a tenant who retains possession continues to be substantively liable for the 
full rent. The procedural dependence of the landlord's recovery on his own performance has 
nothing to do with the dependence of covenants as a substantive matter. 
Nor is such procedural dependence of liabilities in any way a unique feature of ordinary con- 
tract law. Such dependence of liabilities, through counterclaim, recoupment, or seto& appears to 
apply equally under the traditional dual-relationship conception of a lease as both a conlract and 
a conveyance. The matter is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 296-313. 
291. Corbii recognized the clumsiness of contract theories in dealing with problems of this 
type: "It is obvious that in cases in which a breach occurred in the course of performance ajust 
solution cannot be reached by sole dependence on the methodology of conditions, whether they be 
described as express, implied or constructive." A. CORBlN,.ypf(I note 104, at 163. This thoughtful 
reflection is in stark contrast to the facile insouciance with which some have tried to import half- 
truth contract notions into the law of landlord and tenant. 
292. This statement does not mean that, overall, leases are treated as ordinary contracts. If 
they were, for example, the landlord's obligation to allow occupancy would likewise be eventually 
- - 
excused by the tenit 's chronic failure to pay rent. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 85 274-76, 
269 comment a (1932); cf: Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 
1952); Harton v. Hildebrand, 230 Pa. 33579 A. 571 (191 1); Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 143 A. 
609 (1928). See also Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 290-95. To the contrary, under the convey- 
ance theory, the tenant is entitled to possession irrespective of payment of rent or other defaults. 
Seesupra text accompanying notes 72-76. This discrepancy is not surprising since the very reason 
for creating and the continuing effect of the conveyance theory of leasing is to enhance the protec- 
tion given to tenants in their possession over the protection which would be afforded by mere 
contractual interests. See supra note 34 & 36 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text. 
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after a material Both extinguish the rent obligation, but a 
failure to abandon possession prevents both constructive eviction and 
rescission for material breach.295 
3. Making Lease ObZ&atiom Efectively Dependent 
From the standpoint of policy, it hardly matters whether the so- 
called "independence of lease covenants" results from the operation of 
the conveyance theory, the rules of contract, or both. It nevertheless 
must disappoint the expectations of most tenants if the full obligation 
for rent continues even while the landlord is providing considerably 
less than the rent was supposed to pay for. Because purporting to treat 
leases as ordinary contracts does not provide a suitable analytical 
framework for making lease covenants dependent, the question arises 
294. See Bennett, supra note 275, at 63-73; Lasar, Landlordand Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1279 (1960). Seealso Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 
24 (1945). In Kulowilr, the court used an essentially contractual-analysis in discussing the land- 
lord's material breach of a lease covenant, but concluded with the assertion that a "constructive 
eviction" was the result of such breach. Id 
295. On a contract theory, any material breach, not merely those breaches which render the 
premises untenantable, should justify rescission. On the other hand, it is sometimes said that 
abandonment can be justified on a constructive eviction theory only if the landlord's defaults have 
resulted in untenantability. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972); 
Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 
Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932). See also Net Realty Holding Trust v. Nelson, 33 Conn. Super. 22, 
358 A.2d 365 (1976); First Wis. Trust Co. v. L. Wiemann Co., 93 Wis. 2d 258, 286 N.W.2d 360 
(1980). See general@ Bennett, supra note 275, at 63-73. This apparent lack of correspondency 
between rescission &d constructive eviction might, however, bk bf relatively little significance. 
Because occupancy of tenantable premises is the main advantage bargained for by the tenant, if 
the tenant receives this, everything eke is more or less incidental. Thus, no breach by the landlord 
would be material when the tenant still is in occupancy of tenantable premises. Nevertheless, 
there remains the possibility of finding material breaches, short of untenantability, in leases in 
which the services component is a comparatively large pan of the value promised to the tenant, 
especially if the landlord's breach is willful. See O.W. Grun Roofing Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 
S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 8s 241, 242 (1981); 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275(e) (1932). Thus, a purely contractual theory of leasing might 
expand somewhat the number of cases in which a tenant could abandon occupancy and thereby 
avoid the obligation for further rent. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 
2d 41 1, 132 P.2d 467 (1942) (landlord's breach of covenant not to lease nearby premises to com- 
petitor of tenant); University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914) (same); Hiatt Inv. 
Co. v. Buehler, 255 Mo. App. 151, 16 S.W.2d 219 (1929) (same). It should not, however, be 
overlooked that such expansion seems to work equally well within the traditional conveyance- 
cum-contract conception of leases. In any event, such considerations do not affect the main point 
of the present discussion: A purely contractual theory of leasing would not permit extinguishment 
of the tenant's rent obligation if the tenant retains possession, and thus a contract theory would 
not in that respect represent an advance over the traditional conveyance-cum-contract conception 
of leasing. 
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whether any analytical basis for such dependence can ever be found or 
whether the dependence of lease covenants must be treated as simply 
sui generis. Reflecting upon the larger principles of landlord-tenant 
law, it appears that a sui generis approach is not necessary. The depen- 
dency of lease obligations, in practical effect, can be rationalized ana- 
lytically by treating the lease as fundamentally a conveyance to the 
tenant of an interest in property. 
Even under the traditional lines of conveyance-theory cases, there 
have been ways for the tenant to avoid paying the full rent when the 
landlord fails to meet the obligations to the tenant. Remember that the 
tenant has an action against the landlord to recover damages for the 
landlord's Moreover, depending upon local practice, the 
tenant can also assert such rights by set-off, recoupment or counter- 
claim in the very action in which the landlord seeks to recover rent?97 
As a consequence, although the tenant may technically be obligated to 
pay the full rent irrespective of the landlord's breaches, the breaching 
landlord would ordinarily not, as a procedural matter, be. able to re- 
cover more than a net amount; that is, the overdue rent minus a deduc- 
tion for the damages sustained by the tenant.298 This procedural 
dependence of liabilities, even under the conveyance theory, detracts 
much from the substantive independence of covenants. 
Procedural dependence of liabilities alone does not, however, make 
the substantive independence of covenants entirely irrelevant. 
Problems can still arise if the tenant withholds rent and the breaching 
landlord responds by suing not for rent but for possession, by relying 
on a statute299 or a forfeiture provision3"0 in the lease. Even if the ten- 
ant counterclaimed for damages in such a suit, the result might be that 
296. See supra notes 267 & 288. 
297. Eg., Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 111 So. 10 (1926); Selz v. Stafford, 284 Ill. 610, 120 
N.E. 462 (1918); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 
34,39 N.E. 7 (1894); Cooke v. Soule, 56 N.Y. 420 (1874); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 Okla. 262,15 
P.2d 139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Teller v. 
McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (H'. Va. 1978). See also R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 114 11.60; 
Siegel, supra note 11, at 666-70; Annot., 28 A.L.R2d 446,476-79 (1953). It may occur, however, 
that a court, in its discretion, will defer trying the counterclaim, thereby resulting in an initial 
judgment against the tenant for the full rent. See Chelsea Hotel Co. v. Gelles, 129 N.J.L. 102,28 
A.2d 172 (1942). 
298. See supa note 297. 
299. See supra note 79. 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78. 
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the tenant would leave the court with a handful of money but no place 
to live. If, under the lease or an applicable statute, the tenant could not 
present offsetting claims in dispossession proceedings,301 the tenant 
might be evicted for failing to pay an amount that the landlord could 
never lawfully collect anyway. In ordering the eviction despite the 
landlord's breach and attendant liability, the court would be resolving 
only half the controversy. One would not expect that deciding only 
half a controversy would produce a just result. 
One way to avoid this problem is by resort to fictions. It has been 
held, for example, that there is no failure to pay rents when the tenant 
has "paid them by sustaining damages as the result of [the landlord's] 
failure to repairY302 Other cases, similar in approach, simply give sub- 
stantive significance to the procedural dependence of liabilities by fiat, 
holding that the tenant's rent obligations are deemed met, for purposes 
of forfeiture, once the tenant pays at least the actual net liability to the 
landlord.303 It would be satisfying, however, to find a rationale for al- 
lowing tenants in occupancy to withhold rents without resorting to 
fictions or fiats. Somewhat surprisingly, the traditional common-law 
conveyance conception of leasing transactions seems not merely to per- 
mit, but perhaps even to require the conclusion that the tenant's net 
301. See Interstate Restatements v. Halsa Corp., 300 A.2d 108 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson 
v. Haynes, 330 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959). Compare Reaume v. Brennan, 299 Mich. 305,300 N.W. 97 
(1941) with Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972). See also Siegel, supra 
note 11, at 668-70. There is no constitutional requirement that the tenant be permitted to present 
such offxtting claims in eviction proceedings. See Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
302. See Ashmore v. Hays, 159 Ark. 234,240,252 S.W. 11, 12 (1923); accord Jack Spring, Inc. 
v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). 
303. This method of dealing with a landlord's breaches does not seem at odds with the com- 
mon-law conception of reserved rents, that is, that rent is a resewed property right entitling the 
landlord to a portion of benefits which inure initially to the tenant and that such reserved benefits 
may be "recouped" from the tenant in the recuperatory action of debt. Seesupra text accompany- ing notes 57-71. The parties could always expressly make the tenant's obligation to pay the re- 
served rents subject to an express condition of performance by the landlord. Budget Way 
Cleaners & Laundry v. Simon, 311 P.2d 591 (Cal. App. 1957); 6 S. WILLISTON, mpra note 24, at 
9 890A. Additionally, the rationale may be given that, i n  modem circumstances, such a limitation 
on the recoverability of reserved rents must be implied in fact as the proper interpretation of the 
parties' reasonable expectations. See Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403,408,117 A. 882,884-85 (1922). 
The trouble with this implied contract theory is that it makes dependency of lease obligations 
vulnerable to express language of the lease prohibiting the tenant from suspending or withholding 
any part of the rent. If, however, the lease is regarded as a conveyance, an analytical basis exists 
for achieving the desired result despite such express language. See infra text accompanying notes 
304-13. 
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Kability to the landlord is all that must be paid 'for the tenant to retain 
possession. 
Because the traditional conception views the tenant as having a prop- 
erty right to possession,3@' enforcement of a forfeiture for nonpayment 
means that a property right, in this case .the tenant's estate, must be 
terminated. Forfeiture by a leasehold tenant is not, in other words, a 
case of merely refusing to enforce a contract at the behest of the party 
(the tenant) in default?05 This distinction between property rights and 
contract rights appears to be substantively important. The difference 
lies in the different treatment of express conditions on mere contractual 
rights when compared with the treatment of conditions306 on estates in 
land. The difference may be summarized as follows: An express condi- 
tion on a contractual right must be stricth or literally complied with or 
the contract right is forfeited?" By contrast, conditions on estates do 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56. 
305. As a contract matter, eviction for nonpayment of rent would be the concurrent-conditions 
counterpart of rent withholding for nonprovision of services or occupancy. Seesupra notes 269 & 
278 and accompanying text. Of course, in cases of rent withholding, the tenant's nonperformance 
is generally precipitated by the landlord's breach in failing to provide services, that is, both parties 
have at least partially failed to perform. In cases of bilateral breach, ordinary contract law would 
generally hold the fault to lie with the party @ere the landlord) who committed the first materinl 
breach. Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 285-86. As previously demonstrated, however, if the non- 
breaching party decides to continue accepting benefits under the partially breached contmct, that 
nonbreaching party waives the excuse for his own nonperformance; therefore, in a purely contrac- 
tual treatment of leases, the landlord's initial breach would be, for present purposes, irrelevant. 
See supra text accompanying notes 278-91. The tenant's nonpayment would count as the first 
material breach and, hence, the tenant's occupancy rights would be susceptible to forfeiture. 
306. Conditions on the leasehold estate must be express because conditions that the tenant 
perform are not implied in leases. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. Accordingly, the 
comparison in the text is between express conditions in contracts and express conditions on es- 
tates. 
Although the discussion in the text is in terms of "conditions" as distinguished from conditional 
lirnitations,seesupra note 76, the discussion should equally apply, under traditional rules, to relief 
of forfeitures occasioned under the conditional limitation device. See Erskine v. Board of Re- 
gents, 170 Neb. 660, 104 N.W.2d 285 (1961); Hare v. Elms, 1 Q.B. 604 (1893); Taylor v. Knight, 22 
Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725); 3 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5 1736 (14th ed. 1918); 2 W. 
WALSH, supra note 76, at § 193; buf see First NaPl Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, 
Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630,237 N.E.2d 868,290 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968); Dunham, Possibi/ipof Reverfer and 
Powers of Tenninafion-Prafernal or Identical Twim, 20 0. CHI. L. REV. 215, 225-29 (1953); 
Humbach, supra note 77, at 290-91. 
Statutory forfeiture may also be relieved. Such relief is ultimately a matter of statutory inter- 
pretation, however, and is therefore not directly germane to the common-law conception of leases 
or the analytical workings of the common law rules. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 394- 
99. 
307. Eg., Luttinger v. Rosen, 164 Conn. 45,316 A.2d 757 (1972); Metz v. HeAin, 235 Md. 550, 
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not generally result in forfeiture so long as either (1) there is substantial 
compliance with the condition,308 or (2) the failure of compliance, espe- 
cially in cases of payment conditions, is fully cornpensable and corn- 
p e n ~ a t e d . ~ ~ ~  The latter basis for relieving forfeitures of estates is, of 
course, merely a special case of substantial 
To be sure, courts dislike forfeitures of both estate and contract 
rights, and have resorted to a number of devices, such as strict interpre- 
201 A.2d 802 (1964) (a condition "means what it literally says"); Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188 
(1821); Kidervater v. Motorists Casualty Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (1938); 5 S. WILLIS- 
TON, Supra note 24, at 8 675; Ballantine, Forfeifure for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REV. 329, 
341-52 (1921). 
308. Eg., Lasiter v. Town of Oxford, 234 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1956); Stewart v. Weaver, 264 Ala. 
236, 87 So. 2d 548 (1956); Erskine v. Board of Regents, 170 Neb. 660, 104 N.W.2d 285 (1968); 
Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645,256 N.W. 501 (1934); Rose v. Hawley, 118 N.Y. 502,23 
N.E. 904 (1890); St. Clara College v. City of Madison, 250 Wi. 538,27 N.W.2d 745 (1947). See 
also Fowler v. Coates, 201 N.Y. 257,94 N.E. 987 (191 1). 
309. See, e.g., Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175,26 N.E. 319 (1891); Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 
358 (1857); Donnelly v. Eastes, 94 Wis. 390, 69 N.W. 157 (1896). See also cases cited infra note 
313 which, though involving lease forfeitures, invoke the estate character of leaseholds in reaching 
their results. Leaseholds are, of course, far more likely than freehold estates to carry forfeiture 
possibilities based upon conditions of payment because leaseholds normally are conveyed in ex- 
change for rents while freeholds are not. Therefore, it is to be expected that the rules concerning 
forfeitability of estates would most often find application in the leasehold context. 
Apparently, it was by easy analogy to the rules applicable to mortgages that equity began reliev- 
ing against payment-default forfeitures of leasehold estates. Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108 
(Ch. 1806); Northcote v. Duke, 27 Eng. Rep. 330 (Ch. 1765); Hack v. Leonard, 88 Eng. Rep. 335 
(Ch. 1724); see also Wafer v. Mocato, 88 Eng. Rep. 348 (Ch. 1724). The theory seems to have 
been that payment-default forfeitures were intended "as a mere security,"see Cedrom Coal Co. v. 
Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 39, 159 So. 225, 227 (1935); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at $3.96, and that the 
secured party received what he bargained for once the secured payment was made. Maginnis v. 
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wi. 385,394,88 N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901). Consonant with the view 
that payment-default forfeitures are intended as security, occasional dicta to the effect that relief is 
not available for willful defaults, e.8, Molyneaux v. Town House, 195 A.2d 744 @.C. Ct. App. 
1963); Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175,26 N.E. 319 (1891); but cf: Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358 
(1857), should probably not be read to mean anything more than that general equitable principles 
apply. Molyneaux v. Town House, 195 A.2d 744 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); see also Smith v. Warren 
Petroleum Corp., 126 A.2d 152 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956); Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service 
Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C. Mun. App. 1947). Rent withholding by a tenant as a response to 
landlord defau1ts;though a technical breach of the tenant's duties, hardly seems to be the sort of 
aggravated nonperformance to which the willful-default concept is directed. 
310. Interestingly, the treatment of express conditions on estates, though quite diierent from 
that of express contractual conditions, appears to be quite close to the treatment of constructive, 
implied-in-law conditions in contracts, namely, both are subject to a substantial performance test 
as contrasted with the literal compliance test applicable to express contractual conditions. See 
Wilson v. Galt, 18 Ill. 431, 437 (1857); supra note 278. For a striking comparison of express 
conditions on estates and express contractual conditions, see the very lease-like facts of the "li- 
cense" w e ,  Kama Rippa Music v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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tation, waiver, and estoppel, for avoiding f~rfeitures.~'' These avoid- 
ance devices obscure the contours of forfeiture enforceability overall 
and, hence, make it di£Ecult to compare directly the difference in treat- 
ment of express contractual conditions with conditions on estates. Nev- 
ertheless, the clear difference in the points of departure for the two 
kinds of conditions is illuminating. It seems fair to conclude that, on 
the whole, having a property right to possession almost certainly places 
the tenant in a significantly more favorable position with respect to for- 
feiture than if leases were viewed as purely contractual. That is, the 
tenant is better off as owner than as a mere promisee of occ~pancy.~ '~  
In view of the traditional reticence to enforce forfeitures of estates 
despite a degree of noncompliance with an express condition, it may 
be concluded that rent-withholding seldom if ever should ipso facto 
result in an eviction from possession. For even when the nonpayment 
of rent is expressly made an event of forfeiture under the lease, relief 
from the forfeiture would be available under traditional property prin- 
ciples if the tenant is willing to pay whatever net amount is due the 
311. See, e.8, Thomas J.  Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'g Co., 308 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962) 
(strict construction; contract); Board of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1949) (strict 
construction; estate); Southern Sur. Co. v. MacMillan Co., 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1932) (strict 
construction; contract); Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d 810 
(1950) (waiver and estoppet estate); Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908) (waiver, con- 
tract); Berryman v. Shumaker, 67 Tex. 312,3 S.W. 46, (1887) (waiver; estate); Santa Clara College 
v. City of Madison, 250 Wis. 538,27 N.W.2d 745 (1947) (strict construction; estate); Carop v City 
of Casper, 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263 (1950) (same). See Dunham, supra note 306, at 225-29; 
Goldstein, Rights of Entry and PossibiZties of Reverter as Devices to Resfrict the fie of h n d ,  54 
HARV. L. REV. 248 (1940). 
312. There appears to be some convergence of the treatment of contractual and estate condi- 
tions as courts move to mitigate, in a wider range of cases, the harshness of unambiguous but 
draconian express conditions in contracts. See, eg., Burger King Corp. v. Family Dining, 426 F. 
Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977); Wortman v. Jessen, 183 Neb. 274, 
159 N.W.2d 564 (1968). A broad reading of the Second Restatement of Contracts would make the 
convergence practically complete, assuming such a broad reading truly restates the law. The Re- 
statement would excuse any condition which is not "a material part of the agreed exchange" if the 
condition would cause "disproportionate forfeiture." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
3 229 (1981). By contrast, the F i t  Restatement would relieve only an "extreme [instead of a 
merely "disproportionate"] forfeiture or penalty." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS fj 302(a) (1932) 
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the treatment of express contractual conditions does not seem to 
have yet merged with the doctrine of substantial performance applicable to constructive, implied- 
in-law conditions. Kama Rippa Music v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975); Della 
Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Dev., 38 Md. App. 119, 13240,380 A.2d 627, 636-39 
11977); Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 267. Seesupra notes 278 & 310. Accordingly, forfeitures 
by express contractual conditions appear more likely to be enforced than forfeitures under express 
conditions on estates. 
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landl~rd.~ l3 
By viewing leases as conveyance-cum-contract transactions, and ap- 
plying the usual property, contract, and procedural principles to that 
traditional conception, it can be seen that: (1) the landlord in default 
cannot recover the full rent but only, at most, the amount of rent minus 
the damages sustained by the tenant, and (2) no forfeiture for nonpay- 
ment of the full rent should be enforced if payment by the tenant of all 
net liabilities is made, thus compensating the landlord in full. 
That is to say, under the traditional rules, lease obligations are effec- 
tively dependent. It is true that under the conveyance-cum-contract 
analysis, as under "purely" contractual analysis, the tenant's gross rent 
obligation would technically still be regarded as owing despite breaches 
by the landlord. This technical gross-rent obligation usually should 
have no ultimate significance, however, because only the net amount 
due after deduction of damages should be recoverable or the predicate 
of an enforceable forfeiture. Accordingly, to be consistent with the 
view that a lease is a conveyance and not merely an ordinary contract, 
the tenant's duty to pay rent must be held, as a practical matter, condi- 
tional on the performance by the landlord of the landlord's obligations. 
Holdings to the contrary appear to be a misapplication of the tradi- 
tional rules. 
The traditional common-law conception of leases as conveyances re- 
cently has been viewed by courts and commentators as an obstacle to 
reform.314 A contract theory of leasing has been suggested as prefera- 
ble.315 Within the common-law conception of leasing, however, three 
313. Eg., Humphrey v. Humphrey, 254 Ala. 395,48 So. 2d 424 (1950); Cedrom Coal Co. v. 
Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 159 So. 225 (1935); Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 115 A. 219 (1921); 
Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970); Famous Permanent Wave 
Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 Ill. App. 178, 23 N.E.2d 767 (1939); Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 
N.W. 95 (1922); Income Properties Inv. Co. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493, 284 P. 782 (1939); 1 
A.L.P. 5 3.96.   he matter of relief from forfeitures is discussed at length in Humbach, supra note 
77, at 266-88. 
A variation of the approach described in the text is for the tenant to seek an injunction against 
the landlord's maintenance of dispossession proceedings, pending resolution of the parties' money 
disputes. See Thompson-Houston Elcc. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34,39 
N.E. 7 (1894). 
314. See supra notes 11, 115-18 & 238 and text accompanying notes 11-14, 115-18,229-30 & 
268-69. 
315. See supra note 314. 
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important reforms can be understood and analytically accounted fore3I6 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that contract principles, at least 
ordinary contract principles, may be even less conducive to the desired 
reforms than the traditional conveyance-cum-contract conception.317 
Resort to a contract theory of leasing can be criticized for its flawed 
understanding of contract law and for its nonrecognition of certain fac- 
tual realities and interpretational consequences which would rational- 
ize results under the conveyance approach. Nevertheless, the question 
may be raised: What purpose is served in retaining an essentially con- 
veyance conception of leasing transactions? Why not simply regard 
leases as a type of contract and create for leases a special contract law 
which avoids application of certain ordinary contract rules that are an- 
tagonistic to modem policy objectives? 
To be sure, the choice of a conceptual paradigm for leases has no 
-real ontological foundation; it cannot be said that leases are "really" 
conveyances, in their essence, as distinguished from pure contracts. 
Nor can it be said that leases are really, in their essence, contracts. 
Leases have no verifiable reality of this sort, beyond what courts and 
legislatures choose to posit. 
The choice made by common-law courts, at least since the late 
fifteenth century, has been to conceive of leases as fundamentally con- 
veyances of property.318 The rationale for this choice-to better protect 
the tenant's possession319-was essentially functional. Further, this 
functional rationale for the conveyance conception still seems to be ap- 
plicable. No one suggests that the tenant's possessory right be demoted 
to an ordinary contract right terminable on payment of damages,320 
316. The three are: (i) limiting aggrieved landlords' recoveries by deduction of mitigatable 
damages, see Jupra text accompanying notes 212-18, (ii) making landlords responsible for the 
condition of residential premises, see supra text accompanying notes 225-61, and (iii) achieving 
practical dependence of lease obligations so as to permit rent withholding by a tenant in occu- 
pancy when the landlord defaults, see supra text accompanying notes 295-313. 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 201-12, 245-61 & 278-95. 
318. See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 23-56. 
319. see supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 32-37. 
320. Compare Golde Clothes Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E. 917 
(1923) (ejectment by tenant against landlord) with Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 
633 (1913) (license contract provides only a revocable permission) and RESTATEMENT OF PROP- 
ERTY § 519 comment b (1944) (same). 
It is the tenant's specifically enforceable superior claim to possession for a prcscribed duration 
that makes the t e n i t  an ''owner" and the iease a "conveyance." See supra note 15 and text 
accompanying notes 23-56. To extract the conveyance component and leave the lease a mere 
"continuous interchange of values," seesupa note 48, it seemingly would be necessary to w n h c  
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relatively unprotected as against third parties,321 and probably more 
susceptible to forfeiture for breach of express conditions.322 It is true 
that the protection of possession is not the urgent issue that it once was 
in landlord-tenant law, having been eclipsed by concerns more press- 
ing. This fact should be taken, however, as evidence of the success of 
the conveyance conception rather than of its 0bsolescence.3~~ 
Function thus remains the most compelling basis for viewing leases 
as conveyances. Strong arguments of convenience suggest that the law 
should provide the possibility of creating specifically enforceable tem- 
porary entitlements to the exclusive control of areas of land, volumes of 
space, and fixtures. There is a place for legal interests in land, space 
and fixtures which are less ephemeral than a license and less enduring 
than a fee simple. Leases are used to fill that place. 
Though leases function as devices for allocating control of land, 
space, and fixtures, they would not, of course, have to be conceived of 
as conveyances. A kind of contractually based, specifically enforcea- 
ble license could be devised which would serve the purposes and pro- 
vide the protections sought and achieved in leasing tran~actions.3~~ If 
the characteristics of such a device were assembled into a conception, 
however, it is doubtful that the result would be functionally distin- 
guishable from the common-law conception of conveyance. Insofar as 
leases are intended by their parties as devices for allocating exclusive 
control of land, space, and fixtures, courts will tend to carry out that 
intention. Thus, even if the conveyance model were rejected as a guide, 
its functional similarity to leasing, as a control allocating device, would 
cause it to be replicated, or nearly so, in point of fact. To deny that 
leases are conveyances in such circumstances, and to insist on labelling 
them as mere contracts, is 10gomachy.~~~ 
the dispossessed tenant to the substitutionary remedy of damages. For so long as the law commits 
itself to preserve the tenant's possession in specie, the landlord in leasing does more than just 
promise possession; possession~is conveyed. - 
321. See supra notes 32 & 96-98 and accompanying text. 
322. See supra text accompanying notes 304-12. 
323. The problems of habitability and securing landlords' services in general have received 
most of the recent attention, but courts are probably more alert than ever to preserve tenants' 
possession as well. See, e.8, R o b i n  v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cu. 1972) 
(seminal case on retaliatory eviction); Sy Jack Realty Co. v. Pergament Syosset Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 
449, 267 N.E.2d 462, 318 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1971) (preserving renewal rights); see also Humbach, 
supra note 77, at 274-333; supra text accompanying notes 295-313. 
324. See supra notes 30-31. 
325. See Jupra note 320. 
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A consistent conception of comparable interests and transactions is 
no mere aesthetic concern. It is practically indispensable to the even 
application and predictability of the law. It is true that the implications 
and dictates of conceptions should never supplant the exogenously de- 
termined purposes and policies of the law. Ultimately, only the latter 
are legitimate bases for decisions. Nevertheless, as embodiments of 
purpose and policy, conceptions have more than met the test of utility 
as convenient bases for deciding new cases falling within the law's in- 
terstices. Moreover, without the logical coherence which conceptions 
supply, law could be little more than a hodgepodge of ad hoc do's and 
don'ts. The taxonomic framework of conceptions and doctrine is prac- 
tically indispensable to the goal of treating similar cases similarly, dis- 
tinctive cases distinctively and, in general, achieving equality under the 
law. 
Thus, at an ontological level, the choice of conceptual paradigm, 
conveyance or contract, may be trivial. As a matter of practical meth- 
odology, however, it could hardly be more critical. To be sure, logical 
purity in law is not an end in itself; but chaos is the opposite of coher- 
ence and the enemy of justice. Therefore, the coherent development of 
law, especially in areas needing change, is more than worth the effort. 
Retaining the common-law conception of leasing, especially in cases 
introducing reform, remains the best way to assure the coherent devel- 
opment of law. 
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